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Abstract of the Dissertation  
Gender Analysis of Politics, Economics and Culture of Korean Reunification: 
                          Toward a Feminist Theological Foundation for Reunified Society 
By 
Jin Sung ChoLee 
Claremont Graduate University 2012 
 
In this study, I have focused on the process for an eventual reunification of North 
and South Korea. In this process, Korean political, economic, cultural and religious issues 
are necessarily present. My study focuses on cultural and religious factors.   
I adopt the German reunification as a case study. The German reunification 
process provides Koreans with lessons about the negative changes in the status of 
German women since the German reunification caused extreme instances of the loss of 
status and economic opportunity for women. German reunification shows that the 
unequal situation and systems in society were not only due to political positions. Strong 
religious factors deeply influenced the German mentality.  
A similar religion-factor is at work in North Korean society which is influenced 
by Confucianism and in South Korean society which is influenced by Confucianism and 
conservative Christianity. I argue that religion is one of the major factors in the political 
culture of Korea, and religion can either assist a fair and equal process for both women 
and men or it can in a biased way maintain a male-oriented form of reunification. 
Consequently, the cultural and religious factors in this process of reunification must 
  
 
 
include an equalization of women and men. This can only take place if Korean women 
are major participants in the entire reunification process.  
There is a serious need for a reunification theology which incorporate gender into 
Korean theology, thus providing a ‗feminist reunification theology.‘ A ‗feminist 
reunification theology‘ presents basic theological principles that will help build an 
egalitarian community. There are three important ways to include women‘s concern for 
true reunification: 1) The creation of an egalitarian community in work, family and 
society; 2) The restoration of humanity by healing love and forgiveness through the 
power of Cross; and 3) The need for religion to be reformed in which a women can be a 
co-leader in family, church and nation.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
  INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS 
In this study, my thesis focuses on the process for an eventual reunification of 
North and South Korea. In this process, Korean political, economic, cultural and religious 
issues are necessarily present. These issues, however, are only the over-arching 
background for my central position. My central position can be stated as follows. In the 
reunification process, cultural and religious factors play a central role. However, without 
women‘s perspectives and participation in rebuilding Korea, the reunification process 
will be seriously inadequate. Consequently, both the cultural and religious factors must 
include an equalization of women and men.  
I will use the data which took place during the reintegration of East and West 
Germany, since the German process occasioned a serious inequality of women, and this 
kind of equality should not be duplicated in the reunion of North and South Korea. I will 
also use data based on the Confucian culture which has dominated Korean society and 
which continues to do so in both North and South Korea. The Confucian culture has 
strongly emphasized the superiority of men. In the German situation, Christianity was 
played a major religious role, and in the Korean situation, Confucianism will be the major 
‗religious factor.‘  My thesis which centers on gender equality calls for an equal position 
for women based on cultural and religious factors which will assure that a reunited Korea 
will serve the entire population in a positive way. My feminist reunification theology is 
 2 
 
 
based on the Christian Bible and on the best aspects of the Confucian tradition. 
Consequently, the reunified Korean community will, hopefully, be a community of love 
and forgiveness and women will be co-builders of the new community.            
1. Statement of the problem 
 1) Feminist perspective in reunification discourse  
The Korean War and the subsequent demarcation made between North and South 
Korea impacted the lives of all Koreans. It has destroyed the economic foundation of 
Korean life; it has produced political chaos throughout the two Koreas; and many Korean 
families have been wounded through death, anger and fear. Korean women, specifically, 
have experienced a great portion of the wounds and damages inflicted by the 
consequences of war. Most women suffered severe poverty and yet they had to care for 
their families. The sexual assaults caused by the war were burdensome. War widows and 
the lives of Gijichon
1
 women‘s were gruesome.   
Based on this understanding, we could ask whether reunification will bring a new 
and better standard of life for Korean women. Presently, however, the dream of a new 
society in the reunified Korea leaves no room for women.  Most politicians and 
                                                          
1
 Gijichon women: Gijichon means villages which formed around foreign bases, but actually it means an 
entertainment village near the U.S. military bases with night clubs and entertainment facilities. Thus, the 
term Gijichon women means the women who worked as prostitutes in their poverty for sexually servicing 
the U.S. soldiers who resided in the area of Gijichon after the division. After liberation of Korea from Japan, 
many women entered in the area and were known as licensed prostitutes. From the 1970‘s onward, South 
Korea suffered from a lack of foreign currency, and therefore the women were praised by the South Korean 
government as industrial laborers earning U.S. dollars. Actually, their lives were very miserable due to 
confinement and unpaid wages; some women were even routinely beaten. Officially, the government 
blindly overlooked these women. Prostitution seemed to help the economic welfare of the country.  See 
Sungdae Newspaper, March 9, 2012, ―The Human Rights of Gijichon Women screened in Cynicism and 
Prejudice.‖ www.skknews.com  
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governors, theologians and researchers in the reunification processes are male. Also, in 
the discourse about reunification, there is little consideration for women. As we see in the 
cases of German and Yemen reunification, both countries have shown the difficulties of 
political, economic and social systems as far as women are concerned after reunification.
2
 
Especially, in the case of the German reunification, the process did not provide new 
opportunities for women. In contrast, German reunification caused further loss of status 
and economic opportunity for women.
3
 This fact leads us to the conclusion that Korean 
reunification could easily affect women in an adverse way, similar to that of Germany, 
because the positioning of women in the reunification process will be shaped by cultural 
considerations rather than political factors which should benefit all citizens, both male 
and female. German reunification shows that the unequal situation and systems in society 
were not only political but there was also a strong religion-factor which influence deeply 
the German mentality. A similar religion-factor is already at work in North Korean 
society which is under the influence of Confucianism and in South Korean society which 
is under the influence of both Confucianism and Christianity. Thus, I am arguing that 
religion is a major factor in the political culture of Korea, and religion can either assist a 
fair and equal process for both women and men or it can in a biased way maintain a male-
oriented form of reunification.   
Why did reunification in Germany impact women badly? There are two possible 
responses to this question. First, women did not participate in the unification process. 
                                                          
2
 Kim Kung Mi, ―Dokil Tongilgwa Gu Dongdokjiyeokui Yeosung [German reunification and the women 
who were in East Germany],‖ International Political Science Association Annual Conference Kit, 2000. 2. 
   
3
 Myra Marx Ferree, ―After the wall: Explaining the status of women in the former GDR,‖ Sociological 
Focus, Vol.28. No.1 (1995): 10.  
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Second, women‘s problems were postponed because national and social problems were 
the priority after reunification. However, interestingly enough, this was not only true in 
the case of Germany.  According to Jung Hyun-Back, human right violations of women 
and minority groups have been ignored easily in Korean history.
4
 This historical 
development means that equal opportunity cannot be given naturally. Women have to 
figure out what happened in history and they have to make sure that there is no repetition 
of past mistakes.  
Therefore, from the building of the discourse on reunification, women‘s 
perspectives and voices have to work together for the future of a reunified society. Park 
Sun-Kyung asserts that women have to be ―a Mother of a Nation,‖5 which means that 
women have to be a main body in the national problems.  Also, as I mentioned above, in 
the development of reunification and its theological factors, there were only male 
centered perspectives and not much study about a reunification theology from the 
perspective of women. Simply stated, women‘s voices and experiences were not 
involved. Therefore, there is a need to develop a feminist reunification theology which 
engages in the discourse of the role of women.  Furthermore, the reunification is not only 
a problem politically and geographically for there is a greater problem, namely, how 
wounded hearts can be reconciled as a community. Women‘s hearts and minds are good 
soil to bring about healing, and therefore women should be a major part of the 
reconstruction and rebuilding of one nation as a new family.  If women‘s perspectives 
                                                          
4
  Hyun- Back Jung, Bundangwa Yeosung guirlgo Tongilgwajeong [The Division: Women and The Process 
of Reunification],‖ Women Peace Academy, (2001, Spring): 6 -7.  I explain this more clearly in this 
dissertation, 110 – 111.   
  
5
 Sun-Kyung Park, Tongil Shinhakui Mirae [The Future of Reunification Theology] (Seoul: Four Seasons, 
1997),  212.  
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were involved in theology and politics, there would be more harmony and justice for the 
new society. Therefore, feminist perspective theology and politics are needed for the 
future society of Korea.  
2) Political and social perspective  
Korea has been divided since 1953 into two countries, North and South, and it 
remains the last divided country in the world today such as Ben Kremenak indicates that 
Korea‘s division is the only survived case of the cold war.6  Also, there is a unique 
characteristic since North Korea kept the country apart even after the collapse of Soviet 
communism.
7
 The division during these 60 years has caused many conflicts. North and 
South Korea are against each other and are both armed with nuclear weapons, large 
armies and sizeable defense budgets. This tension creates great difficulty in cooperating 
with each other along the 38th parallel. There are deep wounds left by the war 
8
 and both 
sides have thought of each other as enemies. Separated families have experienced many 
traumas called han. Still the people who left their families in the North wish to see them 
again before they die.  
Also, the division was used by South Korea dictatorships to keep their regimes 
under the National Security Law. The security of the nation was a priority during the fifty 
                                                          
6
 Ben Kremenak, Korea‟s Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours, and Dead Ends, Center for International 
and Security Studies Papers, v. 5 (Maryland School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College 
Park, May 1997), 75.    
 
7
 Kong-Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 11. 
 
8
See, Gyoung-Ho Jeong, ―Korean Christian Ethics for Peaceful Tongil between South and North Korea,‖ 
(Ph.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, 2002), 2. The Korean War was an disaster.245, 000 were killed, 
300,000 went missing and more than 330,000 were wounded. The number of noncombatants slaughtered 
was around 130,000 and about 85,000 were kidnapped to North Korea. Nearly 300.000 became widows 
and 100.000 children became orphans. The number of separated families was calculated as more 
than100.000.     
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years just after the division and it repressed democracy in South Korea. In North Korea, 
the effects of the law were even worse.  Min points out in detail how the politics of 
security worked in the South Korean society. First, the politics of security were used as a 
method to extend the existence of the dictatorial governments by oppressing all criticism. 
Thus, whenever the governing body needed it, the National Security Law was applied 
and in many ways it is still in operation today. Secondly, the politics of security 
overwhelmingly led ―the political wildness‖ in South Korea by considering every 
criticism of the government as criticism against the nation itself. The politics of security 
prevented both a positive and creative imagination of politics and a development of 
democracy. Also, welfare policies for the poor were considered as evidence of a 
communist mentality. Thirdly, the politics of security led South Korea to be a dependent 
country to the United States. South Korea‘s capitalism depended on the economy in the 
United States and American economics controlled South Korean economics. Thus, if the 
American government ordered the South Korean government to send Korean soldiers to 
war, the leaders of South Korean had to do so. Another interesting factor is seen in the 
fact that the U.S. generals were and still in many ways are the chief leaders of South 
Korean troops.
9
       
Moreover, a serious problem is the gap between the South Koreans in their 
perspective about the North. For example, when North Korea was suffering from 
starvation during the 1990s, helping them was an issue in South Korea even though South 
Korea had the problem which centered on the consumption of the South‘s surplus rice. 
                                                          
9
 Anselm Min, ―Hanbando Pyunghwawa Bokjisahoegeonseol [Peace and the construction of welfare 
society in Peninsula],‖ Korean Vision, First edition (2011): 38-39. 
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There is a different thinking about North Korea in the South; one group is very negative, 
and the other group is positive in helping and cooperating. This makes the division even 
greater. More than just finding ways to help and cooperate with each other, the major 
problem remains reunification.  
A question arises. Is there a possibility of peace and development in South Korea 
without reunification?
 10
  Without reunification, South Korea has already been able to 
keep peace and achieve economic prosperity. Furthermore, had there been no war, South 
Korea would have kept its status as the 12
th
 economic powerhouse. In 1961, the per 
capita GDP was $82.but in 2007, the per capita GDP had jumped to $20,000. Also, a 
peace treaty, which ensured the North Korean system, its economic exchanges and a 
mutual disarmament, would indeed contribute to keep the entire peninsula at peace. 
However, ―no one can deny that there is always uneasy peace and peace with the fire of 
war if there is no reunification‖: uneasy peace has the possibility to change to war 
anytime and therefore is an obstacle to the future of the nation.
11
 Because of all this, 
reunification is crucial for the development of national prosperity and security.  
Korean reunification is crucial for the development of national prosperity and 
international survival. Further examination of the initial causes of the division sheds 
greater light onto why reunification is necessary. This reason can be understood in two 
dimensions: external and internal. Externally, we have to see the complex international 
politics surrounding the Korean peninsula.  Dieter Dettke claims that ―almost half a 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., 35-36. 
 
11
 Ibid. 
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millennium of common history is a strong indicator that the division of the two Koreas is 
artificial and they should be together.‖12 The division of Korea was not based on Korea‘s 
self-determination but rather implemented by foreign forces. The division of Korea 
started with the 1945 Allied Victory in World War II ending thirty-six years of Japanese 
colonialism. Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-Sheok agreed that 
Japan should lose all territories and they affirmed Korea‘s freedom and independence at 
the Cairo Conference.
13
  Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, 
Soviet forces invaded Manchuria and moved into Korea following Joseph Stalin‘s 
agreement with Harry Truman during the Potsdam conference. U.S. leaders, however, 
worried that the whole peninsula might be occupied by the Soviet Union which may then 
lead to a Soviet occupation of Japan. The Soviet Union arrived in Korea before the U.S. 
forces, but they occupied only the northern part of the peninsula. The U.S. forces 
occupied the southern part, with the 38
th
 Parallel as the dividing line.
14
 Under this 
complication, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to administer Korea under a 
U.S. and Soviet Joint Commission. This agreement set the foundation for the Korean War 
in 1950, a conflict which is still without resolution sixty years later.  
The second reason for the Korean division was internal. Internally, it can be 
discussed in two ways: the ideological clash between the Korean communist group and 
                                                          
12
 Dieter Dettke, ―The Mellowing of North Korean Power: Lessons of Reconciliation and Unification for 
Korea from Germany,‖ in Korea Briefing, 2000-2001, eds. Kong-Dan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (Published 
in cooperation with the Sia Society, 2002), 185.  
 
13
 Bruce Cummings, Divided Korea: United Future? (New York, Foreign Policy Association, N.306, Spring, 
1995), 24-30.  
 
14
Ibid., 31-32. 
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the democratic group
15
 and the large difference between rich and poor at the end of the 
Chosun dynasty. First, after the colonization of Japan, Korea was divided into two 
ideological groups. One was the Korean communist group which was supported by the 
Soviet Union and the other was the democratic group which was supported by the United 
States. Their ideologies clashed and rejected each other. Thus, even though the Korean 
division was due to external factors directly, the internal reason has been ingrained in the 
minds of Koreans so that the nature of Koreans has the tendency to divide in to groups. 
 Second, according to Min, Korea was already a divided nation before the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union made Korea in two.
16
 One of the main internal reasons was the big 
difference between rich and poor. These were divided in two group systematically; 10 
percent of the nobility ruling group and 90 percent of the middle and low level group (a 
division which saw a minimum number of people in the ruling group and a majority of 
poor people in the remainder of the population). The difference of social position and 
wealth caused Han and anger for the poor people throughout the 19
th
 century on the 
Chosun peninsula. The War of Hong Kyung-Rae in 1812, The Revolt of Jesu in 1813, the 
uprising of farmers in Samnam province in 1862 and the War of Donghak in 1894 show 
the situation of the end of the Chosun dynasty. In the 19
th
 century of the Chosun 
hegemony, many poor people were filled with han and anger. Thus, Min states that the 
split between the ruling group and the poor people gave problem-causes to the foreign 
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powers for interfering in the Chosun dynasty; it started from China during the Chung 
dynasty and next Japan‘s advancing and finally Japan‘s occupying Korea.17   
After the colonization of Japan, Korea was divided into two ideologically 
different groups, as we saw above. One was the communist group which was supported 
by the Soviet Union and the other was the democratic group which was supported by the 
United States. Their ideologies clashed and they rejected each other. Thus, even though 
the Korean division was due to external factors directly, the internal reason has been 
ingrained in the minds of the Koreans so that the nature of Koreans has the tendency to 
divide into groups.     
For this reason, reunification is necessary in order for Korea to regain control over 
its own peninsula.  Thus, Anselm Min claims that ―the searching for the nation‘s 
autonomy and prosperity is the right stream of history which will overcome wounded 
hearts and ‗han‘ caused by the War and confrontations.‖18 Thus, solving the nation‘s 
division has been the clear task of Koreans since its division. Moreover, Korean 
reunification would mean the end of the Cold War which would then contribute to 
building peace in East Asia.
19
    
Economic reasons are very important to Korea in establishing a unified country in 
the economic global world today. Every world order is led by an economic power so, 
without economic power, national autonomy is threatened by other nations. Based on this 
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perspective, building a strong economic country is important for self-reliance and 
protecting national autonomy.  
From an economic perspective, the division of Korea has led to wasted resources 
in both countries as each country has used far too much money for war expenditures. For 
example, according to the Gukbang newspaper, January 4, 2010, South Korea‘s defense 
budget for 2010 was about 295 hundred million dollars, and North Korea‘s defense 
budget is estimated as four hundred million, and nine thousand dollars.
20
 If we count all 
of the money used for military security during the past fifty years, an enormous amount 
of money was wasted. All of this indicates that military expenses inhibited the national 
development of both countries because the military money was not used for productive 
purposes. Moreover, according to the Hanguk Newspaper, August 12, 2011, under the 
assumption of a reunification in 2030 and under the assumption that South Korea‘s 
defense budget could be estimated at 1.5% of the GDP of South Korea, the defense 
budget from 2022 to 2030 would be 5,853 hundred million dollars which is only South 
Korea‘s budget. This shows how much money could be saved and used it would for 
productive purposes rather than its use as the budget.
21
       
These expenditures lead to economic uneasiness and obstructed economic 
development due to the possibility of conflict. For example, the possibility of military 
conflict increases uneasiness for the economic activity of the country, and it restricts 
economic development which is sorely needed in many areas of Korean life. Moreover, 
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these situations restrict national profits which are important if a nation wishes to be a 
competitive power. That would only be possible if North and South Korea would 
cooperate with their creativity and labor.
22
 Therefore, if Korea is reunified, there will be 
positive economic effects. According to Jin Si- Won, the effort of unification of the South 
and North would contribute to a larger economy and Korea‘s economic development and 
also, the Korean nation‘s prosperity would multiply with mutual assistance in the 
combined economic system of South and North Korea.
23
 When North and South begin to 
cooperate together, their creativity, labor forces, and resources would engender a 
powerful international competitiveness, due to North Korea‘s cheap and excellent labor 
forces, development of mineral resources and the promotion of the expansion of domestic 
markets through the North.
24
  
Moreover, economic integration can contribute to easing North Korea‘s financial 
difficulties and revitalizing the North Korean economy. Improving mutual assistance and 
its effect can ease the tension between the two communities in military affairs and in 
diplomatic relations.  It has both benefits: economic benefits and peace-keeping benefits. 
Also, economic integration would stay the possibility of sudden collapse in North Korea 
and prevent an absorption form of reunification that would only yield larger economic 
burdens.
25
 According to Dettke, North Korea is in danger of collapse under the burden of 
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its own oppression, its military expenditure and its dysfunctional economy. In the case of 
collapse, South Korea would have to absorb the poverty and hunger of about 23 million 
people living in devastating conditions. 
26
 Therefore, economic integration is needed as 
the necessity for survival in today‘s unlimited economic global world.  
 Also, as Jin Si-Won indicates, reunification has a very important element in ‗geo-
political strategy‘ and ‗geo-economic strategy.‘ In these strategies, the central axis of the 
peninsula moves from an ocean power that connects America and Japan to Eurasia to a 
land power that connects China, Russia, East Asia and Europe. South Korea is 
disconnected from the rest of Eurasia because of the geographical restrictions posed by 
North Korea. Also, North Korea has postponed the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with America and Japan. The geographical position of Korea is very important in this 
sense and thus, reunification can satisfy the ‗geo-political, geo-economical‘ elements 
which could lead to Korea‘s peace and prosperity.27               
Reunification also has nationalistic reasons for its progress. North and South 
Koreans were one nation with the same blood, language, and culture after Silla unified 
the kingdom in 668 C.E. Therefore, Korea has been looked upon as sharing a same 
destiny. However, the current division and war has created barriers between the two and 
led to much hatred and contempt of each other as enemies. Another problem, according 
to Min, is that the division of Korea means the division of national power and the 
division of national competitiveness. This is true when there was a Korean separation 
brought about by Japan‘s attack in the late 19th century, and the same situation occurred 
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when the country was divided by the U.S.A and the Soviet Union in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Therefore, he claims that Koreans have to reunify and rediscover the 
nation‘s excellent creativeness, labor and resources to resolve the eventual united nation‘s 
han and to recover national pride in the international society. Thus, it avoids a Korea 
which lived in humiliation during the invasion of Japan and the subsequent division by 
foreign powers. Furthermore it would contribute to peace in East Asia.
28
  Therefore, 
reunification is a necessary task for Korean‘s who suffered with colonization and 
division.  This is the wider task of the Korean reunification today.        
 3) The phenomenon of Korean Church  
 Why is the Christian group‘s attitude about reunification important? In South 
Korea, about 29.2% of the population is Christian
29
  and the Christian influence in South 
Korean society is powerful in politics, economics and culture. Therefore, Christian 
attitudes about reunification are important in South Korean society. In this research, I will 
focus on the Korean Protestant perspectives and theologians among the Korean 
Christians.  Unfortunately, however, the majority of Korean churches do not see the 
importance of reunification; as a result, churches, before the 1990s, did not present 
strategies and directions for reunification. The majority of Christian Churches had hard 
times due to this ideological struggling; within the churches there is a conflict between 
two groups, progressives (called Jinbo) as Anti-Americanism, and conservatives (called 
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Bosu) as Anti-Communism and Nationalism.
30
 The minority (Jinbo) group protested 
against the politics of anti-communism, and fought for democracy and human rights. 
These Church leaders were represented as Minjung theologians or as a progressive clergy 
struggling with the industrial workers for their rights on the Protestant side and for peace 
and justice on the Catholic side. In contrast, the major churches in Protestantism simply 
reinforced their anti-communist theological positions. One of the reasons why this 
happened in Protestantism in South Korea was the influx of northern protestant who had 
fled to the South to avoid persecution by North communists.
31
 These Protestants from the 
north were basically anti-communist in their religious positions. Also, many clerics were 
either martyred or kidnapped and many churches were destroyed by the communists. 
Therefore, they thought that anti-communism is the correct way to keep their faith.  Thus, 
major Christian groups considered that the Jinbo group is trying to develop reunification 
theology and movements as ‗North Korean supporters.‘ Moreover, the Bosu groups 
(comprised of the major conservative evangelical Christianity) have the dream of 
absorption in the eventual unification of North Korea by the South. Thus they want to 
have the chance to expand Christianity into North Korea. Also, missionary groups in 
South Korea expect North Korea‘s collapse and are waiting for the chance to expand their 
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missions into North Korea without serious considering how the absorption-reunification 
would create more national problems for Korea.
32
  
Also, ‗the anti-communism‘ group created ‗the division theology‘ by the South 
Korean Christian leaders and ‗the division theology‘ became their belief that defeating 
communism is God‘s will. There was no room for talking about ‗peaceful reunification.‘ 
Nevertheless, there were voices that challenged ―the division theology,‖ creating ―the 
reunification theology.‖ The reunification theologians proclaimed that division is sin and 
peaceful reunification is God‘s will and the Korean churches‘ theological mission. ‗The 
division theology‘ and ‗the reunification theology‘ are still coexisting in the South Korean 
churches.
33
    
 
Luckily, the Bosu, conservative group, started to cooperate with the Jinbo group 
with the change of the international political situation, in the dissolution of the Cold War 
and the German reunification in 1990s. The Bosu group came to be interested in 
reunification in terms of national reconciliation and peace. This is a big change when it is 
compared to their ‗division theology.‘ North Korea‘s food shortage became a special 
motive to the Bosu group in joining the reunification movement. They could not turn 
away from the North Koreans‘ tragic conditions.  
                                                          
32
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Nevertheless, the anti-communist ideology is still alive in Korean society.
34
  With 
the win of the election in 2007 by the conservative forces, the new president Lee Myung 
Park has declared that the relation between the two Koreas would be re-examined. This 
means that he will not follow the achievements of the two preceding administrations 
(Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun). During Roh‘s administration, members of the 
―progressive Christianity,‖ and members of Protestant activists controlled the Ministry of 
Reunification. However, the conservative churches discredited the progressive Christian 
establishment and separated themselves from the liberal Korean National Council of 
Churches (KNCC). In1989, they re-formed themselves into an exclusive and conservative 
General Association of Korean Christian Churches (GAKCC).  More interesting aspect of 
the political change is that president Lee comes from a conservative congregation and he 
had gained support for his election from the GAKCC and the various New Right 
movements.
35
  These factors describe the dual-phenomenon of the South Korean 
churches as they operate today and these two churches will be active in any and every 
reunification plan. On this point of a dual church and the several forms of reunification, 
we can say that selecting the program for reunification is and will be a major challenge 
for the future of the Korean society generally and for the Christian churches particularly.  
 
2. Thesis  
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea has been divided into two 
countries remaining as the last divided country in the world today. Because of this 
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division and the war that precipitated it, North and South Koreans have come to view 
each other as enemies. This has caused deep wounds over the past 60 years since the 
cease- fire agreement. Since the division was imposed mainly by foreign powers, 
achieving reunification autonomously is important not only for Korea‘s peace but for 
East Asia as well.  
Given all of the above, how can we describe what the definition of reunification 
might be? Reunification is not only a political process but it is a very complex set of new 
relations which build on common historical, cultural and linguistic unity. Korean 
reunification would contribute to the Korean nation‘s prosperity and security. Only then 
would a reunified Korea give new opportunities and hope to all Koreans. We need to look 
at the political, social and economic consequences of reunification, especially examining 
the potential change in the status of women in the reunification process. Historically, 
women‘s roles often do not change after a nation‘s liberation and a people‘s 
emancipation. German reunification provides us with many lessons about the negative 
changes in the status of women.  The former Communist East Germany, for economic 
resources, had integrated women into their labor force and instituted a family policy that 
made motherhood compatible with full-time employment.
36
  In contrast to East Germany, 
West Germany, a Democratic capitalist country, had a family policy which supported 
motherhood (Mütterlichkeit; motherliness) but it was expensive and scarce.
37
 Thus, it was 
generally not helpful to employ women. The lives of West German women were 
influenced by the ideals of a traditional Christian gender role. One might ask: what 
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positive values did the reunification bring to the lives of German women?  We need to 
focus on East German women especially. In the reunification, East German women had 
experienced a ―Ruckfall,‖ a loss of status and economic opportunity after reunification. 
For example, in East Germany, the change from a socialist to a capitalist economy 
brought a major transformation into the market and this led to high unemployment. 40% 
of employment positions were lost between 1989 and 1992. Among them, according to 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit in 1993, 64% were women and only 36% were men.  
 Reunification means more than political and economic change because it brings 
about social, cultural and gender-role changes as well. Therefore, the German case leads 
us to the concern that reunification may in fact cause women to lose economic and social 
status. Why do women fare poorly in the reunification process? I argue that one of the 
main reasons for this can be found in the cultural and religious beliefs about gender. In 
German society, the conservative cultural and Christian patriarchal principles defined 
women‘s primary responsibility as motherhood which restricted them to domestic life. 
These principles handicapped women when economic and social resources were 
redistributed in the process of reunification. Men as rulers and heads of households 
claimed the primary position in contemporary economic and political society as 
breadwinners. The women‘s loss of economic opportunities affected also women‘s status 
in society and family.  
 Then, what shapes the ideology of North and South Koreans, when it comes to 
political, social and cultural systems? North Korean ideology depends on Marxism and 
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Leninism but Kim Il-Sung developed his own version, Juche
38
 ideology and North Korea 
granted women‘s equal opportunity from the founding of the country. However, research 
on North Korean women‘s position shows that women‘s status and the relationship 
between men and women are still ruled by Confucianism ideology. South Korea, a 
Democratic country, benefitted from economic development. The feminist movement in 
South Korea capitalized on this in order to improve women‘s economic and political 
status. However, South Korean society is also still controlled by Confucianism and 
patriarchal Christian cultural ideologies. These cultural and religious influences on both 
Koreas are likely to impact the status of women in the process of Korean reunification.   
After the division of Korea in 1953, South Korean Christian leaders created 
‗division theology.‘ ‗Division theology‘ considered an anti-communist ideology as 
‗God‘s will.‘ The opposition to the anticommunist ideology was even considered as a 
Christian heterodoxy.
39
 The ‗division theology‘ supported the South Korean 
government‘s ‗Bukjin Tongil‘ policy, namely, ―march North Korea and unify the 
fatherland.‖ 40  ‗Division theology‘ came out of the experience of persecution by the 
North Korean communists; Christians who were considered pro-American and anti-
communist were executed during the war which led to the massacre of innocent 
Christians.
41
 Also, five hundred church leaders were martyred or kidnapped and over a 
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thousand churches were destroyed or damaged.
42
  Thus, anti-communism believed that 
Bukjin Tongil was the only way to protect Korea. ‗Peaceful reunification‘ was not a 
possibility between the divided counties at the time because speaking about ‗peace‘ was 
prohibited by the South Korean government. In this period (1945 – 1972)43, there were 
voices challenging ‗division theology.‘ Their challenges and vision for the peaceful 
reunification were dangerous in the dark age of Korean dictatorships.  
 For this dissertation, among South Korean Christian theologians who challenge 
‗the division theology,‘ there are three significant Protestant reunification theologians, 
Han Sok-Hon, No Jong-Sun and Kim Yong-Bok. They define the division as ‗sin‘ 
according to the Bible and claim that the peaceful reunification is God‘s will. 
Furthermore, reunification can be achieved by national independence and minjung.  
However, even though they created the theological foundation for peaceful 
reunification, there was no place for women in their thinking about reunification. As we 
see in the case of German reunification, Korean reunification would be dangerous to 
women without women participation in the political process and without any 
consideration of the cultural and religious factors. Therefore, there is a need to 
incorporate gender into Korean Presbyterian theology and provide a ‗feminist 
reunification theology.‘  
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This is my thesis as I mentioned in the introduction that it focuses on the process 
for an eventual reunification of North and South Korea. I claim that in the reunification 
process, cultural and religious factors play a central role. Without women‘s perspectives 
and participation in rebuilding Korea, the reunification process will be seriously 
inadequate. Consequently, both the cultural and religious factors must include an 
equalization of women and men. It is my hope that this feminist reunification theology 
will contribute in building an egalitarian community in the process of Korean 
reunification and the Korean society.   
3. Outline of the Content  
In the introduction chapter, I will outline the relationships between reunification 
as a national task and the political and economic social and theological factors. This 
analysis will provide the framework for why feminist perspective is needed in the 
reunification discourse.    
In Chapter II, I will explain the theological framework. First of all, I will give an 
historical account of South Korean Christianity‘s attitudes about reunification. Secondly, 
I will explore the theological responses to Korean reunification by examining three 
theologians who are representative Protestant theologians. These three figures are 
fundamental to the establishment of Korean reunification theology. I will discuss their 
theologies and analyze them from a feminist theological perspective.  
In Chapter III, as a political framework for Korean Reunification, I will explore 
how Germany‘s reunification negatively impacted the lives of German women. This 
begins with an investigation of why the German women lost ground in reunification. 
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Then, I will explain how the position of women in reunification is shaped by cultural 
considerations, especially religion and attitudes toward gender. I will specifically 
investigate the role of religion. Then, I will describe how the division has impacted the 
lives of Korean women and I will claim the need for feminist perspective reunification 
politics.   
In Chapter IV, I will provide a cultural framework. I will explain how 
Confucianism effected Korean women‘s lives; North Korean women were influenced by 
Confucianism and South Korean women were influenced by Confucianism and 
Christianity.  
In Chapter V, I will propose a Christian feminist reunification theology in order to 
help build an egalitarian community. This community is based on a right interpretation of 
the Bible and is looking to build up a community. Also, the community will be built 
through the power of the cross: by restoration, love and forgiveness. Furthermore, this 
newly established community allows women to be co-builders.    
4. Methodology   
 In this study, my methodological approach will use theological, political, 
historical and analytical forms of method.  In order to understand the possible impact of 
reunification on Korean women, I will use Germany as a case study, examining how 
German reunification impacted women‘s lives. By comparing Korea to the case of 
Germany, we can understand the potential impact that reunification will have on Korean 
women.   
 24 
 
 
 With the German case study, I raise the question: why does reunification impact 
women differently, placing women in the loss of status in the process of reunification?  
To answer this, I claim that this loss of position is not only a result of political and 
economic factors but also a result of cultural and religious factors. Therefore, in this 
study, the theological, political, economic, social, historical, religious, and gendered 
factors will be examined together. This study looks at how each exclusive area impacts 
the others.  
 However, I raise the flowing questions, what are the standards which shape 
politics? How does politics influence women‘s economic lives?  What are the social side 
effects of unequal economic systems? I argue that these effects include discrimination 
based on gender, class, race, and religion which bring about marginalization and 
oppression in society. Therefore, the political, economic, cultural and religious 
approaches must function together.  
 The theological methodology will investigate why Korean reunification is a 
theological task and how the South Korean Christian theologies can address the problems 
of division and reunification. Also, through an examination of historical cases, 
specifically from Germany, I claim that the root cause of this phenomenon is cultural. 
Then, what are the greatest influences on the cultural factors? In the case of Germany, a 
major influence is religion, namely Christianity. Especially, in the matter of gender 
issues, the conservative and patriarchal Christian principles define women‘s primary 
responsibility as motherhood. These principles limit women‘s positions and opportunities 
in the economic and political field. The religious mind needs to be changed first for 
society to change since religion, as culture, is a root cause. Thus, based on this cultural 
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approach, I will investigate how the cultural religious factors influenced women‘s 
absence in the German reunification.    
  I will also examine the role of Confucianism in Korea. Even though North Korea 
is a communist country and even though they have granted women‘s position and 
opportunity from the founding of the country, Confucianism has been working on the 
lives and minds in a negative way. The influence of Confucianism and Christianity works 
in the same negative way in South Korea as well. Thus, it shows how Confucianism and 
Christianity have worked against the progress of women.   
Lastly, I will go back to the theological approach. As a theologian, I construct a 
theological view of reunification theology from a feminist perspective.  
5. Limitations 
 As a South Korean woman and an ordained Christian pastor, I am limited in terms 
of presenting a holistic perspective of the South Korean mind. In spite of this limited 
perspective, I believe that when all fields of study and all religious groups try to engage 
in the discourse of reunification theory and practice in their fields, the day of Korean 
reunification will be close at hand.  
 As a theologian and feminist, I am limited in my efforts to explore the political 
and economic information in the reunification. I am only interested in the political and 
economic factors. Thus, for the political and economic information, I rely heavily on the 
literature and analyses of Bruce Cumings, Anselm Min, Hong Ik-Pyo and Jin Si-Won. 
Even though I cannot approach the political and economic part with professionalism, I 
can see that feminist theology cannot be separated from politics, economics and the 
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cultural. The philosophy and theology of feminists have to influence all parts of study 
and life. Even though this research has limitations, the approach and connection needed 
for improving practical feminist theology.  
 The research about North Korean women‘s lives which are under the influence of 
Confucianism is helpful to build up a reunified community in order to better understand 
each other. However, North Korea is still a closed society. The country does not allow the 
outside world to investigate its situation; as a result, North Koreans are unable to connect 
with the outside in terms of travel, mass media, and books. Therefore, researching North 
Korean women‘s life is not easy. But with the effort of South Koreans who want to 
prepare for future reunification, there are archives of information speeches, novels, 
movies, and the testimony of North Korean defectors about North Korean life and its 
economic and political conditions.  A few books, dissertations, articles and testimonies 
were consulted for the research but these have limitations in describing the whole of 
North Korean women‘s life and politics.     
 Chapter one has provided a statement of my thesis, and also the fundamental 
reasons why a feminine voice is needed in the reunification process of North-South 
Korea. In Chapter Two, I will focus on the theological and religious issues involved in 
this dissertation. Religion and. more particularly, a women‘s approach to religion cannot 
be seen as a secondary factor in the reunification process. Rather, it is a major factor.  
Directly and indirectly it affects the entire movement for reunification. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A  THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
 
1. The Christian‟s attitudes and the importance of a theology toward 
Reunification  
 
South Korean churches have two different perspectives about North Korea and 
Korean reunification: there is the Bosu or conservative group on the one hand and there is 
the Jinbo or progressive group on the other hand. The majority of conservative 
evangelical Korean churches strongly reinforced ‗the anti-communist‘ mind and 
supported the South Korean government‘s ‗Bukjin Tongil‘ policy, namely, that the South 
Koreans should march into North Korea and unify the fatherland. 
44
  The ‗anti-
communist‘ mind produced ‗the division theology‘ through which they considered an 
anti-communist ideology as ‗God‘s will.‘ 
1) The Reason for the emerging „anticommunist Christianity‟ mind   
The majority of conservative evangelical Korean Christians (Bosu) have 
reinforced ―the anti-communist Christianity‖ mind and this only increased the South 
Korean anger toward the North and has established strong barriers against a peaceful 
reunification in the mind of Christians. They thought that building up ‗the anti-
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communist ideology‘ was a service to the nation and to God. What were the reasons for 
the emerging of anticommunist Christianity in South Korea? There are three historical 
reasons: the Cold War itself, the experiences of persecution by North Korean communists 
to Christians, and the support from the Rhee Seung-Man government.   
Firstly, according to Lee Man Yul‘s observation, the emergence of anti-
communism started from the confrontation of Christianity and the socialists after the 
Korean liberation from Japan. During the colonial period, Christians and socialists 
worked together and respected each other because of the persecution of Japan, even 
though they had different ways of thinking.
45
 The situation, however, was changed after 
liberation and the two sides were placed in a conflict relationship. The more basic reason 
for the confrontation, Lee states, was ―the Cold War.‖ The Cold War which was led by 
the United States of America and the Soviet Union resulted in the division of Korea. The 
emerging two different systems wanted to keep their systems and ideologies, but the 
efforts to preserve their systems brought about major conflicts with each other.
46
 Lee 
points out that ―the reason of conflict between Christianity and communism was that they 
were not aware how to overcome the Cold War order and the two systems did not meet 
together as regards the objectives of a nation.‖ 47 Furthermore, the political division 
produced the division of denominational and theological stances within the Korean 
Church. Some churches were conservative while others were progressive.  
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The influence of Western missionaries had a great influence on South Korea after 
the March 1
st
 movement. The Western missionaries had a strong asocial tendency and 
this attitude conflicted with many social movements which started at the same time. 
There were labor movements, peasant movements, and youth and student movements. 
Korean Christianity had focused on inward faith, church growth and private piety of soul 
salvation.
48
 Moreover, the asocial tendency of Christianity conflicted with communism, 
which began to be introduced in Korea and actually led to the killing of Christians in 
Manchuria. Because of this situation, missionaries defined communism as the center of 
anti-Christianity and these South Korean churches adopted anti-communist policies.
49
                            
The second reason was the experience of North Korean Christians who were 
persecuted by North Korean communists which began in the late 1940s and lasted during 
the Korean War. The Korean War resulted in many thousands of combatant and civilian 
deaths. Twenty-five percent of the North Korean population was killed. Christians who 
were considered pro-American and anti-Communist were executed during the war which 
led to a massacre of innocent Christians.
50
 Also, five hundred church leaders were 
martyred or kidnapped and a thousand churches were destroyed or damaged.
51
 Thus, 
many pastors and Christian leaders escaped to South Korea for religious freedom away 
from the persecution and they became the leaders of the South Korean church with its 
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anti-communist mindset. These situations made many Christians believe that all 
communists were atheists and evil. Thus, their stance was ―the confrontation between evil 
and angel.‖52  
The third reason was the support from Rhee Seung-Man government. Because of 
Rhee Seung-Man‘s election, who was the first president in South Korea (1945) and an 
elder in the Christian church, Christianity‘s attitude towards unification began to change. 
Many Christian groups developed a religious perspective, the goal of which was victory 
over communism. This perspective provided a stronger division in South Korea on the 
issue of reunification.
53
  Rhee held the view that the development of Korea based on the 
ideology of Christianity and on the support of the United States was the best democratic 
model.
54
 About fifty-percent of cabinet-level officials in the new government were 
Christian.
55
 In addition, the experience of horrendous terrors and disaster during the 
Korean War led to the belief that anti-communism was the only way to protect South 
Korea from North Korea.
56
 Thus, North Korea was considered as an enemy to defeat and 
―the theory of a forced unification‖ and ―the theory of an attack-on-North—Korea-
                                                          
52
 Ibid.  
 
53
 Gi-Youn Jang and Dong- Sun Kim, ―Minjok Tongilgwa Bukhansungyo [Reunification of Nation and the 
North Mission],‖ Missio Dei, 393. 
  
54
 Jong-Chol An, ―From Enlightenment to Anti-Communism: the Relationship between Syng-man Rhee 
and Christianity, 1912~1950,‖ Dongbang Hakji 145 (2009): 193. 
 
55
 Ibid,. 109. 
 
56
 Won-Jin Nam, ―A Study on Discourse of National Literature of South and North Koreas (1945-1962),‖ 
Bukhan Yeongu Hakhoe, 10, no. 1. (2006), 178-179. 
 
 31 
 
 
reunification‖57 prevailed. Any other way of reunification was considered as communist 
ideology.
58
  
The anti-communist ideology worked together in the churches and public 
education. I remember the public education program about anti-communism during my 
own elementary to high school years (1970‘s - 1980‘s). We learned that communists were 
cruel and that they killed a child whose name was Lee Seung–Bok because he shouted ―I 
dislike communists.‖ Moreover, whenever I enter the school, I saw a large sign in front of 
the school‘s building that read, ―I dislike communists.‖ Every year, a student competition 
was held for the best anti-communist posters and writings in which usually North Korean 
communists were described as red devils. We even thought that North Koreans had red 
colored skin. In contrast, the United States was considered as the savior of South Korea 
who would eventually defeat North Korean communists.  
With this mixing of the anti-communist ideology and the Christian mind, anti-
communism became a national characteristic with its Christian identity. Therefore, South 
Korean Christians supported the government and the theory of a North Korean attack-
reunification. North Korea was defined as the devil.
59
  Furthermore, this perspective 
engendered a silence by South Korean church leaders, so that they could not openly 
criticize the unethical activities of the South Korean government. Many Christian groups 
lost their prophetic voices and the church prospered under the name of national security.   
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However, the April 19 Revolution in 1960, and the May 16 Coup d‘états in 1961 
provided a chance to change Korean Christianity. The revolution of April 19 led to a new 
nationalism. A large number of Christians had accepted Rhee Seung-Man government‘s 
illegal election, but they began to realize the need for a stern self-examination. They 
addressed their responsibility as Christians to the national problems.
60
 Also, discussions 
about reunification were started by Christian leaders and pastors such as Kang Won-
Young, Park Sang-Jeung, and Mun Ik-Han.  
2)   The development of “division theology”  in the 1960s  
The anti-communist mindset in South Korean Christianity produced ―division 
theology.‖ This attitude of Christianity is shown in its history. When the ceasefire talks 
were held between the two Koreas, the Presbyterian conventions (in 1952 and 1953) 
clarified their position, stating that they opposed the cease-fire and expected 
reunification.
61
 Also, the Presbyterians expressed their dissatisfaction with the third 
agreement of the Joint Communiqué of 1972. This attitude led to the preference of the 
policy of an absorptive reunification in the 1980s.
62
 Therefore, the Korean Presbyterians 
had taken the position that war could be allowed for the elimination of communism and 
                                                          
60
 Man-Yul Lee, 393. 
 
61
 In-Chul Kang, ―Bundangwa Pyounghwae daehan kidokgyoui Yeiksajeok Chaekim [Christian‘s Historical 
Responsibility on the Division and Peace],‖ TC, 438 (June 1995): 25. 
 
62
 Bueng-Guan Kim, Korean Reunification and Jesus‟ Ethic: Guidance for Korean Churches, (Ph.D. diss., 
The Suthern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1997), 41.    
 
 33 
 
 
that his war could be called ―a sacred war,‖ or ―a war of the crusade.‖ 63  Korean 
Christianity supported Pukjin Tongilron
64
 and Myulkong Tongilron. 
65
       
Even though discussion of reunification was started by a few Christians, the main 
idea of the movement in the 1960s was anti-communism. Division theology maintained 
that the anti-communist stance reflected the ideology of ―God‘s will,‖ and that opposition 
to the anti-communist stance was ―heterodoxy.‖ Therefore, in their prayers they asked 
God to save and expand the churches to North Korea. They did not pray for the social 
responsibility of the churches in either the personal or the public level.
66
 As a result, 
many reunification theologians asserted that Christianity had to confess the sin which had 
developed through ―division theology.‖ The National Council of Churches in 
Korea
67
confessed that South Korean Christianity had sinned:  ―We confess that the 
Korean church‘s silence in the history of Korean division. The churches had turned away 
from the movement for national reunification which had been strong in the past, and that 
this rejection had justified the division.‖68  
3) The Emerging of reunification theology (1970s) 
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 The regime of Park Chung-Hee (1970s) changed the policy about North Korea
69
  
In his ―Declaration of Peace Reunification‖ on August 15, 1970; Park admitted that there 
were ―the two Koreas.‖ He abandoned ―the theory of the only one legal government.‖70  
On July 4
, 
1972, the South-North Cooperation Declaration 
71
 was a significant chance to 
change Christianity‘s attitude for reunification. Up to this date, the major group of 
Christians (a conservative group) did not overcome the anti-Communist logic and did not 
have plans and directions for reunification even though reunification discussions through 
the N.C.C. had tried to amend the anti-communism ideals.
72
 The South North 
Cooperation Declaration was the first meeting between the North and South after the 
division and the delegates formulated the North South Joint Agreement Document. The 
South North Cooperation Declaration gave both great joy and shocking news to the 
people of South Korean, but South Korean Christians suffered an even greater shock and 
embarrassment because of their attitude and theology concerning o the North.
73
  Even 
though many Korean Christians accepted the changing situation, they remained cautious 
about anti-communism.
74
 Park Hyeong Gyu criticized their Christian attitude on the basis 
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that the Christians had maintained too much toleration for Capitalism‘s contradictions 
and evil, and in contrast these same Christian had maintained a pathological aversion to 
the communist system.
75
     
 Another important incident in the 1970s was the emergence of various 
democratic movements in South Korean society. There was a strong dictatorship in the 
South Korean governments during span of 31 years (1961-1988).
76
  However, 
progressive Christians had accepted the idea that the reunification movement could be 
achieved through democratization. As a result, many of Christian reunification activists 
joined the democratization movements against the dictatorial governments.
77
 Thus, the 
Christian reunification movement‘s direction was ―First democratization and then 
reunification.‖ In this position, they tried to establish the basis for reunification an 
overcoming of internal problems, especially the problem of a dictatorship. The 
interconnection of reunification movements and democracy movements, however, was 
based solely on the progressive religious groups rather than on the entirety of the South 
Korean churches.  Thus, these two streams of theology in South Korea came together but 
only on the basis of a change in government in South Korea. 
Further problems, however, were also influential:  the exclusiveness between the 
two theologies rubbed against the sharing of the same religious confession, the sharing of 
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the same Bible, and the sharing of the same organizations. In all of this, they did not 
consider each other as partners. Rather than develop and explore new ways of theology 
through dialogues, they excluded each other leaving no room for listening to one another. 
Kim Dong Sun describes their attitude as follows: the progressive churches were sending 
cold smiles and they had a sense of superiority over and against the conservatives from 
the other side.
78
 Thus, exclusiveness created further restrictions to develop the 
reunification movement. 
79
  
4) Reunification as the churches‟ mission task  in the 1980s  
   The 1980s became a crucial time for Korean Christianity. In this period of 
years, reunification was discussed mutually in an earnest way. Until the late 1980s, the 
government had monopolized the problem of reunification, but several major Christian 
groups had formed research organizations to discuss the issue of reunification within the 
churches.
80
 Another important change in Korean Christianity involved the democratic 
movements and the reunification movements in a unity which could not be separated. The 
two movements were one. According to Lee Sam-Yul, these Korean Christians gave 
priority to the eventual democracy and social justice in South Korean society. These 
Christians fought against the Park Jung-Hee‘s dictatorship, but they also watched the 
establishment of a new dictatorship after the Park dictatorship. Therefore, these 
Christians realized that the basic reason for the reunification problems was the 
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government which was an undemocratic political system and an overbearing power 
structure. Also, they realized that the division of Korea had given enormous justification 
for the Korean dictatorship. 
81
   
Another change was that these Christians started to recognize that the problem of 
reunification was a mission task of the church.
82
 The Presbyterian Church in South Korea 
proclaimed on March 1980 that ―the reunification is the churches‘ mission task.‖ Also, 
they included the reunification problem in the article of Confession of Faith for the first 
time and added the view of a peaceful reunification as the South Korean Christian‘s 
commission. The most representative proclamation of reunification as the mission of the 
church was ―the Declaration of the Korean Christian Church for National Reunification 
and Peace‖ issued in February 1988 by the National Council of Churches in Korea 
(KNCC).
83
  Thus, in the 1980s the Christian reunification movement contributed to 
expand the discussion of reunification from churches to the general public and evoked 
international interests about the problem of Korea‘s division and reunification.84        
5) Cooperation between Jinbo (progressive group) and Bosu (conservative 
group) in the 1990s 
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The 1990s had new changes internationally such as the dissolution of the Cold 
War and German reunification in 1990. On the other hand, South Korea achieved its first 
Civilian government in 32 years. The civilian government proclaimed ―the agreement 
reunification‖ excluding ―the absorption reunification.‖85 A more interesting change in 
1990 was the conservative group‘s participation in the reunification movement.  The 
conservative churches started to be interested in the reunification movement for the 
national reconciliation and peace in Korea. Even though the conservative churches could 
not overcome ―division theology,‖ they gave serious attention to the problems of North 
Korea such as food shortages in order to prepare the document ―Preparing Nation‘s Peace 
and Reunification.‖ 86  
Also, the ‗Korean Christian Council for Peace and Reunification‘ found and 
continued to lead both the solidarity and the cooperation reunification movements. These 
became important steps toward the reunification of Korea by Korean Christians who now 
had the possibilities to overcome their denominations and theologies. Kim, Hyung-Suk 
87
 
describes the cooperation of both groups in the following way: ―The ‗direct mission 
absolutist‘ approach and ‗the reunification movement supremacist approach‖ coincided in 
one goal. They have now started to recognize the need to cooperate each other.‖ The 
conservative churches remained in the Cold War ideology and in the expectation of 
absorption-reunification, and in the ideology of an imperialistic mission. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
85
 Mun-Young Heo, ―Gidokgyo Tongilundong [Christian Reunification Movement],‖ Nation Reunification 
and Korean Christianity (Seoul: Korea Christian Student Press, 1994): 127.  
 
86
 Man-Yul Lee, 352.  
 
87
Hyeong-Seok Kim,  KookminDaily Newspaper, 2002, p.9, 18. 
 39 
 
 
they also recognized that both groups have to join together for one nation and peace in 
the world.  
In order to reach this union, the progressive churches have to accept the 
advantages of conservative churches, and also the conservative churches have to approve 
the Korean National Council of Churches in Korea which is a driving force in Korean 
society. Chae Su- Il suggests that because the reunification movement is a church mission 
task, the churches have to work together as a solidarity movement. Conservative groups 
also have to be in the reunification movement with all the advantages brought to it by the 
conservative denominations, the evangelical movements of North Korea, and the 
rebuilding movement of the North Korean church itself. 
88
 The Korean Christians, 
therefore, need to be awakened to the national task and have a more historical view. 
Korea‘s theological debates for reunification have to be developed even more strongly in 
the many and varied Korean Churches. Reunification theology must strongly influence 
and change South Korean society.   
 
2.  Korean theological responses for the principles of reunification.   
As we saw above, South Korean Christianity had started research about Korean 
Reunification in the 1980s. Reunification theology focused on overcoming Korea‘s 
division and defined the division as hindering the establishment of God‘s peace in 
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history.
89
 Therefore, the goal of reunification theology was to make one Korean 
community primarily through peace. Furthermore, the reunification of Korea is not the 
final goal for it must continue to accomplish unity between North and South Korea.
90
 It is 
not to be a one-sided victory since its goal is to make one community without mistrust 
and hostility. Also, it is expected that there will be a peaceful community as the fruit of 
justice.
91
      
There are many reunification theologians in South Korea. Among them, I have 
selected three representatives who are representative Protestant theologians: Ham Sok-
Hon, No Jong-Son and Kim Yong-Bock. Their works will be discussed, compared, and 
also examined from the feminist perspective.  
1) Ham Sok – Hon‟s reunification theology 92 (1916 – 1989)  
Ham is considered one of Asia‘s important voices for democracy and non-
violence. He was nominated two times for the Nobel Peace Prize (1979 and 1985) and 
often called the ―Gandhi of Korea,‖ ―a Korean prophet‖ or ―a voice in the desert.‖  He 
lived as a religious philosopher and writer all his life and was known as a non-church-
goer and even as a Quaker.  He was incarcerated nine times because he criticized the 
regimes. We find his criticism in the following areas: his anti-Japanese colonialism, his 
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refusing to cooperate with the interim Soviet military government, and his anti-regime 
and pro-democracy stances and activities with his monthly magazine the ―Voices of the 
People (Ssial).‖93 His challenges were made during the regimes of Lee Seung-man, Park 
Chung-Hee, and Chun Doo-Hwan.       
Ham‘s main idea of reunification can be characterized as peace, 94 national 
independence, Minjung,
95
 humanitarianism, and democracy. As a theologian, 
philosopher, and activist, he defines the national division as a sin with and through a 
biblical understanding. Thus, he points out that Korea needs repentance and confession 
for the national division is not just a misfortune but it is also a sin. For national 
independence and peaceful reunification, he asserts the inspiring Minjung‘s 
enlightenment in which the Minjung have responsibility for the reunification. 
96
  Ham did 
not separate religion and politics because both are necessary for healing the national 
problem; he defines it as ―the sanctification of politics and the secularization of 
religion.‖97 Let us consider each of his main issues. 
 PEACE: Peaceful reunification is one of the central ideas of Ham. He defines 
peace as neither a notion nor a theory but as a way of life. Thus, peace, for him, is ―a 
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religious belief‖ and ―an historical obligation.‖ Peace is not a matter of possibility but a 
decisive command from history.
98
 In the 1970s, he suggested that the pacifist way was a 
more specific and reliable way toward reunification. This is due to three steps: a non-
aggression pact, a mutual arms reduction and adopting peace as a national policy.  For 
him, one of the ways of peace is non-violence rather than war and the use of military 
forces. He suggests that non-violence is not only speaking with the mouth but also 
showing with action that we are ready to sacrifice ourselves.
99
 Thus, ―if I really want to 
keep non-violence, I can overcome the social evil with love because it can change the 
heart of the evildoer.‖100 As the first step for Koreans who develop an awakening to their 
mission of peaceful reunification, he asserts ―put your sword down and think hard.‖ Thus, 
according to him, non-violence and peaceful reunification of the only ways of 
reunification, and when Minjung of North and South are enlightened and demand it, 
peaceful reunification is possible.   
 As we see in Korean history, the biggest barrier to Korean reunification is the 
separated mind. Thus, Ham suggests a way to remedy the tragic experience of Korea 
caused by the division and Ham shows us how North and South Korea might accept each 
other even though they still consider each other enemies. He explains this with the 
relation between Jesus and Judas. After Judas betrayed Jesus, he remains a friend of 
Jesus. Thus, Ham says that when Judas opens his mind and could talk with Jesus about 
the Kingdom of God and of hell, salvation will come into this world. Therefore, Jesus is 
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still imploring us to love our enemies even though most Christians have failed to answer 
that call.
101
 Ham indicates that the way of peace is an open dialogue with enemies. Thus, 
dialogue with other people and with enemies is one of the ways of reconciliation. Ham 
stressed that working together is the way to defeat evil.
102
 Pacifism, for Ham, is the most 
important value of Korean reunification.        
 NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE: Ham named Korea ―The Queen of Suffering,‖ 
or ―The World‘s Sewage‖ or ―The Garbage Can.‖103 These nicknames by Ham show us 
Korea‘s past painful history and the reasons for it. His titles express the pain of division 
and the reason why North and South Korea have to be one.  
Is it not a pity when the armies of the two counties arrived, one in the north and 
one in the south, how splendid it would have been if we had come out with a firm 
declaration, ‗We are one nation, one people,‘ When the two got together to draw a 
line across our unscarred middle, the one thrust on us communism, the other 
capitalism, we should have said, ‗We are neither communist nor capitalist.‘ We 
are one nation. We know only of being, not two. We would sooner die as one than 
live as two.
104
    
 
Ham also indicates the internal reason for the division. Even though the foreign 
powers were largely responsible, Korea also bears responsibility. Furthermore, he asserts 
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that reunification is like a revolution. It is neither just a people‘s revolution nor just a 
social one. ―It is a larger and deeper and newer revolution.‖105     
Ham realized that the Korean War and the division were due to the lack of 
national independence. Thus, reunification should be made by Koreans who should not 
make the mistake again of relying on foreign powers which benefited from the division. 
Also, he asserts that social reform and democracy are impossible without national 
independence.  In achieving national independence, anti-Communism – that is the South 
Korean government‘s policy and the South Korean Churches‘ faith – is a serious obstacle 
to reunification.  So, Ham seeks for ‗neutral reunification‘ which transcends the 
ideologies of both the North and the South. Reunification is only possible when there is 
one mind, even though political systems are different. When the country adopts a high-
minded position, it is possible to forgive old enemies unconditionally. Moreover, Ham 
uses comprehensive peace and warns against statism. He wrote: ―Reunification aims 
ultimately at a revolution eradicating statism and in this sense it is greater and deeper 
than a national revolution.‖106  Thus, he calls for an anti-statism which is beyond one‘s 
country‘s benefit and looks for the other country‘s benefits.  For Ham, reunification 
means world peace beyond nationalism. He says that ―only the whole is holy and if the 
whole is one, it is also clean and holy, but if it is separated from the whole, it is dirty.‖107          
 MINJUNG: Ham criticizes North and South politicians‘ greed for maintaining 
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their power through the division. In 1971, he strongly criticized the regime of Park which 
monopolized the reunification discussion for its own benefit. ―Using reunification for 
dictatorship power is a sin.‖108 Thus, Ham stresses that true reunification is possible only 
through the Minjung‘s enlightenment and participation. Thus, Minjung have to be a 
subject to solve the division. He emphasizes Minjung‟s pain and oppression by the 
division within political ideology and he defines Minjung as victims in the political 
situation. To him, the ultimate goal of his reunification is the liberation of the Minjung 
from foreign and internal political powers. Therefore, the real revolution is not caused by 
North and South leaders but by Minjung and it is the Minjung‘s responsibility also.  He 
reminds us what a real reunification is. Ham says that ―true reunification should not be 
only a political reunification between the North and South governments, but reunification 
between the whole people of North and South Korea.‖109   
Peace, national independence and Minjung are interrelated in his idea of 
reunification. Furthermore, Ham insists that whenever the power of religious truth is 
applied in the world, the social, political and economic problems, both international and 
national, can be solved. 
110
 Ham insisted on peaceful, non-violent reunification during his 
whole life and emphasized that real reunification can be achieved through Minjung‟s 
enlightenment on the ways in which can build national independence. His peaceful 
reunification ideology influenced many South Korean leaders who worried about the 
                                                          
108
 Ham, Ibid., 12. 
 
109
 Ibid., 201. 
 
110
 Young Sang Han, ―What is the Most Extreme Luxury,‖ Quakers: The Voice of Ham Sok-Hon (Seoul 
Monthly Meeting of Society of Friends, 1983), p. 1 
 
 46 
 
 
nation‘s future111 and his ideology became the base of reunification theology. Also, 
Ham‘s idea of peace, national independence and Minjung became the foundation and key 
idea of the North and South Korea in the July 4
th
 Joint Communiqué in 1972.    
2) No Jong-Son‟s reunification theology (1945 -   ) 
No Jong–Son is a second representative of reunification theology. He is an 
expert member on the reunification committee of the NCCK and an ordained pastor in the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK).   He has taught at Yensei University in Korea. He 
studied at Yensei University, Harvard Divinity School, Yale Divinity School and Union 
Theological Seminary (Ph. D). Among his publications are: Toward a Theology of 
Reunification (1988), Liberating God for the Minjung (1994), and The Third War: 
Christian Social Ethics (2000)  
No‘s idea of reunification can be categorized in four sections; sin, jubilee as an 
inclusive world view, liberative nationalism, and political realism.  
 SIN: Like Ham, No understands the division of Korea as sin. He states this in an 
unconditional way: ―Separation is a theological sin.‖ 112 He explains it from a biblical 
perspective because the separation between God and human is caused by human sin. The 
first separation in the Bible is the separation between Adam and God. The problem was 
not whether Adam ate the apple or not but the first human action of sin came from 
Adam‘s division with God. Therefore, the separated situation between God and human is 
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sin.
113
 Also, he defines that the separation /division is a situation against God‘s will. 
God‘s will is shown in the separated Israel situation and God proclaims that ―they will 
become one in my hand.‖ (Ezekiel 37:19). Therefore, division and separation are seen as 
sin. As God saves and cleans Israel, God and Israel are rebuilding their interrelationship 
and they are entering into unity.
114
 Therefore, division is the first step of sin and against 
God‘s will, and sin becomes more intense when there is a ―continuation of a sinful 
state.‖115 Therefore, for him, reunification is the recovery of a relationship with God, and 
this is also the will of God.  
No claims that the problem of hindering Korean reunification is the ―division–
oriented mindset.‖116 The division-oriented mindset has influenced the way of life of 
almost all Koreans. Thus, without overcoming the division-oriented mindset and not 
thinking as one nation and as sisters and brothers, Koreans cannot expect to experience 
reunification. Thus, he reminds Koreans that they share the same blood ties, same history, 
same natural heritages and same language.
117
 Furthermore, many South Korean churches 
had supported division theology and therefore their beliefs have reinforced the unending 
division in Korea. Thus, the Korean churches have to agree with the July 4
th
 Joint 
Statement in which ―transcending the thought, ideas and institutions, we as a nation have 
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to promote national unity.‖ Furthermore,‖ No asserts, ―the Korean churches have to 
consider autonomy and peaceful reunification.‖118  
 LIBERATIVE NATIONALISM: No stresses the ideological liberation from 
foreign ideology and criticizes Western theology. He claims that North and South 
Koreans were brainwashed by the outside political and economic ideologies of 
Capitalism and Communism. The dependency on foreign ideology led to accepting 
division ideology; he calls it ―Collective pediatric neurosis.‖ When an adult befalls 
mental illness it brings neurosis. The adult cannot give mature judgments and actions, 
and so he/she tries to depend on a strong dictator person. Also, with the dictator‘s support, 
the Koreans claim to find their peace in obedience to the dictator. Furthermore, the two 
Koreas try to relieve anxiety by depending on strong foreign armed forces and military 
cultures. No calls this: ―Subordinate consciousness and subordinate behavior.‖ The adult 
with neurosis is a symbol of the South Korean, for such adults are not independent and so 
they have fears and anxieties because of their feelings of dependence on foreign 
powers.
119
 Therefore, cleansing the Western ideology is a fundamental factor in achieving 
salvation for Korean Christianity.   
Also, he criticizes first-world theologies which protected the colonial, imperial 
and neo – colonial powers politically, economically and culturally. A spiritual foundation 
of national independence is possible through the liberation from foreign ideologies and 
through a strong criticism of Western theologies.  However, his national independence is 
not nationalism in a negative sense. His idea of liberative nationalism is liberation of the 
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third world from the oppression of the first world imperialism. Therefore, his 
reunification theology has the same meaning as liberation from oppression in both the 
colonized and in the neo-colonized situation.
120
  
Thus, he searches for a good world view which needs to be an inclusive 
worldview for reunification which can be shared by both North and South. He finds this 
world view in ‗the command of Jubilee‘ which is mentioned in Leviticus chapter 25 and 
Luke chapter 4: 18-19. He defines the command of Jubilee as ‗An Order of God‘ in the 
Bible, and he believes that the world view which accepts the command of Jubilee could 
be an axis which overcomes division ideology.
 121
 Also, because western theology and the 
Korean churches have supported division theology, his claim goes even further. If 
theology ignores or rejects the reunification, it is anti-reunification theology and therefore 
it is imperial ―idolatry theology.‖ Anti-reunification theology destroys the image of God 
and human dignity in the world.
122
                  
 POLITICAL REALISM:123 No Jung Sun considers liberation of the oppressed 
people of the third world and the Korean national independence as essential elements of 
peace. Therefore, he asserts that peace is based on political realism. National 
independence and security are important elements to him because the Korean division by 
foreign powers brought the loss of independence and has broken the peace in Korea and 
Eastern Asia. Therefore, to maintain national independence, military force is necessary. 
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No says that ―Military cooperation between North and South armies, in terms of a 
reunification army, is necessary for a common security of North and South Korea against 
the armed intervention by a foreign power.‖124  No criticizes the nuclear superpowers and 
asks for a reduction in nuclear weapons. However, he says that ―if nuclear armament is 
the inevitable way for national independence and security of North Korea I am willing to 
support its nuclear armament.‘125 His understanding of non-violence is dependent on the 
perspective of strategic concepts rather than the perspective of a theological and ethical 
dimension.
126
 Therefore, his idea of peace is based on political realism.  
No‘s reunification theology starts with a strong criticism of first-world theologies 
which allowed the first-world‘s desire to expand their power to other countries. Thus, 
recovering from the Western ideology (North Korea–Marxism, South Korea-Capitalism) 
is the first step for Korean national independence. Also, the third-world minded people 
need to be liberated from first-world oppressive nationalism.  
No‘s political realism, which is different from that of Ham, is his unique strategy 
among reunification theologians. But the interesting part of his political realism is that he 
distinguishes the meaning of violence from two perspectives; the first-world and the 
third-world. If the first-world‘s violence could be translated as conquest or exploitation, 
the third-world‘s victory could be translated as liberation from evil structures. Therefore, 
he understands that the meaning of violence is different from the circumstances of the 
third-world in ethical terms.       
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3) Kim Yong-Bock‟s reunification theology (1938 -    ) 
Kim Yong-Bok is a Minjung and reunification theologian.  He was formerly Co-
Director for Research at the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development 
in Seoul, Korea. He participated in the reunification movement of the NCCK. He is a 
pastor in the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK). He studied in Yensei University in 
Korea and Princeton Seminary where he received his Ph.D in 1974. He edited a book, 
Minjung Theology (1981) and drafted ―The 1988 Reunification Declaration.‖   Kim‘s 
idea of reunification is divided into four parts: Jubilee, Minjung, nation, and peace, all of 
which are based on socio-economic security.   
 JUBILEE: For Kim, the biblical term, Jubilee, is a key concept in reunification 
theology, and he suggested the concept of Jubilee as a key idea in the discussions on 
peace and reunification at a KCCK consultation (or conference) in 1987. Jubilee (See 
Leviticus 25:8-55) means a period of emancipation; lost lands return to the original 
owners, debts are cancelled, and slaves are liberated. Jubilee is the next year which 
follows seven Sabbaticals years. Thus it is a fiftieth year from the first Sabbatical year. 
Kim understands that the Sabbatical year is a time when God‘s sovereignty is concretized 
in the history of God‘s people. Thus, Jubilee is a liberation year in which God‘s 
community is freed from division and conflict and structures which wound reality. By 
God‘ sovereign recovery, the land and house go back to the original cultivator through 
God‘s own distribution for life‘s safety and prosperity.127 Kim finds the peace agreement 
for North and South Korea reunification in Ezekiel 37:15-28, in which there is a peace 
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agreement for North-South Israel. This jubilee year is a reunification between God and 
God‘s people: ―I will make a covenant of peace with them; it will be an everlasting 
covenant, I will establish them and increase their numbers, and I will put my sanctuary 
among them forever‖ (Ezekiel37:26, NIV). This peace agreement is understood in its 
connection with the ruling of empire because it is an agreement for the nations who are 
under an empire and are suffering from their rule. Thus, the agreement of peace is 
connected with the vision of peace found in Isaiah 11:1-9 which is the shalom of the 
messianic kingdom.
128
  The Jubilee is the year of an act of God‘s people to keep the 
agreement between God‘s people and God himself. The Israelites are called on to trust in 
God‘s sovereignty. In doing so, they will overcome social and economic conflicts which 
are made by empirical and political powers, and they will recover a covenantal 
community of peace.
129
  Therefore, jubilee means to Korea a recovering of God‘s people 
in a community which is integrated as a whole and avoids division and conflict. 
130
  
 MINJUNG: Kim considers the Minjung as ‗the subject of history.‘  The Minjung 
are oppressed in Korean history politically and economically, and they are not visible in 
historical explanations. They are unable to create their own destiny. Therefore, Kim 
asserts that the Minjung‘s subjectivity has to be recovered and stand as ‗a permanent 
reality within history‘ and as ‗the protagonist in the historical drama.‘131 Kim criticizes 
every power-centered political messianism which tries to explain theologically the 
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Minjung‘s historical subjectivity. Thus, the Minjung‘s struggle for liberation has to be 
explained in the light of the Messianic Kingdom, which is not a utopian dream but is a 
struggle of the poor and oppressed people in the history.
132
   
 PEACE WHICH IS BASED ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC SECURITY: Kim‘s 
understanding of peace which is based on biblical concepts is not only the absence of war 
but also a realization of social justice. Kim explains that true peace with justice is related 
to the socio–economic security of the Minjung. He regards anti- communism and military 
logic as a false form of peace-ideology.  Therefore, he suggests, as an example, that the 
tithe can be a religious model of economic democracy. With a repentance of economic 
greed, the tithe can be considered as a religious ―alternative economic system‖ for the 
poor, weak and oppressed. 
133
   
Kim suggests: ―A national diakonia134 movement‖135 as a new step for Korea‘s 
reunification if it contains socio-economic security for all.  In globalizing the economic 
world, according to Kim, the problem of economics will be an important issue and North 
Korea‘s economic crisis is a systemic problem of North Korea. Also, as we have seen in 
the German reunification, an absorption-reunification provided an enormous burden for 
the West German economy and the Germans are still struggling with it. Thus, if South 
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Korea reunifies with North Korea in a top and bottom relationship in economy, South 
Korea‘s burden of economic and North Korea‘s sacrifice would be huge. Therefore, Kim 
claims that people (Minjung) have to be a subject of social and economic problems in 
preparing reunification and practice the social diakonia for serving others. Peace, Kim 
says, is a national common prosperity which is the meaning of biblical shalom. Military 
conflicts have to be changed to economic cooperation. Only a national economic mutual 
prosperity will be a true foundation of peace.  
Therefore, Kim claims that the South Korean churches have to switch-over the 
reunification movement from the dimension of politics to the economic-sharing 
movements.  The collapse of North Korean economy is not only North Korea‘s loss but 
also a loss for the whole Korea. It would be an enormous burden to the South Korean 
economy. Thus, Kim suggests that South Korean has to support the North Korea private 
economy. Kim warns one more thing namely that the economic supports have to coincide 
with the way of serving and sharing rather than an economic attack or economic 
subordination.
136
    
 To Kim, Jubilee is a key concept of reunification theology and a model of Korean 
reunification just as the jubilee is an axis to overcome the divine ideology to No Jung 
Sun. Also, Kim focuses on Minjung as a subject of reunification. He emphasizes that true 
peace is based on the socio-economic security of Minjung. Economic security is an 
important concept to Kim. He asserts that only a national economic mutual prosperity can 
be a true foundation of peace in the peninsula. Therefore, he suggests concrete economic 
support for North Korea.       
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4) Analyzing Korean Reunification Theology and the need for Feminist 
perspective Theology 
A. The common  and different ideas in reunification theology   
 These three reunification theologians are responding to the situation of a divided 
Korea and look for a peaceful resolution for building a community. They have common 
ideas in many perspectives. 
 First, the peace concept is the basic ground and goal for the three theologians and 
the way of peaceful reunification is based on the biblical perspective. So, they reject war 
and the use of military force in the process of reunification and define the division as sin. 
But in the way of armament, only No asserts political realism, Ham and Kim asserts non-
violence and disarmament. No asserts the need for armaments to respond to the armed 
intervention of foreign powers. Thus, he supports nuclear armament if it is the inevitable 
way for national independence.  
 Second, the three theologians assert anti-statism. Even though they look to the 
nation‘s independence for the recovery of division and conflict, they warn the dangers of 
nationalism and ask goes beyond the nationalism for the whole world. It is different from 
an exclusive nationalism or racism.   
 Third, they assert that the Minjung have to be the subject of history. They explain 
that true reunification is not gained by political reunification but only through 
reunification between the whole people of North and South Korea. Therefore, they assert 
the Minjung‟s enlightenment and participation in the reunification movement.  
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 Fourth, the three theologians do not separated religion and politics. They think 
that theology have to contribute to build peaceful and justice world. Thus, reunification 
theology has to contribute to building a reunified nation. Their theology is not confined to 
churches, but they apply their theology to the Korean nation and to world as well. Thus, 
they criticize dictatorships in Korea and also first world imperial and neo-colonialism.       
 If we see each theologian‘s characteristics, Ham could be defined as a founder of 
the reunification theology. Ham influenced No and Kim in their basic ideas for the 
reunification theology in the concept of peaceful reunification, national independence, 
anti-statism and Minjung as a subject of history. Ham‘s theology and philosophy 
influenced later reunification theologians and Minjung theologians. Also, Ham‘s need for 
national independence deeply influenced the Korean people and theologians. But whereas 
No and Kim are Presbyterian Church pastors, Ham joined a ‗non-church movement‘ 
which against institutionalized churches resulted in a spiritual hierarchy, and a renewal of 
Christian faith movement which aroused in Japan by Uchimura Kanzo. Thus, Even 
though Ham based on Christian thought and Quaker, he does not follow orthodox 
Christian doctrine for he believes that all religions are basically one religion,
137
 whereas 
No and Kim stresses the Korean churches‘ ideology and practice in the process of 
reunification of Korea.      
 As we see above, No‘s ‗political realism‘ is different from the other theologians. 
No accepts the necessity of the military force for keeping national independence for a 
while, Ham and Kim assert non-violence and pacifism. Also, as his characteristic of 
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reunification theology, No focuses on the national independence through liberation from 
foreign ideology and criticizes Western theology.    
 Kim‘s characteristic of reunification theology is his developing peaceful 
reunification in the concept of Jubilee. He connects the meaning between the 
reunification of Korea and the Jubilee in the Old Testament, looking for the community 
of God‘s people in aiming toward a realization of a national jubilee. It is the way of 
reconciliation and integration as a whole. The socio-economic security of the Minjung is 
his unique contribution.  
B.  Critique from the feminist perspective 
 These theologians have powerfully contributed to building a peaceful 
reunification theology in the conflicted and divided peninsula. Moreover, their views 
have strengthened national independence and reunification for the Minjung. Nevertheless, 
the reunification theology of all three theologians has serious limitations.  
 THERE ARE NO VOICES OF WOMEN:  Even though they consider the 
Minjung who are weak, poor and alienated and oppressed as a subject of history, they 
missed the recognition that women are the most oppressed. There were no women among 
the Minjung. Reunification theology is struggling for the oppressed but there are no 
voices of women. Historically, there was no liberation of women and no solving the 
problems of women‘s oppression and alienation when women participated in the 
liberation movement. I can see the contradiction in my own experience. I joined the 
Korean democracy movement in my college days, and we fought for democracy against 
the dictatorships of South Korea. We had hoped to build a peaceful and equal society and 
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criticized their hierarchy of systems and authoritarianism. However, when the male 
activists came back home, they were still patriarchal, and hierarchical masters to their 
wives. At that time, I realized that the democratic movement alone cannot bring women‘s 
equality in to society. Therefore, women‘s voices have to be raised in any social 
movement. 
 THERE ARE LASCKS OF CONCERN ABOUT WOMEN‟S ISSUES: Also, 
Ham‘s interview and the writing about his wife show us his lack of concern about 
women‘s issues and accepting women‘s traditional virtue as good. Ham had an interview 
with Han Young Sang which was published in Seoul Monthly Meeting of Society of 
Friends in 1983. Han Young Sang had several questions. Among them were two questions 
about women. The first question was whether the Women‘s Rights Movement was first 
introduced by the Quakers? But Ham‘s answer about that was very short and he went 
directly to explaining the Quakers.
138
 During the interview, Han Young Sang had another 
question about women and also about the Quaker movement for the equality of men and 
women. However, Ham had the same response; without answering the question, he 
passed into a different answer.
139
 Even though he had many concerns about peace, 
reunification, national independence and Minjung, he had no interest in women‘s unequal 
problems and the movement of the Quakers for the rights of women. It may look like he 
included women in the Minjung‘s problem but actually he had no concern about women.  
Ham‘s attitude about women‘s problems is also seen in his writings about his 
wife, after she passed away. He laments his wife‘s death and her suffering for their 
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family with the title, ―I am Nothing.‖140 In his essay, he honors her self-sacrifice, 
obedience and patience during her life. He regrets that he never considered his wife as a 
companion in his beliefs. In the lifetime of Ham, women‘s virtues were the same as those 
of his wife. Men could not consider a wife or women as a companion. I think, however, 
that Ham had a different ideology and had opened his mind to the oppressed and unjust 
world.  
 THEY DID NOT OVERCOME A PATRUARCHAL IDOELOGY:  
Nevertheless, he did not overcome a patriarchal ideology in his real life and in his 
relationship with his wife. He laments her suffering life and honors her, but he does not 
have any awakening why her nick-name was ―I am nothing‖; it means that she never 
claimed anything for herself. He did not raised questions why his wife‘s life had been 
filled with suffering, and why she had considered herself as nothing. Also, if he did not 
think of his wife as a companion, it is a contradiction because he was an enlightened 
person for the Minjung. Nevertheless, he did not make any effort to help her find her 
identity and status. He just felt thanks to her after her illness and death. After his wife was 
ill with Parkinson‘s disease, he felt guilt and thought that ―God punished her, in order to 
punish me.‖141 He did not realize exactly why he was guilty about her. He just had shame 
for her difficult life while married to him. He considered her suffering in a personal 
dimension but not in a cultural social perspective. As I mentioned, Ham‘s attitude toward 
his wife was natural at the time and there would be no blame to him because all men 
lived in the same way. Thus, even though the reunification theologians included 
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enlightenment, even though male leaders opened their eyes to the social injustice and 
oppression, they were not aware of the gender issue, namely, what was happening to 
one‘s family, one‘s wife and one‘s daughters.    
 I understand why the male theologians could not be aware the suffering and 
oppression of women because we can easily forget and lose attention to outsider‘s 
experience. As we see, many theologies raised their theological themes from their 
experience of the personal and from the temporal context. The male theologians did not 
have a woman‘s experiences. I do not blame their non recognition about the suffering of 
women. However, I think that they have to listen, learn and try to sympathize from and 
with women‘s experiences and they should cry because theology has to provide an 
answer to the issues and theologies which affect women. Furthermore, male theologians 
have to make room for women in order that their theology can find completion.                    
 There will be real peace and equality when the feminist discourse is included in 
reunification theology. True reunification is not only the integration of political, 
economic and social systems but it means a true peaceful society in which there is no 
oppression, exploitation and injustice. Therefore, reunification theology has to be 
developed with women‘s voices (experience) and women‘s characteristics to build a 
peaceful community.   
 In this chapter, I have presented the theological aspects which affect the 
reunification process for North-South Korea. We have seen the views of three major 
Korean theologians who have written on this subject. Their work is of tremendous value 
for the process of reunification. Nonetheless, there was and remains an insufficient 
theological component which deals with the question of a woman‘s voice and presence 
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throughout the reunification process. I will deal with this in the final chapter. In the next 
chapter, Chapter Three, we will study a major component of the reunification process, 
namely, a review of a similar reunification process which took place in Germany and 
how the strengths and the failures of the German process can be of major assistance to the 
Korean process of reunification. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
 Chapter Three is divided into two sections. In the first section, I will present in 
some detail the reunification of Germany which began in 1990 after forty years of 
separation between East Germany and West Germany. The German process of 
reunification provides the Korean leaders and people with a major case study on the 
reunification process from a political, social, economic, familial, and religious point of 
view.  
The second section of Chapter Three centers on a reunification of North Korea 
and South Korea which hopefully will take place in the near future. The Korean process 
of unification can learn much from a profound study of the German situation, as regards 
both what to do and as regards what not to do. In both cases, the German reunification 
and the Korean reunification, I will focus the material at least in the conclusion of each 
section on the need for women to be vitally part of reunification, which is the focus of my 
thesis.     
 In presenting the German case study of reunification, I will go into detail, since in 
these details we find out what historically was beneficial and helpful and what was not 
beneficial or helpful. In each of the points of view - political, social, economic, familial 
and religious - I will indicate strongly the presence or non-presence of women and how 
politically, socially, economically, and in a family way, German woman-both East 
German and West German- suffered from their exclusion from the reunification process. 
I will try to be as straightforward as possible and I will remain focused on the German 
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issues. Only in the second section of Chapter Three will I make cross-references to the 
Korean and German reunification efforts.   
 There is an abundance of statistical material which is needed to verify the 
situation of German reunification that accounts for the non-inclusion of the presence of 
women. It is, in my view, necessary to present this abundance of statistical material since 
the statistics provide the basis for the German reunification as a unique and important 
case study for the Korean reunification.   
1. The Reunification of East and West Germany: a Case Study 
1) Germany family policies and East German women in the united Germany 
 The forty-year separation of East and West Germany made many powerful 
differences in the lives of the German people, especially in the socio-economic systems. 
Prior to reunification, there were major and opposing policies on family life.  Among 
these differences, the relation of women to the labor force and to social domestic 
positions was different. The East Germany government tried to integrate women into 
their labor force and made motherhood compatible with full-time employment. In the 
East German constitution, the government guaranteed the equal rights of women when it 
states: ―Men and women have equal rights and the same legal standing in all areas of 
social, state and personal life. Advancement of women, especially in the professional 
qualification, is a task for state and society.‖142 Article 20, paragraph 3, indicates that the 
state supports motherhood with a guaranteed pregnancy leave, maternity leave, and both 
material and financial support at birth, as well as children‘s allowances and special 
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medical care needs. Furthermore, the government guaranteed equal positions to married 
women with children and unmarried women.
143
  Even though the government 
guaranteed women‘s equal rights, according to Trzxinski, East German women 
experienced equality in employment but a lack of equality in the home and political 
areas.
144
 Nevertheless, the government of East Germany aimed to encourage women‘s 
full integration in to the labor market.   
 
The West German government also guaranteed equality for their citizens, stating 
that everyone is equal regardless of gender. The government also prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of gender.
145
 The family policy in West Germany encouraged 
nuclear families to gear their private lives and they did this by offering special benefits 
for family life. However, in West Germany the family policy had a strong gender division: 
namely, one person is the breadwinner, and the second parent when necessary leaves the 
labor force to raise children. In West Germany women‘s lives were influenced by the 
ideals of the conservative Christian Democratic Party
146
 and consequently the traditional 
female role in a family was emphasized more strongly than in East Germany.
147
   
The above definitions of the roles for women show that in both East and West 
Germany‘s and later in the United Germany there were different approaches. In East 
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Germany, women were considered in two ways: as workers in production and mothers in 
reproduction.
148
 In contrast, West Germany and the United Germany considered women 
as dependent on men for their economic–well-being. The husband was seen as the head 
of the household and therefore he was the overseer of the wife, and women were the 
mothers.
149
      
In the former East Germany, all women participated in work systematically and 
contributed to their nation; equal rights were better than those of West Germany.
150
 
Therefore, at the time of the reunification, the former East German women‘s lives were 
challenged socially and culturally by the changes in the systems of comprehensive 
welfare benefits for family and women.
151
 This change has been called ―three steps back 
for women.‖152 That means the reunified German policy had failed to provide a true 
equality of women. East German women have been called by Lynn Duggan the ―losers‖ 
of unification.
153
 His classification is valid since East German women lost their desire to 
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be only mother but were unable to find new jobs even though many professional women 
earned more than they did in the old system. Jone Johnson Lewis explains the East 
German women‘s suffering in the reunification process as follows:  
Some reports indicated that two-thirds of working women in the new 
Lander were unemployed, and many more were turned into part-time workers as a 
result of privatization, downsizing of firms, and elimination of support services 
such as day-care and after-school centers. To improve their prospects for 
employment, some women in eastern Germany reportedly were resorting to 
sterilization, one of the factors contributing to the steep decline in births from 
twelve per 1,000 in 1989 to 5.3 per 1,000 in 1993.
154
 
  
2) The Political, Economic, and Social Situations of East and West German 
women. 
A. Women‟s employment situations  
In East Germany, the equality of women and men within the socialist society was 
part of the official goal and an essential ideological aspect of communism. Also, in this 
economic situation, the women‘s labor force was needed urgently. In contrast, in West 
Germany a mother‘s employment was not desirable when the children were born before 
the mother was 25 years old.
155
 According to Sibylle Meyer and Eva Schulze‘s interview 
results, East German women did not feel that their actions were determined by state 
policy. They thought that the East German politic combined motherhood and 
employment in a healthy way.  East German women enjoyed social privileges like the 
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right to work for equal pay, protection of motherhood, fully paid pregnancy and 
maternity leave, free contraception, free abortion on demand in the first trimester, paid 
leave to care for sick children, and supportive social programs for the family. Child care 
was also part of social welfare and it was not expensive. The East German government 
tried to ease the burden of child rearing for working women, and it encouraged women to 
enter traditional male professions by offering continuous occupational skill and 
professional expertise training.
156
 Also, the government paid attention to younger women 
who wished to pursue a vocational education and wanted to be employed until retirement, 
except for a year of ―baby break‖ for each child.157 Therefore, according to a Ruth Leger 
Sivard‘s survey of the 1980s, East Germany had a high female rating in three areas: (1) 
the highest rate world wide of female participation in the labor force, (2) the first in 
literacy rates for adult women, and (3) the third position in the proportion of women 
enrollment in higher education.
158
 For example, 9 out of 10 mothers in East Germany had 
a job, mostly full-time, and most of the women returned to their work one year after the 
birth of a child. 
159
     
Table 1:   Women as a Percentage of the Paid Labor Force
160
 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 
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GDR 44.2 46.3 49.9 49.8 
FRG 37.8 36.6 38.0 38.9 
Sources:   For Western European countries, OECD Labor Force Statistics 1959-
1970 and 1969-1980 
 
In West Germany, during the same period of time, 38% of women were in the 
labor force, and 80% of women were biological mothers in comparison to East Germany 
in which 49% of women were in the labor force and 91 % of women became biological 
mothers.
161
  Also, the employment rate of women in FRG rose only 4 % (from 34.4% to 
38.9%) during the timeline of 1966 to 1983, and 90% of part-time workers were women 
by the late 1980‘s.162  The West German women were less likely to work for pay and less 
likely to have children. Twenty-five percent of East German women were in part-time 
jobs while 41% of West German women were in part–time jobs.163 East German women‘s 
average work week was 43 ¾ hours and West German women worked 38 hours per week.    
 Even though part-time job meant low pay, low benefits, lack of job training and 
security, West German women were attracted to part-time jobs for a variety of reasons. 
First, they could manage their family concerns by flexible scheduling.
164
 Kindergartens 
and elementary schools operated only half days, and the school day lasted until noon or 
early afternoon with no school lunch programs, and school vacations were longer than 
work vocations. In contrast, East German schools operated until mid-afternoon and 
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provided state after-school programs. ―The problems with childcare are the most 
significant predictors of absenteeism and unproductive time at work.‖165   
Second, a store‘s business hours influenced women‘s employment. In West Germany, 
shops did not open evenings or all-day Sunday, and Saturday hours were 8 or 9 am to 1 
pm. In East Germany, the stores were open late one night per week, and also a special 
store with late hours could be found in each city district.
166
 These environments made 
women take part-time jobs in West Germany but they allowed full-time employment in 
East Germany. The following table shows West German female labor force participation 
rates.     
Table 2:   West German Female Labor Force Participation Rate by Marital Status  
 Total Married Single Separated Divorced 
1972 46.9 40.7 69.7 67.9 74.6 
1980 48.2 44.1 57.6 64.5 71.8 
1989 50.5 44.7 62.9 61.3 67.7 
Without children 54.9 47.3 63.1 66.8 67.0 
With children       
Under 18 yrs 44.6 42.7 42.7 52.9 64.1 
Under 6 yrs 36.3 35.2 47.9 41.9 45.3 
Under 3 yrs 32.5 31.9 41.6 33.1 36.6 
Source:   Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989.  
 
This table shows how the labor force participation rates were different for the 
women who have young children. For example, women who have children younger than 
three have a 32.5 % participation compared to 54.9% of women who do not have children.     
The ―Mütterlichkeit‖ (motherliness) family policy in West Germany limited the 
type of work, the hours and the conditions of work for women. Thus, women who are in 
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patriarchal and capitalist economies are under cheap, unorganized and marginal labor 
reserve. Also, they have the double burden of paid work and domestic responsibilities. An 
even more interesting reality in the West Germany mothers‘ employment is that they have 
to submit documentation which proves childcare availability. Women are unable to work 
without this document.
 167
    
Household income is important to marital power. East German women‘s 
contribution to household income was higher than that of West German women. East 
German women contributed 41% whereas West German women only 18%. West German 
women more frequently withdrew from the work force than East German women. Also, 
as to potential earnings, 91% of East German women were working daily or were in 
training programs compared to 18% of West German women. Among East German 
women, more than one-third were skilled workers compare to 7% of West German 
women and more than one –third were white collar workers compared to 11%. Also, 87% 
of East German women had finished some form of occupational training in 1988 
compared to 69% of West German women in 1985. The East German women‘s 
employment led to the conclusion that women could always exist on their own financially 
and would not be dependent on their husbands. This financial situation impacted divorce: 
women could end married life relatively easily and two- thirds of all divorces were 
initiated by women in 1986.
168
  
    
B. Family policies 
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a. Child-care systems 
The two constitutions of Germany guaranteed citizen‘s rights. According to 
article 3 of West Germany, the constitution guaranteed equal rights regardless of gender 
and prohibited any form of discrimination on the basis of gender. 
169
  The East Germany 
Constitution guaranteed equal rights of men and women: ―men and women have equal 
rights and the same legal standing in all areas of social, state and personal life. 
Advancement of women, especially in professional qualification, is a task for state and 
society.‖170 The East Germany (GDR) more fully integrated family and state; according 
to the interpretation of Article 6, ―an institutional guarantee against the undermining of 
the family as a result of laws.‖171 Also, Article 20, paragraph 2 promises protection of 
marriage, family and motherhood by the state; ―the promotion of women especially in 
employment is a societal and state responsibility‖172 and it guarantees women‘s 
pregnancy and maternity leaves, material and financial support at birth, child allowances 
and equal position in the work place in Article 20, paragraph 3.
173
  Even though the West 
and East German Constitutions guarantee equal rights to women and men, Trzcinski finds 
issues which can be criticized, for example the guarantees do not apply to all women‘s 
activities on a daily basis.
174
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 East and West Germany have very different state support systems for child care. 
Child care responsibility belonged in the private sector in West Germany compared to 
East Germany which supports child care by the state. 95% of children under 3 in East 
Germany had a place in childcare centers in 1987 and only 5 - 6% of children in the West 
Germany. Eighty-one percent of 6-10 year old children in East Germany had after school 
care compared to West Germany (FRG), in which only 4 -6% had a place.
175
       
East Germany (GDR) started to promote public childcare and parent support 
systems in the 1960s to increase women‘s employment. They had nursery schools and 
kindergartens for young children and after-school groups such as the Pioneers or FDJ 
(Freie Deutsche Jugend) clubs for older children. These social supporting systems helped 
the parents pursue their careers. 
In West Germany, the state did not try to integrate women into the labor forces as 
in the East Germany and so they provided childcare only in a limited degree; Also, 
because the states provide childcare for only a small fraction, the few childcare spaces 
were extraordinarily expensive.   
Table 3:  Daytime Childcare for under 3 years old children of Working Mothers 
in West Germany (1975)    
 
Source of Care  % of Children 
Mother 17.6 
Grandparents 45.6 
Other Relatives 6.6 
Other Sisters or Brothers 2.5 
Friends, Neighbors 4.4 
Specialized Persons 7.2 
Other Families 6.1 
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Various Institutional Arrangements 12.6 
Sources: Niedhardt, (1995)
176
  
As the table illustrates, 45.6 % of children under the age of 3 were cared for by their 
grandparent and only 12.5 % of children were placed in daycare spots.  
b. Maternity leave and  paid leave to care for sick children 
Both countries have maternity leave; East Germany established a maternity leave 
in 1976 called ―Baby Jahr‖ (baby year). It was a paid leave for the second and 
subsequent babies and this policy expanded to the first born in 1986. Also, there was a 
revision in the Labor Law Code in which women who have babies less than 18 months 
old leave work one day a month for the household. The paid leave follows this rule; 26 
weeks is at full pay, for the additional leave, 60% pay for the first baby and 90% for the 
second or subsequent babies until the baby‘s first birthday. They can get additional leave, 
up to when the baby is 18 month old. According to Adams, this maternity leave caused a 
rise to 87% employment in women ages 16 to 60 and increased the birth rate also.
177
  
In West Germany, 14 weeks were allowed with full pay. Among the 14 weeks, six 
weeks were taken prior to childbirth and eight weeks after, then, the mother was allowed 
to return to work. After that, one of the parents could leave until the baby is 15 months 
old. It expanded to 18 months in 1990. They could receive 600 DM which was 27% of 
Western German workers average earnings.
178
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 In both countries, men were allowed the additional leave also, but usually women 
took the maternity leave because women‘s wages were lower than men‘s.  
In the case of sick children, parents are allowed five days of fully paid leave per 
year in West Germany. However, it had a limitation in practice because health insurance 
allowed parents to leave for sick children but it needed the confirmation of a doctor that 
stated that the parent was absolutely necessary for the care of sick children because 
nobody else was available.
179
  
c. The side effects of the family policies in both West and East Germany. 
The family policies were launched from the perspective of helping motherhood 
and work, and these did indeed help women enter the traditional male spheres. However, 
they also undermined the women‘s position in the labor market for  employers had less 
desire to employ women because of the family policy programs such as maternity leaves, 
day-time housework leaves, paid leaves to care for sick children, and a shortened work 
week. Actually, ―mothers spend twenty-three fewer hours on a paying-job per month than 
fathers.‖180 It was also hard for women to do overtime work. From an employer‘s 
standpoint, women employees missed work more than men and were therefore less 
dedicated to work than men. All of this brought the result, Goldenberg states, that ―male 
working teams were evidently unwilling to put up with absences of women colleagues, so 
women stayed in female dominated fields, where assuming family responsibilities was 
acceptable.‖181  These factors created segregation in so far as women have different 
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categories of work and lower paid jobs, while men have the tendency to achieve high 
level positions which brings about money, power and other rewards.  Furthermore, these 
factors reinforced the thought that women have child-rearing responsibilities which men 
do not have. The women‘s role is primarily that of a parent. Women as the primary parent 
increased women‘s dependency on men especially in West Germany. This latter situation 
eventually engendered a view in both countries that, at least to some degree, ―women 
remained second-class citizens.‖182 Even though East Germany tried to achieve women‘s 
equality in employment and ―encourage women‘s full integration into the labor force,‖183 
government leaders recognized that men were failing to perform household tasks.
184
         
 A comparison of the family policies in both East and West Germany family 
shows that, the East Germany family policy contributed to women‘s participation in the 
labor force and the birth-rate even though it did not overcome reinforcing traditional sex 
roles. In West Germany, as Duggan states, the ―West German policies were not overtly 
gendered,‖ rather the family policies simply reduced women‘s labor force participation 
and increased traditional sex roles.
185
    
 
C. Position in the family 
 
  Participating in the labor force gives women a different position in family and 
society.  Women who have full time jobs are more independent, have a higher status and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
182
 Lynn Duggan, 84. 
 
183
 Barbara Lobodzinska ed., Family, Women and Employment in Central-Eastern Europe (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press,1995), 103-104. 
 
184
 Jennifer Schulenberg , 51. 
 
185
 Lynn Duggan, 160. 
 
 76 
 
 
more decision making power compared with women who are only housewives. 
Therefore, reduced social support system for women diminishes their personal options.
186
      
a. House work (household) 
In sharing housework, the two countries had different policies even though both 
countries‘ Constitution encouraged husbands and wives‘ cooperation in household duties. 
East Germany family laws encourage more male participation in housework and child 
care. The East Germany‘s Family Code paragraph 7 (1965) indicate it well: ―Both 
spouses do their share in the education and care of the children and the conduct of the 
household. The relations of the spouses to each other are to be so shaped that the wife can 
combine her professional and social activities with those of motherhood.‖187 In contrast, 
West Germany allowed women‘s employment not to interfere in their marital and family 
duties until 1977 when the First Act on Reform of Marriage and Family Life was passed. 
The West German Constitution paragraphs 1356 and 1360 shows that one of the spouses 
was in charge of the whole household until 1976.
188
  The reading of the West German 
childcare system means that women, found it difficult to be employed and so they took 
full responsibility for their household.  
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Also, the West Germany laws gave more time off from women‘s job, since they 
considered the mother as the primary parent. This reinforced both the double burden of 
the woman and the discrimination of the employer against women. Household work 
includes shopping, housework, child-care, gardening, auto repairs and labor force work. 
According to the survey of Sibylle Meyer and Eva Schulze, most of the house work and 
the majority of duties in the family remained with women. However, the men in the East 
did more house work and child-care compared to Western men. The interview by Sibylle 
Meyer and Eva Schulze presents the case that husbands finished work earlier than their 
wives. Thus, husbands took the children home from school, completed the shopping for 
the family, fed and played with the children, and lastly put them to bed. The following 
provides us with a two recorded examples:  
Mr. Q, born 1970, a photographer, currently a part-time film projectionist, 
lives together with Ms. N, 1969, and their 2-year-old son: Right at the 
moment I‘m picking him up from the day care center. Regina brings him 
there in the morning. It usually depends on if we need something, doing 
the rounds and a little shopping. ‘Cause sooner or later you have to stock 
up on groceries. If I pick him up, it‘s around quarter to five. Then you go 
for a round of shopping and by the time you‘ve got everything, it‘s after 
five in no time. At half past five you have to start again with the bathing 
and feeding. So this phase after picking him up goes by very quickly. You 
play with him a little bit, wash up, eat, and then it‘s off to bed.         
 
                                        
Ms. E. born 1957, a dietitian, currently a manufacturing consultant, since 
1990 divorced and living since that time with Mr. G, born 1961, a mason. 
Both of Ms. E‘s children, 10 and 13 years old, live at home: A sick child 
belongs at home and not in the nursery school. Usually the mother then 
stayed at home, but it was also possible for the father to call in sick. We 
also managed to have Eckardt call in sick and stay home for three days 
and I went to work. That‘s still taxing for the mother since she goes crazy- 
what with the sick child at home and the husband too. When you come 
home, the dishes are done, but incorrectly done because the husband did 
them. You don‘t want to complain because he did his best, but he just 
couldn‘t do it. Inside I felt completely spent because even if the husband 
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did help out, the most involved situation responsibility nevertheless 
remained with the mother
189
 
   
  These two cases show how the East German men participated in housework and 
child-care. The first case shows the well divided house work: Finishing work early the 
father picks the child up and takes care of him up to bedtime. So, the wife whose work is 
done late does not need to be exhausted with the left over house work. However, the 
second case shows the more usual case. It is that even though the East men divided the 
housework in everyday life, the housework was not equally divided and the responsibility 
of work was still with the women.  
Table 4    ―Time use of families (Men and Women) in East and West on normal 
workday         (full-time employed couples with children only)‖190  
 
Hours of daily 
activities 
 West*  / up 
to 35 years 
old 
West / 35 
to years 
old 
East** / up 
to 35 years 
old 
East/ 35 to 
50 years 
old 
Housework Women 3.18 3.22 2.62 2.91 
 Men 0.93 0.8 1.1 1.07 
Child Care Women 4.1 1.85 2.96 1.91 
 Men 1.62 0.92 1.84 1.01 
Total Women 7.28 5.07 5.48 4.82 
 Men 2.55 1.72 2.94 2.08 
   Source:    SOEP
191
  
*SOEP-West, 1987 and Meyer and Schulze‘s own calculations. 
**SOEP-East, 1990 and Meyer and Schulze‘s own calculations. 
The table shows that Western women work more hours than Eastern women. On 
average, the women of Western Germany up to the age of 35 spend up to 7 hours and 28 
minutes doing housework and taking care of children whereas the women of Eastern 
                                                          
189
 Silbylle Meyer and Eva Schulze, 100-101. 
  
190
 Ibid, 101. 
 
191
Ibid.   
 79 
 
 
Germany spend up to 5 hours and 48 minutes doing the same tasks.  If the women are 
distinguished by age, then – in both countries – the women between 35 and 50 years of 
age work more than those who are not yet 35 years old. In contrast, the Eastern men 
work more hours than the Western men and also, in contrast, men who age are 35 years 
old and below work more than the men whose age is between 35 to 50 years old. One of 
the reasons for this is that women who are older are more influenced by patriarchal 
culture, and younger men are less influenced by it. In conclusion, Eastern men do more 
work house than Western men. Eastern German men spend up to 2 hours and 94 minutes 
doing housework and taking care of children compared to Western German men who 
spend 2 hours and 55 minutes. Nevertheless, it is clear that women‘s house work hours 
are longer than those of men; however, women assume the responsibility of house work 
in both countries.      
b. Decision making 
Another aspect of measuring the marital power of East women is ―decision 
making‖ in the family. In the decisions regarding marriage and divorce, regarding new 
partners or decisions about fertility, or regarding the timing of children‘s birth, women 
hold a more significant position in the family.  According to the research of Meyer and 
Schulze, Eastern women participated in all family affairs, and in very important family 
decisions they shared decision-making equally with their husbands. Moreover, Eastern 
women made more decisions than men at the beginning of pregnancy. Even though men 
wanted children, women made the final decision. We can see that the Eastern German 
women‘s independence and self-reliance are stronger. In contrast, in the West women 
who divorced were considered as ―bad housewives‖ until the 1960s. They also needed 
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their husband‘s permission for their outside work until 1977.192 Thus, Western German 
women had the tendency to depend on the decisions of men because of their part-time 
jobs and their unemployment due to child care responsibility. Western German women‘s 
decision making and self- confidence was lower than that of Eastern German women.  
D. Social network  
Also, the close relation to groups outside the family‘ called ―Arbeitskollective‖ 
(work collectives) and the close relationship with their relatives‘ important resources for 
women. The close relationship between colleagues at work through group excursions to 
films, theater, concerts, or exhibitions gave women the space to discuss personal subjects. 
Partner conflicts, worries about children, and the tribulations of everyday life were 
discussed with colleagues.  
Also, the close relationship with relatives was another important resource for 
women since most often it strengthened their family and work positions. In close 
relations with relatives, they received important material and emotional support. This also 
helped their constant lack of goods which brought about emotional instability. These 
women‘s networks were stronger than those of Western women and they strongly 
strengthened the positions of women in their domestic partnership and in their work 
relationships.   
The Easter women surpassed the Western women in the following areas: 
possibilities for occupational training, employment, the labor-work in family and home, 
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their positions within the family, and at time their concerns about income. All these 
resources contributed toward a greater ability by Eastern German women to gain more 
equal relationships.   
 
3) The effect on women‟s lives after the reunification 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, the two different systems 
of government with different economic systems, social structures and ideologies caused 
unification to take one year to complete. However, West Germany‘s policies, laws and 
legislation were forced onto the people of East Germany.
193
 Goldberg states that the 
situation caused ―no systematic attempt to evaluate the institutions of the former socialist 
state with a view toward saving or incorporating positive policies in the unified 
nation.‖194 By the colonized reunification, East Germany‘s social programs and its 
understanding of personal identity could not apply in the United Germany. Let us 
consider some of the main effects which this reunification engendered. 
A. Women‟s unemployment rate  and lower level jobs 
The impact on women‘s life in the social support systems and the position of 
women in the society or family after unification was enormous. What was changed in the 
lives of German women after the unification? Even though they achieved being one 
nation, the position of East German women was weakened and their independence was 
reduced.  
                                                          
193
 Hanna Behrend, ―East German Women- Chief Losers in German Reunification,‖ In Barbara 
Lobodzinska ed., Family, Women and Employment in Central Eastern Europe (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press; 1995), 113-121.    
 
194
 G. Goldberg (1991), 40. 
  
 82 
 
 
Unemployment was the major influence which caused their weakened position. 
The change from a socialist to a capitalist economy brought about a profound 
transformation in the labor market which led to high unemployment. Forty percent of 
employment positions were lost since 1989, and 1,100,749 persons were registered as 
unemployed in the new federal German state on December 1992. Among them, according 
to the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit in 1993, 64% were women.
195
  Women had a higher 
unemployment rate due to the closing of factories especially in the textile industry. The 
dismissals which occurred in the East German area affected more women than men. East 
German goods were rejected as inferior products, a judgment that led East Germany into 
a trade breakdown and West German products in the Eastern area destroyed the East 
German markets. In December 1992, the male unemployment rate in the East was 10% 
whereas that of females was 19%. The female unemployment rate was almost twice that 
of the West, which was 7% for men and 8% for women in December 1992.
196
 These 
numbers show that the situation of women during the reunification became worse than 
that of men. According to the weekly newspaper, Freitag, May 29, 1992, ―82% of the 
women in the former East Germany are worse off after reunification.‖197 
Table 5:   Female Unemployment Percentages in the NFS, 1991-1996 
 
Year Number of Unemployed 
Women 
Percentage of Female 
Unemployed from Total 
number of Female 
Total Unemployment Rate 
(Men and Women) 
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1991 529,961 58.1 10.3 
1992 741.145 63.3 14.8 
1993 743,320 63.9 15.8 
1994 740,644 64.8 16.0 
1995 660,079 63.0 14.9 
1996 673,776 57.6 16.7 
Source:    BMFSFJ
198
  
 
The above table demonstrates that women‘s unemployment became permanent in 
the New Federal States (NFS) after reunification. With the reunification, women lost their 
jobs and the unemployment situation continued for six years after reunification. Thus, we 
can understand why people define the women‘s situation after reunification as ―three 
steps back for women.‖    
Another feature is that the percentage of women who were in highly skilled 
occupations suffered a major drop and women considered transferring to less highly 
valued jobs.  In unemployment, both men and women in East Germany both their jobs 
but men who lost jobs had other alternatives. The men held two- thirds of all subsidized 
temporary jobs and interestingly, 80% of men who reported living in the East were 
employed in the West. This shows that men made this move for their independence or to 
support their family but women, who had already had their children, maintained their 
responsibility of childcare and they could not move to seek their fortune in the West.
199
                                             
 Also, the unemployment of women not only increased but they had to look for 
lower level jobs.   Myra sees the same case during the Great Depression in the United 
State as an example.  In the U.S. women who were in higher -level positions were laid off 
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and men were replaced the positions. Some women made an effort to increase their job 
qualifications and this helped to provide a competitive advantage against other women.  
However, their position did not prevent them from being replaced by men even though 
the men were not qualified and had less job experience. Consequently, women lost high 
status jobs.
200
 According to Uta Maier‘s research, there were 100,000 women who held 
upper management positions in East Germany in 1989, but there were only a few left in 
unified Germany in 1995. In contrast, men had experienced a drop from 200,000 in 1990 
to 80,000 in 1992 (60%).  In the case of highly qualified white collar jobs, men‘s 
numbers dropped from 850,000 to 660,000 (20%) compared to women who dropped 
from 600,000 to 420,000 (30%) from 1990 to 1991. In East Germany, financial 
management jobs, like insurance, accounting and banking work, were completely female 
jobs but these are mixed sex occupations in West Germany. Maier points out this 
situation, noting that ―employment figures in former East Germany show men now 
entering these fields in substantial numbers, as the labor force changes to reflect the West 
German standard of ‗normality.‘‖201   
 Another feature is the ―mini jobs‖ of women. In the 1980s, according to the 
Statistisches Bundesamt report,
202
  nine out of ten mothers in the East Germany had full 
time jobs and they returned to work at least one year after child birth. However, the 
mother‘s activity rate for those who had children less than six years old declined in the 
New Federal States (NFS). The main reason is child-care. For example, the mother‘s 
                                                          
200
 Ibid., 14. 
 
201
 Ibid., 14-15. 
 
202
 Jennifer Lina Schulenberg, 108-109. 
 
 85 
 
 
working-rate, with 3-to-5-year-old children, dropped from 83% to 65% between 1991 
and 1996. Also, mothers with than children less than three years old saw a decline from 
63.5% to 22.0%.
203
  An even more interesting fact is that mothers with children have a 
tendency to be in ―mini jobs.‖ According to the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW), ―some 5.4 million people were engaged in ‗mini jobs‘ of which 1.4 million of 
them had a secondary activity in addition to their main full-time job.‖204  The mini job in 
terms of DIW produced gross earnings below the level of 610 DM per month and was not 
permanent but contractual. In the report of the DIW, 40% were married women, 25% 
were students, 10% were pensioners and 7% were sole parents among 4 million mini-job 
persons.
205
  This statistic clearly shows the married women‘s employment situation. 
However, compared to men, men‘s working rate, between 15 and 64 years old with 
children under 3 years old, was 80.7% in 1996, while women, with 6- to 14- year-old 
children, was 52.8%, and women with children under 3 years old was 26.4% in 1996.
206
  
The Statistisches Bundesamt researched as part of a national census a questionnaire 
asking what they felt about their employment opportunity in their market places. 14% of 
men versus 8 % of women answered that they felt they had good employment 
opportunities from 1988 to 1990 in East Germany. Furthermore, 29% of men and 15% of 
women in Unified Germany answered similarly in 1993.
207
 With this phenomenon, 
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Jennifer Schulenberg states that ―with the East Germany social infrastructure completely 
dismantled with the imposition of FRG law and policy, women lost the policies and 
social supports that permitted them to combine labor force participation and household 
responsibility.‖208                   
As the major reasons for a higher unemployment rate for women, Quack and 
Maier explain the labor market policy of Germany in four parts.
 209
 
  There have been severe cutbacks in female-dominated industries.  
  Women‘s positions have been cut more severely than men‘s positions, 
even in industries that have been male dominated. Women in these 
industries have benefited less from labor market policies that buffer core 
production. 
 Migration and commuting to West Germany are less viable for East 
German women, who are less mobile than East German men because of 
their care giving responsibilities.        
 The East German policies and social support that permitted women to 
combine labor market and household responsibilities were eliminated.  
 
B. Reduced social support system 
 Finding new jobs for women was more difficult than in the former East Germany 
because they had to combine motherhood and an occupation while dealing with a lack of 
social support. Many child-care social systems were reduced or closed, and company 
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child care centers hardly existed. For example, child-care centers, kindergartens, and 
afternoon centers for children decreased by about 5000 from 1990 to 1992 in New 
Brandenburg.
210
 As mentioned above, with German unification in December 1990, West 
Germany massively cut the former extensive East German policies such as child support 
assurance, free public child-care, and liberal maternity and sick leaves. The amount of the 
child support system assured by the state until a child reaches 16 year old was dependent 
on their parents income in East Germany, but the West and unified Germany provided for 
a maximum of only three years before a child reaches age 6 and half-day public school. 
Child-care became a restriction for women looking for jobs. 
 This situation increased women‘s responsibility for childcare and they had double 
burdens due to the threat of unemployment and childcare. The story of a woman who 
lived in the East after unification shows well the hardness of their lives.  
Ms. S, the employed nursery school teacher in 1983: At our place they are 
now beginning to close the nurseries and are terminating teaching 
positions. A terrible story. I have to come to terms with the fact that I 
could be the next one to go. For me it would be horrible- I can‘t even 
imagine it happening. Deep down, with all my heart and soul, I am a 
nursery school teacher. It would be simply unthinkable for me not to have 
a foothold in this profession. This anxiety is shared by all of my 
colleagues. You can feel it everywhere. ―Just don‘t call in sick‖ is the 
motto. Almost nobody feels confident enough to stay at home if their child 
gets sick. I notice this attitude among my colleagues and also with our 
mothers who bring their children to the building even when they‘re 
running a temperature. It didn‘t used to be that way. Everyone is scared 
about losing their job.
211
 
 
 
 Moreover, the family has an expanded responsibility in caring for the old, sick 
and disabled in the transformation of the social security system. Before German 
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unification, the East German families did not have the responsibility of caring for the old 
and the sick in their homes. In the West, 80% of elderly persons were cared for by 
middle-aged daughters or daughters-in-law, but the East German women could not 
imagine doing this because the middle-aged women had a higher employment rate. These 
tasks were considered as a part of the collective responsibility of the state and these 
issues were reflected in the government‘s health and social policies, such as the 
socialization of children in the former East Germany.
212
     
 East Germany had the highest elderly population in the world during the 1970s. 
Twenty-two percent of the elderly were over 60 years old and 92 % who were over 80 
years old were women, compared to 50% of men who were without partners in 1974.
213
  
The East German Constitution, article 36, guaranteed the elderly financial security, 
providing age-adequate job positions, age-adequate housing, medical and social care in 
the neighborhood and special nursing support at home and in nursing homes.
214
 East 
Germany tried to keep integrating elderly people into society as long as possible with 
pensions for comfortable living. Also, the elderly people worked in infant-care, health-
care, cultural activities and holiday accommodations. However, with the reunification, 
the family had the responsibility to take care of elderly persons. As we saw above, the 
duties for the care of elderly persons fell mostly upon women.  
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      Also, older women experienced more drastic changes after the unification. Above 
all, the definition of ―older‖ changed from around 50 to 40 years old in many industries 
and occupations, leading to a highly unbalanced unemployment rate. First of all, the 50-
to-60-year-old age group began to be laid off from the labor market. The older women 
workers were not wanted by employers. Therefore, there were no options but to accept 
early retirement. According to the German Institute for Economic Research, 45% women 
who were aged 50 to 60 were no longer in the labor market in March 1991. This early 
retirement dropped the women into a poverty group because the early retirement benefit 
was fixed at 65% of previous income levels, averaging 682 Marks per month. At the 
time, an income of fewer than 1000 Marks per month was considered as severe poverty. 
Statistics show how the early retired women‘s group was in severe poverty and that 16% 
of families in East Germany and 3% of families in West Germany had income under 
1000 Marks per month. All of this brought about the ―the feminization of poverty‖215  in 
the New Federal States. 
C. The result of unemployment and reduced social support system on women    
        The mass unemployment of the former East German women has had a huge 
impact on their lives. The young women‘s first choice was not to have children. The birth 
rate began to fall steadily. There were 178,000 births in 1989: it dropped to only 87,000 
in 1992.
216
 It was cut almost in half in three years. This shows the social difficulties 
generated by the process of unification. People had fear for their future and decided not to 
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have children. The following interview by Meyer and Schulze show how they feel about 
their life and future plans.
217
  
Ms. B, the industrial designer: In these times, I cannot have a second 
child. I mean, it would be better for Marie to grow up with a little sister, 
but somehow I just don‘t believe I could do it- I say that in all honesty. I 
mean, it would work out here in the apartment- that wouldn‘t be the 
problem. But I simply fear the future. The child care facilities, on which 
we could always rely, will no longer be here in the future. In the past I 
always know, I can leave my child there, it will be taken care of. In the 
past I would certainly have had a second child. I even would have 
managed to convince my husband if he would have hesitated. I know, 
even if the relationship falls apart, with my income I would have been 
able to raise my children alone. Nowadays it‘s no longer like this. What 
will become of my job, I don‘t know yet. Many of my colleagues are 
already laid off. I‘m much more dependent upon my husband than before. 
And due to this it‘s much more important for me to come to an agreement 
with my husband in such far-reaching decisions as having a second child. 
And he is at the moment very hesitant.    
                 
      Also, young women postponed their marriages. The number of marriages dropped 
by 50% from 1989-1992 due to unemployment and lack of job security (and the age of 
first marriage also rose.) Another consequence of unification was that the divorce rate 
dropped dramatically for East German women. Ferree explain this: ―In 1989, the GDR 
had a divorce rate of 122.8 per 10,000 existing marriages. This had dropped by 1991 to a 
rate of 22.6, indicating how much worse the situation is perceived to be for women who 
are attempting to raise their children on their own.‖218  
      Additionally, there was a male preference in the work place. Employers wanted to 
maximize their productivity and so they began to reduce wages and preferred employees 
who could work full-time. This meant that a worker who has responsibilities at home 
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such as cooking meals, cleaning, child-care, and buying food, is not preferred at the 
workplace. As Myra Marx points out: ―In all countries, capitalist and socialist alike, 
women still carry the bulk of this burden of unpaid work.‖219 Thus, women who have to 
share their time and energy are considered less flexible and this places them at a 
disadvantage in a competitive system. So, Maier says that ―the invisible hand of the 
market was never gender neutral.‖220 The continuing responsibility of women at home in 
providing for the family led them to be at a disadvantage. Also, single mothers who 
cannot work overtime faced discrimination at work and being overburdened made them 
miss their life in East Germany which had seemed easy and secure.
221
             
      The changed situation for East German women has affected the position of 
women in the family. Due to high unemployment, a women‘s position was weakened as 
regards financial independence and self-confidence. Women lost their economic 
independence and were dependent on men. This has enhanced the status of men as 
breadwinners in the family and also the women‘s position as an equal partner has 
weakened. Women lost their integration into the important network of their colleagues. 
By the transfer to a capitalistic system, people became harder and more exhausted leading 
to decreased emotional contacts and reducing the solidarity of colleagues by the 
competitiveness in the work place. According to Meyer and Schulze‘s interviews, they 
said that close links between people have become more distant and everybody has been 
forced to increase their responsibilities. 
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      This weakened position of women has influenced the domestic labor division. 
Meyer and Schulze insist that ―there is a close coherence between the lack of women‘s 
financial independence, the reduction of child care facilities and the ‗new but old‘ 
patriarchy of husbands and familial structures.‖222 The lives of women have affected 
men‘s help with the housework. This happened especially to women who were laid-off 
from work after the reunification of Germany. Domestic work became exclusively the job 
of a woman in the family. Below is as another example: a woman has problems with her 
husband, who is unemployed, concerning domestic work.  
Ms. S. the nursery school teacher: Although my husband is unemployed 
and I need to get further qualifications for my job, everything has now 
changed with raising the children. He does less household work than 
before. While we were both employed we shared the household work 
almost equally – almost, I say. But now he acts as if it‘s a loss of dignity 
when he is supposed to clean or do the washing up.
223
    
   
 Usually we think that if women are unemployed, the duty of domestic work is 
theirs.  But this case of the husband not being employed is different. We need to examine 
the husband‘s response; ―he acts as if it‘s a loss of dignity when he is supposed to clean or 
do the washing.‖ If a woman is unemployed, she still has responsibility for the 
housework, but if men are unemployed, they struggle not to do the housework because it 
hurts their dignity. When men are unemployed they try to find a new job or improve their 
skills for the future. However, when women are unemployed, people think that it is the 
time to come back home to their original settings. However, this thinking misses one 
point that when women have all the domestic responsibility, their possibilities for looking 
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for new jobs are restricted. Also housework limits their time and energy needed for their 
jobs when they are employed.           
      Women‘s unemployment problem produced another phenomenon: the increasing 
incidence of violence and abuse within households.  Duggan says that it is the ultimate 
expression of one family member‘s power over the other.224 When violence happens in 
households, women have a tendency to endure the violence because there are no 
economical options for them or their children. Moreover, the financial dependence makes 
it harder to have a partnership in marital relationship, even though there is no physical 
violence. Therefore, Duggan points out the failure of women‘s policies in the unification 
of Germany; ―German unification would seem to provide the perfect opportunity for such 
a blend (East- West family policies). But this has not taken place; the current government 
has reversed all East German progress toward expanding women‘s fallback position.‖225  
Therefore, East German women, losing economic independence, have to choose between 
a career and motherhood. If they decide on motherhood, they have to decide whether to 
seek part-time jobs. Moreover, it reinforced the traditional gender division of labor. The 
part-time job with low pay leads to less investment in worker‘s training, and chronic 
unemployment results in greater economic marginalization of women.             
 Thus, Myra predicted that women would be ―losers‖ in the four years since 
unification and Schulenberg defines that many East German women are excluded from 
the labor market in the economic outcome of reunification. This is a serious negative 
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impact of reunification that influenced the restructuring of the economy and the 
contraction of the labor force.
226
  Trzcinxki asserts that 
 The integration of East German women into the German economy 
proceeded with an apparent disregard for the women‘s desires and needs 
and these desires and needs had been artificially created and maintained 
through coercion by the East Germany and hence (women) would gladly 
accept the more natural arrangements offered by the West Germany policy. 
227
  
 
D. Conclusion  
 East German women lost their status and economic opportunities after unification. 
Johnson Lewis explains this: ―Discrimination remains in united Germany. Income 
inequalities persist: a woman‘s wages and salaries range between 65 percent and 78 
percent of a man‘s for many positions. In most fields, women do not hold key positions. 
Generally, the higher the position, the more powerful is male dominance.‖228   This shift 
meant that German unification was in no way a new opportunity and new world for East 
German women. One of the important reasons why the unification gave women these 
problems was the lack of their participation in the process of German unification. 
Therefore, women‘s influence was low under the structure of the systemized political 
decision making. Also, it was due to their lack of identity in East Germany. Because East 
German communism was based on patriarchy, the politics of women in East Germany 
and in the new unified nation as well were also dominated by patriarchal politics. 
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Therefore, the resultant policies did not reflect the needs and difficultness of East German 
women.  
 Secondly, the process of reunification of Germany did not provide equal positions 
between East Germany and West Germany. Rather, the process was controlled by West 
Germany which meant that the New Federal State had to accept all West Germany‘s 
institutions and social structures. Schulenberg states that the German reunification was 
―an extension of the FRG.‖229  Patricia Smith describes the process of German 
reunification in a slightly different way: ―East Germans essentially abdicated any 
significant role in the design and implementation of the unification process and accepted 
the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, along with the political, economic, 
and social systems and institutions of West Germany.‖230 All of this looks like cultural 
colonization, and feminists rightfully see it as ―a re-masculinization of Germany.‖231 
Marxist scholars regarded the union as ―capitalistic and they predicted economic disaster, 
and intellectuals mourned the loss of Eastern identity.‖232 Therefore, East Germany‘s 
social programs and identity were not applied to the NFS. Finally, according to Kim 
Kung Mi,
233
 at the time of unification, there was a strong stream of Neo-liberalism that 
preferred reducing the welfare system and labor market-flexibility. This also created 
policies that were against women.  
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 However, a more basic problem is clearly seen when the two social systems are 
compared as far as the family policy is concerned. Margrit Eichler divides the ―models of 
the family‖ into three: the patriarchal model of the family, the individual responsible 
model and social responsibility model. The patriarchal model of the family is part of a 
nuclear family of the family and the model in which the husband is the only social and 
economic leader in the household. Men are measured in economic terms, while females 
are measured in moral, sexual and social terms. 
234
  This latter model of family is 
―unrealistic in contemporary times and can be harmful.‖235  A father‘s power is strong and 
children who are born outside marriage are illegitimate. A wife‘s or a mother‘s unpaid 
labors in the household are ignored and women are economically dependent on the 
husband.
236
  In the individual responsibility model of the family, however, both husband 
and wife have the same economic functions. Thus, spouses are considered 
interdependent.
237
 Both parents have the responsibility to take care of family members 
but the public has no responsibility for it except in cases where parents are absent or 
unable to take the responsibility. The social responsibility model is, according to Eichler, 
a new model that should improve family policies. Families and state have an interaction 
to improve familiar relations and the well-being of the family. The stratification of men 
and women is minimal in ideological emphasis.  Both parents have responsibility for their 
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children in economic and in social care. Furthermore, the characteristic of this model is 
that the state shares the responsibility.  
If one parent is really absent or unable to contribute his or her share, 
society will pay the cost of his or her contribution. The cost of care for 
inevitably dependent adults is public responsibility, while the delivery of 
the care may be rendered by a family member.
238
    
 
 The state has a responsibility for the care of the family: a child care system, 
adequate parental leave for family purposes, employment benefits and child support. Also, 
state supports the care of the elderly.
239
  
 The Eichler model points out the problems in the United Germany‘s family 
policies compared to the West and East Germany. The West Germany (and also the 
United Germany) had a conservative laissez-faire family–state relationship.  It resembled 
the patriarchal model of the family in which they supported married parents with children 
while state support had few care giving programs for children and the elderly. East 
Germany family policy ―represents an interventionist family-state relationship that 
indicates public patriarchy within the realm of a social responsible framework.‖ 
Comparing the two shows how the state family policy impacts family lives in sharing 
responsibilities for child care and the elderly, which are major reasons for women‘s 
employment and status in the society.                
 Thus, German women, especially East German women, became losers in the 
reunification. However, questions can be raised; what does the unemployment rate and 
the changed state supported family policies mean? And what are gender attitudes behind 
the unemployment rate?   
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2. Cultural and religious reflection on the phenomenon of German women in 
the reunification 
 
In the New York Times, Katrin Bennhold states that ―women in the former 
Communist East seemed to be the big losers‖ when the Berlin Wall collapsed.240  German 
women became losers in the reunification process of the two Germanys. This result raises 
the question: what are the gender attitudes behind the unemployment rate? It is clear that 
culture, politics and religion impacted the number of unemployed women after the 
German reunification. Thus, I claim that culture and religion play a strong role than the 
role of politics in human lives and consequently culture and religion must be part of any 
reunification of political entities. Religion is a major factor, influencing both politics and 
culture.    
 In the process of the unification of Germany from 1990 to 1994, the number of 
women employed in East Germany fell from 10 million to 6 million. In the East, the paid 
employment of women between the ages of 16 and 65 was 85%, compared to 54% in the 
West. However, after unification, women‘s employment fell to 49% and 44%.241     
These rates are the result of the outside structures of the labor-market and the 
market- policy of Germany.
242
 Even though both East and West Germany had guaranteed 
equality in their constitutions and even though the unified Germany was based on the 
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same ideology, internal factors brought about these results of unemployment. Questions 
can be raised: what were the reason for the severe elimination of women in the work-
force and the consequent lack of social support for women, and what was the 
fundamental reason why in the political structure women have primary responsibilities in 
the household? I will discuss the concept of women‘s primary responsibility as 
motherhood, and how it affects the society and also how the political culture and family 
policy institutions were influenced by women‘s position and employment.   
1) Is the primary responsibility of women motherhood? 
 In The Encyclopedia of Women‟s History, Jone Johnson Lewis defines women‘s 
role in German society in using the three ―K‖ words: Kinder (children), Kirche (church), 
and Kuche (kitchen).
243
   
Trzcinski asserts that a dichotomous category about gender brought unequal 
outcomes as a natural result of inherent differences between women and men. Also, 
policies were made that favored men systematically and that these policies were a 
disadvantage to women.  However, the greater problem is that the unbalanced systems 
and culture in the two Germanys are hard to reveal. Hare-Mustin and Marecek say that 
―inequalities of power are often concreted on our culture.‖ This means that when the 
dichotomous category about gender occurs slowly as a social and economic relationship, 
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it is easy to conceal. Moreover, when gender is categorized in politics, society and culture, 
it is used to create and maintain unequal outcomes, and the outcomes are considered as 
natural and inevitable.
244
 This is the reason why people do not raise questions about the 
unequal situations and consider them as natural and inevitable in the society.  
Both East and West Germany proclaimed equality in their constitutions. However, 
as Spakes points out, even though the Constitutions guaranteed equality, it was not 
possible to form an equal opportunity when policies continued to reinforce the 
assumption that the primary responsibility of women is motherhood.
245
  This view asserts 
that women‘s primary duty is being wife and mother. Also, women‘s primary parent 
responsibility was encoded in the governmental policy. Even East Germany decreed in 
their Family Law Code of 1965 that both parents have responsibility to take care of home 
and family but the government assumed until 1989 that women, as mothers, should be the 
primary parent. Married women with full-time jobs and single parents were allowed a 
housework day and a shorter working week with full pay. However, fathers were not 
allowed the benefits without special permission.
246
After 1986, married men took parental 
leave for wives‘ maternity leave and other special occasions with permission but few men 
used these benefits. Another example of the unbalanced system and culture was wage-
difference between women and men. East Germany‘s Constitution, article 3, guaranteed 
equal rights for men and women and the prohibition of discrimination by gender. Thus, 
wage reductions for women were illegal, but also it recommended in the 1955 
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Constitution that businesses can establish wage-groups that depend on physical labor. It 
could be used to categorize whether work is easy or difficult. Also, until July 1, 1977, as I 
mentioned above, East German law stated that a wife can be qualified at the combine 
work and familial duties. Also, mothers, not fathers, are required to provide the 
documentation showing proof that child-care is available. This contradicts the 
Constitution, which guaranteed equality.
247
  Defining women as mothers has influenced 
gender base politics and practices. Also, it has protected men more effectively than 
women in the process of unification.           
Trzicinski says that the categorization brought hard situation to women in both 
German states:  
This categorization was the basis for policies before and after unification 
and shaped men‘s and women‘s relationships to power in both the GDR 
and the FRG. Thus, the lack of equality in the home and in the political 
sector made it difficult for women in the GDR to achieve equality in the 
employment sector.
248
  
 
 
The high rate of unemployment of women after unification was the result of a 
revealed phenomenon that concealed power relationships. Therefore, the imbalance in the 
distribution for women at the beginning of unification was the result of the societies 
which were based on the conceptualization of the difference between men and women. 
Also, these societies created and maintained distinctions in the social and economic 
relationships. 
249
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2)  Political culture 
  There is another reason for analyzing the unequal outcome after unification in 
gender and attitude, namely the concept of ―political culture‖.  Marina A. Adler and April 
Brayfield assert that the gender related attitude of the two regimes have changed with 
policy-developments in the United States and in the two regions of unified Germany. 
Political culture is defined as ―the dominant values, attitudes and beliefs in a particular 
country, and the related behaviors of the citizenry. 
250
 It includes national characteristics, 
cultural identity of the country, and the population‘s attitudes toward the political system 
and policies, all of which relate to the economic structure of society. Therefore, political 
cultures are based on maintaining particular welfare systems and gender polices.
251
   
 Also, social, political, cultural issues affect institutions through social political 
discourse and interpretations. Kunzler says: ―the political culture of a country can 
determine its development by framing its ‗approach to family and gender relations‘ via a 
combination of Catholicism, conservatism, and corporatism (West Germany), or 
socialism, egalitarianism, and centralism (East Germany).‖252 Therefore, political cultures 
are associated with the private or public sphere of family policy and functions to force 
choice in national policies. Political culture in regard to the meaning and value of 
employment is also related with the political and economic structure of society. Also, it 
includes the country‘s dominant ideologies such as gender-status, motherhood, women‘s 
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independence, work-family balance and a culture of care. It can be expressed as ―gender-
culture‖ which is connected with gender-order and public attitudes of the gender division 
of labor.
253
  
3)   Religion as one of the major facts of German belief and way of life    
Nationalism influenced German belief and way of life in the definition of the role 
of women. Helene Slessarev-Jamir asserts that German nationalism has been an 
important role in reinforcing patriarchy in German society. From the old Prussia state, 
“good Germans” were meant to have more children for the fatherland with the slogan of 
“Blut und Boden.” The Nazis followed this same pattern: children for the fatherland. 
Slessarev-Jamir adds: “after the defeat of the second World War, there remained a great 
need to repopulate Germany after its enormous losses that no doubt led to government 
policies encouraging women to see themselves as mother first, rather than workers.”254  
She also points out the German unions’ and the Social Democrats’ influence in the 
role of women. She argues that German unions and the Social Democrats favored the 
position that women stay at home with children. 
255
 Martin Kitchen in his book, A History 
of Modern Germany 1800-2000, argues in the same way.
256
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In Nazi Germany, the status of women gradually improved. Kitchen writes: “The 
lot of the vast majority of women in the Third Reich improved greatly. Their husbands 
had a steady job, real wages were rising, admittedly from a very low level, and the future 
looked promising.”  However there were many negative aspects in the Nazi policy toward 
women: “Under ideal circumstances they were to be confined to the home as mother of 
racially sound children, all in the interests of eugenics, racial politics, and preparation for 
war. The Fuhrer needed children, and to this end ‘Mother’s Day,’ which had been 
instigated during the Weimar Republic, was made into the central event of the Nazi 
fertility cult, celebrated with great pomp, ceremony, and pathos.”257        
Gorden Smith in his book, Politics in Western Europe, argues that religion and 
politics are balanced in Western Europe. He describes West Germany’s religious balance 
[Catholic and Protestant parity] as follows: “In these three countries [West Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland], there is a peaceful coexistence of the two; no longer does 
a person’s religion result in political or social discrimination, nevertheless, religion does 
have a salience for politics, and the two churches are still to an extent in competition with 
one another.”258  Also, he asserts that for middle class men and women, whether they are 
actually church goers or not, the religious element was an identifying symbol of their 
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values of society, even though for the younger generation the link between party and 
religion was not very significant.
259
   
 As I mentioned above, the political culture of a country affects family policy 
institutions. Ola Sjoberg in her research compared thirteen industrialized countries in 
Europe concerning the role of family policy institutions in structuring attitudes towards 
female labor force participation. She found that there are two different perspectives 
which explain the role of family policy institutions. First, gender role attitudes differ by 
the capacity of family-policy institutions which combine home-labor with paid-work. 
Second, the family policy institutions give rise to the norms about ‗proper‘ roles in 
society.
260
  
 One of the major factors influencing the formation of political culture is religion. 
Institutionalized religions like the Catholic Church and different Protestant churches have 
been powerful social forces in guiding people‘s lives. Both Catholics and Protestants 
have supported the ideal role of women as ―proper wives.‖ Therefore, according to Hall, 
this domestic ideology gave working women the image of being unnatural and 
immoral.
261
 Catholic social doctrine has been a core voice that women are subordinate 
persons. Thus, women‘s family obligations take priority when the family obligation and 
outside work are conflicted. Therefore, female employment is considered negatively in 
these religious societies, and motherhood is the priority and natural vocation for women.  
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 Even though Catholics and Protestants have the same traditional ideal of family, 
they have influenced the societies in different ways. Catholic social doctrine has been 
more influential in policies and in their ideology for most Christian Democratic parties in 
Europe which strongly reflect Catholic dominated nations because of its rejection of the 
ideology of secularization of religions.
262
 Thus, a family policy model supposes the view 
that the wife‘s primary responsibility is caring and reproductive work. So, outside work 
with pay is considered temporary and secondary. The family policy based on Catholic 
doctrine conflicts with models that encourage women‘s participation in the labor force 
and combines the parent (both men and women) model with paid-work. In contrast, 
Protestant dominated nations show a different phenomenon. According to Ferrarini, the 
left- wing government in Protestant dominated nations regard gender equality as a base 
for gender liberation. It has a different view of the traditional roles of women and men. It 
tries to manifest a policy that reduces the responsibilities of women to the family and 
gives changes to work outside. 
263
        
 When women feel that employment is not compatible with a mother‘s role, they 
face a serious identity conflict. Therefore, the support systems of family-policy 
institutions could ease the conflicted role between women‘s work and family obligations. 
Family-policy institutions can be a means of combining work as a mother and work in the 
paid labor force.
264
 Therefore, Sjoberg asserts that family policy-institutions can affect 
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deeply individual lives, identities, self-images and orientations towards the world. Also, it 
can affect the prevailing norms in society and can be a part of a strategy of societal actors 
to make better the power resources. 
265
        
 Guido Heineck shows how religion influences women‘s paid employment.266  
Heineck asserts that women‘s participation in paid employment is influenced by religious 
groups, but depending on the groups‘ strictness.267 It means that a woman, who has a 
spouse with strong beliefs, tends to react to work negatively. According to sociological 
and economic theories, religion affects women‘s decisions whether to work or not. Also, 
gender roles and the division of labor are differently valued by religious groups. For 
example, almost 25 percent of ―exclusivist Protestants‖ has strong tendencies that 
husbands have the prime responsibility for earning a living and wives should take care of 
the home and family. In contrast, only 8 percent of persons without religion agreed with 
the view. Also, the exclusivist Protestants did not agree that women who have children 
under 5 years old should have full-time jobs. Thus, women‘s paid employment depended 
on whether husbands and wives are of the same religious group and also, whether the 
husband belongs to a more liberal religion or not. According to Lehrer, women whose 
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husbands do not belong to the same religious group and belong to a more liberal religion, 
have a greater possibility of participating in the labor force. 
268
  
 Heineck distinguishes the groups by religion and married women‘s employment. 
The first group shows that married women who belong to stricter religious groups are less 
employed compared to the opposite groups. For example, 72% of women who do not 
belong to a major religious group (especially, in the Muslim group in Germany) 
269
 are 
highly not employed. Women, who belong to Christian churches or groups like Baptists, 
and Methodists, are not employed; 59% are unemployed. In contrast, women who do not 
belong to religious groups are more employed at full time jobs. Also, 64% of women who 
say that belief is very important are not employed. In contrast, 43% of women who say 
that belief is not important are not employed. Twelve percent of women who believe are 
employed as a full-time employees compared to 40% of non-religious women who are 
employed in full-time positions.
270
  In a similar picture, when women who are Muslim 
spouses who are also Muslim, both full-and-part- time employment clearly decreases. 
Also, when Muslim women have husbands with different religions, full time employment 
increased and were in line with expectations. Therefore, it is clear that there is a religious 
influence in married women‘s labor supply. As we see, strict churches or religious groups 
are negative as regards women‘s participating in paid employment. Also, an inner–faith 
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marriage partner who has the same denominational affiliation should influence negatively 
while inter-faith marriage might positively or negatively affect women‘s labor supply. 
Thus, marital composition influences women‘s labor participation and women who attend 
church regularly are often less employed.     
 
Table 6:      Employment Status of married women in Germany by denominational 
affiliation and strength of belief. 
 
 Employment Status in 1997 (Shares in row percentages) 
 Full-time Part-time Not employed Total 
Denominational 
affiliation 
 
Catholic 18.7 29.1 52.2 100 
Protestant 19.5 31.3 49.2 100 
Other Christian 18.2 (23.1) 58.7 100 
Other religious 
group 
(11.2) (16.3) 72.5 100 
No denomination 43.8 16.6 39.6 100 
Importance of 
religions/belief 
 
Very important  12.4 23.6 64.0 100 
Important 20.9 27.7 51.4 100 
Slightly 
important 
22.7 30.8 46.5 100 
Not important 38.9 18.2 42.9 100 
Total 23.3 26.6 50.1 100 
Source:        GSOEP, 1997 and 1998; weighted calculations
271
  Notes: ( ) cell includes 
less than 30 cases. 
 
  In conclusion, the reasons, that German women become losers and the behind of 
employment rate of women were not just the political situation in forming a new state, 
but there were other more primary reasons. The dichotomous category of gender 
considers women‘s primary responsibility to be motherhood. Also, political culture, and 
family policy institutions are factors which determine women‘s position and employment 
rates in the society. Also, the major fact in determining political culture and family policy 
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institutions is religion which influences people‘s minds, beliefs, way of life and the 
system of society. Specifically, this section has examined how religion influenced 
women‘s paid employment in German society.  Married women whose husbands belong 
to the strictness group and who have the same religion and have strong faith were less 
employed in paid full time labor forces.  
 This analysis shows that the unequal situations and systems in society are not only 
political problems but also religious ones. Therefore, without reconstruction of religious 
ideology, which confirms women as subordinate being and women‘s primary job is 
motherhood, there is no overcoming the conceptualization about gender division in the 
labor force and developing support systems for family policy. Moreover, there will be no 
equal position and employment either in the family or work place.    
3. Gender Politics in Korean Reunification  
1)  How the division influenced South Korean women‟s lives? 
A. The division‟s effect on women  
War is the most radical violence for it destroys and erases human life. The 
number of deaths in the Koran war will never be accurately assessed. The misery of the 
Korean War continued even after the war itself ended, for the war led to the division of 
one nation and brought uncountable sufferings to almost every Korean, but among the 
two populations, North and South, Korean women were in many ways the main victims. 
How can I say that the Korean women were the utmost victims? In this part, I will 
describe the division‘s effect on women in three parts and provide evidence for my thesis 
through narrating the practical experiences of women which were caused by the division.   
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 First of all, a major reason why the division affected Korean women‘s lives was 
the legalization and expansion of the patriarchal Korean culture. While the Chosun 
dynasty strengthened the patriarchal culture in Korean history, the division of the country 
legalized the expanding of patriarchy beyond that of the Chosun dynasty. In the South, 
everyone had to obey the new laws of the nation because political and social security had 
become the top priority in South Korean society. Human rights and the freedom of ideas 
and meetings were prohibited, since they were seen as a danger to political and social 
security. The new legislation also produced an authoritarianism which emphasized the 
concentration of authority, effectiveness, hierarchy, order and obedience in the central 
leadership of South Korea. The culture of authoritarianism and hierarchy seriously 
affected women‘s lives. The order of importance can be expressed in the following order:  
―the nation- then man-then woman- then child.‖ An even more important aspect of the 
legislation was its ideology which seriously affected women because of sexual violence 
of women, poverty which had been caused by war, war widows, and Gijichon women. 
Nevertheless, many women considered the situation as not overly problematic and just 
accepted it as a result of the post-war period. However, women often became victims of 
violence in these circumstances.
272
 Furthermore, as Jun Suk- Hee points out, the violence 
against women was not personal; rather it was a type of ―collective violence‖273 caused 
by the system of a divided nation. Jun defines patriarchy, gender division of labor, gender 
discrimination in work and family, and violence as evidence of collective violence. The 
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two-nation division system became the justification of women‘s dehumanization.274 A 
more serious problem was this: Korean society considered these issues as ―just problems 
of some women.‖ rather than problems affecting all the lives of all Korean women.275  
  Secondly, Korean women‘s lives after the division were influenced by the delay 
of feminine participation in politics. South Korean society suffered even more when there 
the threat of nuclear weapons. North Korea began to develop nuclear weapons as 
protection of its sovereignty. To be placed under the danger of nuclear weapons strongly 
increased the fear of South Koreans vies-a-vies the North Koreans. The politics of safety 
led to excessive war expenditures and economic uneasiness in South Korea; it also 
obstructed economic developments with the consequence of requiring sacrifices by all 
South Korean people. Also, the military dictatorships suppressed any and all democratic 
developments, efforts to bring about economic justice, and every challenge to the 
government which had claimed that is was following the ―correct interpretation of 
history‖ under the name of security. Unluckily, these situations led to major difficulties 
for women, but the major difficulties for women never became urgent problems in 
Korean society at large.
276
 Many women suffered in the work place, in school and even in 
family life. The division of Korea stifled women‘s voices and the call for the human 
rights of women. Likewise, the systematic developments in politics, economics, culture 
and education remained male-oriented to the detriment of women.   
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 Therefore, the division of Korea produced poverty and health problems for 
women, as well as wartime rape on a national level, the problem of Gijichon in the 
economic area, sexual abuse in the area of ordinary life, domestic violence, gender 
division of labor, and gender discrimination in both the social and the family areas. 
Patriarchy and unequal gender relations of power excluded women in almost every 
cultural area.
277
       
B. The experience of two mothers and separated families 
The experiences of two mothers who lost their precious sons show us how the 
division and military dictatorships influenced women‘s lives. One mother lost her son 
during the time of the war and the division of the country, and the other mother lost her 
son during the subsequent military dictatorship of South Korea.  
 The experience of the first mother was written in her daughter‘s book, ―Mother‟s 
Stake‖ by Park Wan- Suh, in which she describes her family history from her youth to her 
mother‘s death. The story starts with her mother‘s spasms. Because of these spasms, her 
mother fell down on a snowy road and broke her leg. The cause of the mother‘s s 
instability came from her buried unconscious memory concerning her son‘s death. With 
her wild stamping, the needle for the medical solution came out of her arm, spreading 
blood all over her sheets. She was screaming once again to ―the soldier, the teachers of 
the soldier that only women are living in this house. You do not need to search this 
house, teacher of soldiers!‖278 ―Guys, stop there, guys! Kill me instead, guys!‖279 She was 
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asking all this because of the cursing and searching soldiers who were looking for her 
son. They found him hiding in the house and they killed her son.                                     
 The mother and her family lived in the rural district, Kae Sung,
280
 for she had left 
her home town for her son‘s education after she had lost her husband. So, she decided to 
move to the capital city for her son‘s education, even though she had been opposed by 
many of her family. She rejected their opposition because her son was her life‘s goal and 
her family‘s future. She supported him with needlework for prostitutes in the poor area of 
Seoul.  
 The North and South governments exchanged control of the capital city every 
three months at the Korean War time. The mother and son could not openly take refuge 
in Seoul because her son was considered ―a traitor of North Korea.‖ Therefore, they hid 
in a poor area where they had lived before. However, the son was discovered by the 
North soldiers and was shot. The surviving two women (mother and daughter) performed 
the funeral rites without crying because they worried about somebody who might hear 
their cries. Outside, the mother looked peaceful, but the war engendered in her a 
profound pain that remained with her for the next thirty years. Her whole life was 
affected by the pain of ―han‖ for she had lost her son in the war.                 
 The second story is the mother of Jeon Tae- Il who lost her son when he was only 
22.  Jeon was born as a son of a poor worker and grew up peddling wares. He had had 
only an elementary level education. In 1965, he started work as an assistant tailor in a 
factory within the Seoul Peace Market. At that time, his wage amounted to the price of 
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one cup of tea, even though he had worked 14 hours of labor per day. In 1966, he came to 
realize how the low wages of young women were. He began to realize how harsh the 
environment in which he worked truly was, and how tedious was his work as a tailor. He 
started to be interested in the labor movement. When he tried to help a young woman 
worker who suffered with pneumonia due to the harsh work and the environment, he was 
fired.  
 By chance, he found out about the legislation regarding the Labor Standards Act, 
and he felt a righteous anger that employers and the government did not enforce even the 
minimum standard of working conditions. Thus, he organized the first Peace Market 
labor movement, which he called ―the Stupids‘ Meeting.‖ Because of the labor 
movement, he was fired again but he came back to the Peace Market in September, 1970 
and began organizing ―Sam Dong Chinmokhoi.‖ Jeon and his members decided on 
November, 11, 1970 to perform a burning ceremony of the Labor Standard Act which 
was in his view a worthless law and did not protect human rights. But when the 
capitalists and police tried to break up the meeting, Jeon set himself on fire and ran 
through the streets of the Peace Market shouting: ―We are not machines, enforce the 
labor code.‖ Because of the fire, he fell down and said as he collapsed:  ―What I did 
cannot be in vane because of my death.‖ In the hospital, he died and but before dying he 
asked his mother, ―Mother, you accomplish the work that I did not finish please.‖ 
 The mother of Jeon Tae- Il, Lee So Sun recalled her painful experience: ―In a way 
very troubling. I always think and I have always thought I should not have been born into 
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the world. I should have had been snatched out of the world by fate. If I had not been 
born, Tae Il would not have been born.‖281  
In her saying, we can feel the pain of a mother who lost her son and regrets the 
she herself was even born. After her son‘s death, she tried to honor her son with a favor. 
She lived as ―a Mother of Workers‖ for 39 years. She had lived only 22 years before her 
son died, she lived her entire life as the mother of Jeon Tea- Il. She suffered severe 
hardship: she broke the law 18 times and was jailed for three years. Lee So-Sun said that 
―after I had honored Tae- Il‘s request, I ran to the fighting places where even my body 
could be turned into powder.‖282            
           In a way similar to the women in these stories, many mothers lost their sons and 
daughters both during the war and after the division. In Korea there is a saying: ―If parent 
dies, they are buried in the mountain, but if children die, they are buried in their mother‘s 
heart.‖ Among the biggest sorrows in life, would be a mother losing her children. 
Because of the war, the division of the nation, and the side effects from the division, 
many mothers have lived their lives in the sorrow and ―han.‖ 
 Another painful experience brought on by the division was family separation. I 
cannot forget the television special program called ―Looking for separated families‖ that 
the South Korean broadcasting company (KBS) produced. It was aired on June 3 1983. 
The KBS had established a meeting space for families who were separated by the Korean 
War. On their way to take refuge during the war and even after the war, they had lost 
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contact with each other and could not be in contact until after the end of the war. Fifty 
thousand people gathered around the station with signs that showed their lost family‘s 
picture and described where, when and how they were separated. The number of people 
who gathered around the station showed how many families had been separated by the 
division. All South Koreans cried together when the separated families met and hugged 
each other. Many fainted with the pain and joy while others could not stop crying. They 
hugged each other as if they would have to separate again. On that day, 10,180 families 
met each other after years of separation. This happened again when North and South 
Korea made a space for the separated families to meet on August 15, 2000.  Still many 
old people, however, are even today waiting for the time to meet their separated families, 
even though meetings were held 16 times up to 2009. Family separation is the pain and 
sorrow of war and division.          
C. Does the Reunification Mean a New Life for Women?  
Many Korean women expect that Korean reunification will give new life to 
women such as new roles in economics, education and politics. However, as we saw in 
the case of German reunification, the impact on women‘s lives was negative as far as 
political, economic, and social changes were concerned.  
Jung Hyun-Back explains the reasons for the negative impact on women‘s lives. 
Because there was a national change in relation to ―nation‖ and ―women‖, human rights 
violations of women and minority groups could be ignored easily in history. For example, 
most colonized nations had the task of building an independent and modern nation after 
their liberation, and women participated as a part of the process economically, politically, 
and socially for national liberation. Jung explains how women‘s positions were changed 
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by the South Korean nation‘s situation.  
In consideration of the colonized Chosun dynasty, when the nation lost its 
sovereignty, woman was symbolized as ―Mother‖ and motherhood was 
praised. The mother (but not the father), who worked for the cost of living, 
was honored but the honoring was temporary.  After the country recovered 
its independence, the father‘s role was symbolized in an honorable way 
and the role of mother was symbolized with only a passive and 
marginalized image.
283
  
 
 
This indicates that when the nation was in danger, women were considered as 
having an important role. But on the other hand, when the danger passed, women‘s 
benefits could be sacrificed for the national benefit.
284
            
Another case shows that women‘s roles have been marginalized in Korean history 
and this took place during the process of the industrialization in South Korea. After the 
experience of colonization, Korean society tried to find its national identity and culture. 
However, the patriarchal and feudalistic Korean society of the past remained at least 
quietly, and this produced labor exploitation and discrimination against women. In the 
case of South Korea, the mobilization and exploitation of a cheap female labor force was 
used for South Korea‘s industry in the 1970‘s and 1980‘s. From the middle of the 1960‘s 
onward, South Korea enforced a five year plan of economic development with wage laws, 
labor intensive activity, and light industry based on a low gain price policy. With these 
policies, the rural economy collapsed and the phenomenon of rural exodus rapidly 
increased. Rural girls came to the capital, Seoul, without any plans. They wanted to 
provide for their family‘ living costs and for the educational tuition of their brothers. The 
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girls were absorbed as factory workers, bus conductors, housekeepers, entertainment 
workers, and prostitutes. In the name of national industry, many young women workers 
had to endure severe labor situations and they were looked upon with contempt. However, 
women‘s contributions were not considered as valuable and honorable in the historical 
evaluation of South Korea‘s industry development.285 
We can see an example of young women worker‘s lives and the labor situation in 
which they worked in a report which appeared in the daily newspaper ―Donga 
Newspaper‖ on April 12, 1980. According to the report, under the Sam Il governmental 
highroad, there was the continuing sound of sewing machines. There are young women 
workers who sew fabrics that are still wet and have a strong chemical smell. In the area, 
known as the ―Peace Market‖ area, there were about 600 small factories employing 7000 
workers. Young women workers usually worked 10 to 12 hours per day with low wages. 
In 1980, according to their contract, assistants earned 40$ per month, sewing assistants 
52$ to 60$, sewing machine technicians 82$ to120$, and tailor assistants 70$. The 
newspaper featured the case of a young woman worker, that of Cho Mi- Ja, who was 20 
years old. She had been working since she was 13 years old after graduating from 
elementary school and now had seven years of experience as a sewing machine 
technician. She worked from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. Monday through Saturday and her wage is 
110$ a month. Not only was there a low wages problem but also the workers could not 
earn more money overtime. Even more serious were the problems job-related diseases. 
The women were working under dim fluorescent lamps and it was hard to find thin thread. 
Most of the worker‘s eyes suffered from some sort of eye disease. Also, they sat all day 
for the work and this produced gastro-intestinal disorders due to the lack of exercise. 
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Many of the women developed respiratory diseases. Among all these women, there were 
many who were still suffering from tuberculosis but they tried to hide it because they 
worried that they would be fired. 
286
 Even though the young workers sacrificed their lives 
for South Korean industry, they were looked upon with contempt as ―a factory worker.‖                   
At times, we can see that modern democracy has given some fairly good positions 
to women but at the same time we can see that in general women were marginalized. 
These historical experiences could be repeated if and when there is a reunification of 
North and South Korea. Jung warns that sex distinction in the labor market could easily 
bring about a political and social inside ―colonization of gender‖ and this could easily 
happen in the process of reunification.
 287
 Women have to remain aware of what happened 
to women many times in history and they have to be prepared that past mistakes are not 
repeated. 
2) The need for feminist perspective reunification politics   
German reunification gives us many lessons. In the German process of 
reunification, there were few considerations for women. As a result, the policies did not 
reflect women‘s needs and difficulties. Moreover, women‘s problems were postponed in 
the process of integrating both systems, because national problems and other social 
problems held the priority. This also happened in past Korean history. Park Ye- Kung 
notes that ―the German unification failed in its perspective if the purpose of political 
integrations goal is sociological integration,‖288Therefore, if Korea would be reunified in 
                                                          
286
 Dong A Newspaper, April 12, 1980.  
 
287
 Jung, op.cit., 9. 
 
288
 Ye- Kung Park, ―Hangukaeseoui Yeosung,  Pyeonghwa and Tongil [Women, Peace and reunification in 
Korea],‖ Deahan Jungchihakhoebo Vol. 14, No. 2 ( 2006): 11. 
 
 121 
 
 
the same way as a democracy and market economy, the North Korean‘s pain will be 
increased. The majority of North Koreans would drop to a poorer class – status, because 
their income and their skills, work experiences and education would not be useful in the 
reunited society. Therefore, finding work places would not be easy for them. Moreover, 
since they were under the education of Juche ideology for about 60years and since they 
believed and served Kim Il –Sung and Kim Jung-Il as their fathers such as God, the 
majority of North Korean would be ideologically insecure. Thus, the democratic society‘s 
different culture and value–system would be a new and difficult task for them to adopt.     
Also, North Korean women would have more problems than South Korean 
women in the new system. If Korea does not want to follow the German steps, Korea has 
to develop a new way of reunification. Women have to participate in the process of 
reunification and make politics for women part and parcel of the historical outlook. Park 
also warns that there is a possibility that the Korean patriarchal society would become 
stronger in the process of solving the social and economic problems because of sexist 
politics, economic employment and gender roles. Let us consider this in some detail. 
 
A. Women‟s poor participation in South Korean politics and the reasons 
for this lack. 
First of all, it should be noted that to data women‘s participation and comments 
appear rarely in the reunification discourse of South Korea. Also, women‘s participation 
in political, military, and economic issues is limited to a few women, and even then most 
women are able to concentrate only on a few social areas. The chart below gives the 
number of women from 1990 to 2003who participated in discussions in the Ministry of 
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Unification department,
289
 and in the Foreign Affairs Department and in the Defense 
Department.
290
 
   Table 7:    Women‘s participation rates in the Ministry of Unification, the Foreign 
Affairs Department and the Defense Department. 
 
 The Ministry 
of Unification  
The Foreign 
Affairs Dep.   
The Defense 
Dep. 
Total 
1990 9.7 (7/72) 3.3 (2/60) 0.5 (1/203) 9.0(1019/22374) 
2000 22.7(17/75) 7.9 (5/63) 4.1 (10/244) 15.0(972/6494) 
2003: 
Natural positions 
Appointed positions 
 
0.0 (0/11) 
 
22.7(10/44) 
 
-- 
25.0(2/8) 
 
0.0 (0/24) 
21.5 (44/205) 
 
1.3 (25/1983) 
27.3(1237/4523) 
  Source:     The Institute of Korea Women‘s Development www.kwdi,re.kr    
 
According to the chart, the number of women‘s committees in the Ministry of 
Unification, the Foreign Affairs Department and the Defense Department respectively 
totaled 9.7%, 3,3,% and 0.5% in 1990. But the rate increased to 22.7%, 7.9%, and 4.1% 
in 2000. It looks as if women‘s position and participation had improved. However, if we 
study the statistics more carefully, natural positions are 0% and women appear only in 
appointed positions. The committee of natural positions is restricted to senior officials 
and to some appointed positions of citizens who only attend meetings a few times a year. 
This means that of now there are no senior official women who participate in the process 
of political decisions.
291
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In the case of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, 
which is commissioned to suggest unification policies to the president and to collect 
statistics on people‘s willingness and capacity for unification, there is  also a low rate of 
women participants, namely: 2 women are chair people among 20 vice chairmanships 
(10%); 1 women is among 10 directors of divisions (10%); women among chair-people 
of the domestic regional issues are (2.2%); and there is only one woman among 22 chair 
people  of the board which considers a broad of regional consultation (4.5%); and 41 
women among 213 standing committee members which are appointed positions (19.2).
292
 
This rate shows that women‘s participation is low and marginalized in all these official 
committees which are working for peace and unification.  
However, some changes have taken place which favor women‘s positions and 
politics in South Korea. Women‘s participation in society has improved and the equality 
perspective has increased. Also there is considerable improvement in education, in 
female participation in economic activities, in women‘s positions in families, and also in 
the public voice regarding an awareness of and a response to sexual assault, domestic 
violence, criticism of the patriarchal culture and participation in politics.
293
 However, as 
we have seen in the Table, there is no women‘s improvement in the many aspects of the 
Ministry of Unification, the Foreign Affairs Department, and the Defense Department. 
Women senior officials in government are rare, and there are no women secretaries. Also, 
all the representatives of ‗the Six Party Talks‘ were men.  
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Why is there no women‘s participation in those areas? Why are women excluded 
in these areas? There are three reasons.
294
 The first is this: these areas are considered for 
males partly due to the patriarchal culture that has been transmitted by the Confucian 
tradition and was enhanced by the Korean division. Thus, the participation of women has 
been almost non-existent in these discussions. For example, most of the published books 
and public school text books in South Korea show gender division pictures: men are 
symbolized as workers and women as house wives. Caring work is a women‘s task, while 
politics and military activity are male tasks.
295
 From childhood to adulthood, the roles of 
men and women‘s are divided clearly in text books and other literature used by children 
and young boys and girls. Moreover, the lack of women‘s active participation has been an 
enduring phenomenon for a long time in South Korean society. Thus, women need to 
recognize the importance of further women‘s active participation in these movements and 
take the initiative to change these issues.  
    Another reason for the lack of women‘s participation is the powerlessness of 
women themselves in politics, the military and economic spheres. Even though there are 
a few professional women in the areas just mentioned, it is difficult for them to penetrate 
the male–dominated fields because there are no groups for women‘s empowerment. For 
example, my husband and I graduated from a theological seminary and both of us are 
ordained as pastors. He is a senior pastor in a church and I am a graduate school student 
and an assistant pastor in my husband‘s church. When I have a chance to meet my 
alumni, the male alumni call my husband pastor and address me as the pastor‘s wife. 
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Female alumni, however, do call me pastor. What is the difference between male and 
female alumni in defining my position? It seems to me that male alumni are concerned 
about their future positions. They share information and introduce each other but they do 
not consider women alumni as part of their membership. They know that some ordinary 
churches are unwilling to accept women as senior pastors and therefore, women cannot 
join their group. These ―clerical‖ distinctions evidence the same phenomenon that the 
male power lines already have built in politics, the military and the economy. It means 
that governmental level institutional mechanisms for improving women‘s participation 
and roles are becoming standard for other institutional groups of men.         
The third reason for the lack of women‘s participation is that women‘s studies 
have missed the context of the Korean division.
296
 Women studies in South Korean 
society tend to emphasize discrimination in labor, family, law, and the violation against 
women. They define South Korean society as a patriarchy and they have tried to enhance 
the patriarchal cultural identities. These studies indicate that women have been active in 
confronting the problems of South Korean society. However, women‘s studies have 
apparently missed the context of division in their research even though the division has 
had a strong influence on women‘s lives as we have seen above. Also, women are the 
main victims of the division but the damages to women have been considered only as 
women‘s problems in South Korean society. The division‘s effect on women‘s lives has 
not been considered a problem for the whole Korean civilization. Therefore, there was no 
research on women‘s issues in the context of the division and no research on the ways in 
which the division has influenced the Korean patriarchal society. Shim notes that 
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―Korean Women‘s Studies have researched Korean society as a subject, but they have 
been excluded in discussion as if there was no North Korea.‖297 She points out that one 
problem of women‘s studies is that there has been little to no preparation for the future 
reunified society. Without preparation and participation in the reunification discourse and 
politics, there will be no room for women in the future reunified Korean society.  
B. The need for feminist reunification discourse  
 Why feminist perspective views are needed for the future society? The 
participation of women in the process of reunification does not mean that women will 
occupy men‘s positions or will even have some positions after the reunification. Rather, 
the feminist perspective seeks to build a better society in which women‘s insecurity is 
removed and peace and equality are working.
298
  
Shim asserts that ―peaceful reunification is the intermediate goal, and security of 
women has to be the ultimate goal‖ in the vision of a reunited Korea. Today, we must 
consider the possibility of the alienation of women after the reunification. The women‘s 
peace movement for reunification has a distinct form, since is not only wants to make 
reunification possible but it also wants to consider women as an integral and equal part in 
the future of society. Thus, to build the gender equal society, she suggests four things; 
first, there can be no more wars or armed conflicts in the newly unified country. 
Moreover, there can be no dictatorship; there can only be a peace-seeking democratic 
society. Secondly, there needs to be a free world with a strong remission of poverty and 
violence in the structure. Also, society needs to take care of marginalized people. In 
                                                          
297
 Ibid.  
 
298
 Young- Hee Shim, 63.  
 127 
 
 
doing all this, the nation‘s budget for the military may shrink, but hopefully there will be 
an increase in funds for social welfare for the weak. Third, there can be no prejudice 
against women in labor, family, and law. If this happens, there will be an improved 
gender equal society in which democracy, tolerance and nonviolence prevails. Fourth, 
there needs to be a reducing of cultural violence such as patriarchal militarism, which 
then allows for a more caring society and a mutual responsibility among women and 
men.
299
  
The peace movement discussion, according to Shim, is not only part of the 
political, economic and military understanding of reunification, but also a part of the 
reduction of the patriarchal system and ideology. She calls all of this ―the power of life.‖ 
There is no perfect peaceful reunification in the feminist‘s perspective without solving 
the problems brought on by the patriarchal militarism in everyday life, by the manner in 
which women and men are ―used,‖ and by the way in which the male privileged military 
security affects women.
300
               
The way of unification is changing today from an absorbing unification to an 
establishing of peaceful coexistence unification that is based on reconciliation and 
cooperation. Thus, it is time for women‘s roles and perspectives to appear strongly 
through new forms of men-women relationships through the use of dialogue, 
understanding and cooperation. Park Ye Kung suggests that a woman‘s agenda needs to 
be centered on peace and coexistence and on a system which manifests mutual 
understanding and cooperation. She hopes that the feminist perspective will contribute 
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positively to the South Korean society gender problems such as the labor market 
imbalances, inequality of patriarchy, and sexism in the workplace.
301
 Furthermore, the 
meaning of women‘s participation in the process of reunification is that the feminist 
perspective could lead to a new approach; it adds peaceful minds with caring and 
cooperation to the male centered political areas; and it moves from competitiveness and 
fighting to reconciliation and cooperation.    
3) Women‟ peace and reunification movements 
In discussing the feminist discourse of reunification, the investigation of women‘s 
peace and reunification movement is meaningful for it is seeking new directions for the 
future of women in the reunification movement. Women‘s peace movements have been 
started as the response to the women victims that were caused by the division.
302
 These 
movements have made many efforts to change the lives of women who have been and 
still are oppressed and damaged.  
The women‘s peace and reunification movements will be studied in three 
categories; 1) the women‘s rights movement, 2) the anti-war movements, and 3) the 
North and South Korean women‘s exchange movements.          
A.  The Women‟s Rights Movements      
 How and why do women‘s rights movements get started? As we have seen 
above, the division and poverty after the Korean War and the political confusion it 
engendered became the basic ground for the military dictatorship in South Korea. The 
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military dictatorship used the division situation to enhance their regime in the name of 
economic development and they used excessive violence in South Korea to maintain their 
grasp on the government.
303
 During the military dictatorship, from 1960 to1980 which 
was a period of industrialization, there was no recognition of civil rights but only the 
development of the nation and the national security. 
304
 In this situation, there were 
campaigns against sex tourism, the women‘s labor movement, the Gijichon women‘s 
movement, and the Comfort Women‘s countermeasure activities. 
First, the campaign against sex tourism in 1970 was a starting point among the 
women‘s rights movement. During the regime of Park Jeong Hee -- president from1963 
to 1979 -- the government implicitly encouraged sex tourism for foreigners, especially 
Japanese, in order to earn foreign currency. The dark side of sex tourism was considered 
a personal problem of the women prostitutes themselves; it was not considered a social 
problem. Most of the newspapers and broadcasts did not mention the dark side of sex 
tourism. Only the organization of Korean Church Women United and a few other 
women‘s organizations raised the problem and exposed it as a structural contradiction. 305 
The campaign against sex tourism was a challenge to the government of Park Jeong Hee, 
and the government was caused trouble by the heated response from Japan and other 
parts of the world.   
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Second, in the 1980s, the most representative women‘s movement was the 
women‘s labor movement. Feminists pointed out again and again the brutality which was 
part of the women‘s working conditions at that time and how these conditions maintained 
systematic violence. More of a problem, however, was the way in which the women‘s 
labor movement was considered, namely it was considered as a part of the national 
democratic movement. It was not considered in and by itself.
306
 Therefore, the problems 
of women were not raised as serious social issues, even among women. However, from 
the mid of 1980s onward, women‘s problems have been raised through organizations like 
the ―Women Workers Meeting,‖ which was established in March, 1987. The ―Women 
Workers Meeting was established as an independent women‘s labor movement and was 
expanded as the ―Korean Council for Women Workers‖ which asked for the discarding 
of discriminations such as unequal work, unequal pay and the unequal resolutions of the 
problems of retirement by marriage.
307
    
Third, there were the Gijichon women, who were in the U.S. Military Camp in the 
1980s to the 1990s. The problems of Gijichon women started in 1945 when the United 
State army established a base in South Korea. Kim Yun Ja, who worked in the Song Tan 
and Kun San Gijichon, publicly raised the problems of Gijichon women. The 
systematical women‘s movement of Gijichon was started from the ―Durebang‖‘s 
opening
308
 in Uijeongbu city in March, 1986. The major projects of Durebang were 
counseling, English classes, joint dinners, child care, career changes for the ex-
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prostitutes, and many other Gijichon activities. These works were started by the Union 
Activities of the Gijichon Women‘s Movement and the college women‘s movement. 
Women students announced the problems of Gijichon at colleges and public places.     
 However, the Gijichon women movement has been changed by the increasing 
flow of foreign women and the diversity of prostitutes who came from the Philippines 
and from Russia in the late 1990s. Thus, Gijichon includes foreign women, not only 
Korean women, and cultural diversity among the women brought on prostitution 
problems such as the subsistence of foreign prostitutes, the increase in phone girls and in 
massage girls.
 309
        
Fourth, the Comfort Women also had problems with the Japan army. Comfort 
women were sexual slavery by Japanese military government during the Japanese 
colonial period. Korean young women and also Asian women were kidnapped and forced 
to serve the Japan soldiers as sexual slaves. They were called as “comfort women.” These 
problems were first raised by Yoon Jeong- Ok in 1988, and the ‗Korea Council for 
Comfort Women‘ was organized by women‘s groups and individual gatherings on 
November 16, 1990. They asked the Japanese government to apologize and give 
compensation for the misuse of women. They also asked that the Japanese develop 
legislation for the comfort women. A grandmother, Kim Hak Sun, held a press 
conference at which the victims who lived in hiding were revealed and the damages to 
these victims were exposed in 1991. With her witness, the report phone line was opened 
nationwide and other grandmothers who were comfort women began to show themselves. 
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There were a lot of campaigns and protests from the memorial service for comfort 
women in Oka Seagate, Japan. The protest called ―Regular Wednesday Protest for 
Problem Solving of Japanese Comfort Women‖ was held every Wednesday in front of 
the embassy of Japan asking for a public apology of the Japanese government.
310
  
Also, the Comfort women problem was raised in the UN Human Rights 
Commission and in the International Labor Organization. A UN special reporter was 
appointed for the investigation. The special reporter, Gay Maekdugeol, reported that the 
problem of the comfort women was actually rape and the service club of comfort women 
was a rape center. This report changed the international recognition about comfort 
women. Also, a more notable issue is that the comfort women problem was initiated by 
Michael Honda, a Democrat, who is a third generation Japanese in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The Representatives adopted the ―Japan Comfort Women Formal 
Apology Resolution‖ (H.R.121) in unanimity on July 30, 2007 with a resolution that asks 
the Japanese government to recognize and apologize for this brutal activity. They also 
asked that in schools, young Japanese boys and girls are educated correctly on these 
historical facts.
311
  
B. Anti-war and disarmament movements 
 Antiwar and disarmament is one of the most important peace and reunification 
movements. It can be classified under two headings; the antiwar and the disarmament 
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movements. The disarmament movement started with ―the bomb victims support 
movement‖ in the 1970s.312 Korea Church Women United (KCWU)313 made the country 
understand the seriousness of the Korean bomb victims who were exposed by the bomb 
radiation which was dropped in Japan during the World War II. These people came back 
to Korea and suffered from various diseases, and too often they had mutated children at 
birth. Even if they had normal children, these children often suffered from genetic 
diseases and poverty. However, few Koreans were interested in their suffering. The 
KCWU conducted a survey about the bomb victims, and they helped the victims get 
treatment, cost of living for the family and education fees for the second generation until 
2000. In the 1980s, the KCWU had been more organized in supporting bomb victims 
with broadcasts about the status of the victims, kit issues and the risk of nuclear weapons 
through lectures, seminars, and slide shows.  Also, they urged that there be some 
compensation from the Korean government. They visited the Korean government to try 
to have laws enacted for the compensation and medical assistance of these victims. They 
also asked the Japanese government to compensate the bomb victims through the 
Korean government.
314
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    These movements influenced other disarmament movements such as the anti-
nuclear and nuclear power construction movement in the 1980s. Some students and 
intellectuals raised the problem of the nuclear weapon in South Korea and asked the 
government to clarify the nuclear weapon arrangement layout. However, the Korean 
governments have completely blocked any information about the issue because the 
Korean government groups have supported the U.S peninsula policy which means that 
Korea is a politically colonized country. Therefore, anti-nuclear discussion was 
considered anti-state security and supportive of North Korea. Even though the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki‘s nuclear bombing by the U.S. in 1945 made sixty thousand 
bomb victims some of whom were Korean, the Korean government completely 
prohibited raising the problem of victims. Korea has suppressed the voices of any and all 
people who raise the issue because the government believes that this silence is a way to 
show gratitude to the United States and some Korean leaders have even considered the 
bombs as a blessing that destroyed Japan‘s past and brought liberation to Korea.315   
Jeong Young- Sub criticizes the South Koreans who are in the group approving 
nuclear arms. Also, according to the polls made by the Dong –A daily newspaper (August 
6, 2005), 52% of the South Koreans approve Korea‘s eventual keeping of nuclear 
weapons. On the other hand, 57% of Korean respondents are opposed to the holding of 
nuclear arms while 41% of the people approve of it. These statistics are in contrast to 
86% of the Japanese and 93% of the Germans who warns against keeping nuclear 
weapons on their soil. These statistics show clearly that the defeated countries like Japan 
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and Germany are overwhelmingly opposed to having nuclear bombs on their land, while 
victorious countries like United States and the Soviet Union approve of nuclear weapons 
and this reflects a military ideology. Therefore, it also shows that Korea shares the 
victorious countries‘ nuclear ideology.316      
Also, the women‘s movement approved the defense cuts in Korea in the 1990s. 
The women‘ groups recognized that the excessive defense costs affected adversely 
people‘s lives and welfare. Furthermore the defense costs could have been used for the 
improvement of women‘s welfare. They held a rally in favor of the defense cuts in 
September, 26 1991, and on Oct. 15, 1991, one thousand persons signed a petition 
approving the defense cuts. A similar rally was held again urging the defense cuts in 1992 
and presented a document which listed women‘s welfare costs compared to the defense 
cost.            
Anti-war movements which were held from the early 1990‘s are important 
activities for the women‘s peace and unification movement groups. Among of anti-war 
                                                          
316
 Anti-nuclear movement groups criticizes that the U.S. has the use availability and decision of nuclear 
weapons in the South Korea. The central storage of nuclear weapons was Kunsan air base until 1980. The 
sixty nuclear bombs which are equipped in F-4, F-16 bomber having ability of nuclear attack had been 
storage in Kunsan in 1985. Also, the Youngsan base are in charge of nuclear mine, water nuclear (nuclear 
aircraft carrier, weapons that are firing from submarine), lance missile warhead capable of mounting, and 
nuclear cell. These nuclear weapon powers, according to the U.S. A.‘s posting, are 1,750 times than the 
power of nuclear weapon which boomed in Japan. The U.S.A. founded the Korean-American Association 
in 1978 and took over the operational commander in chief from the international allies. Thus, the head 
quarter of the Korean-American Association became the nuclear commander. It means that the South Korea 
president has no control power of nuclear but just provides means of transporting to the U. S. A. There 
were no decision and the right to discuss about the nuclear weapons and the right to know about how many 
and what kind of nuclear weapon including the scenario of using nuclear weapons. It means that Korea‘s 
destiny is put on the foreign powers again like the division and can be a sacrifice for other country‘s 
benefits and security. The anti-war and nuclear movements wanted inform about the risk to the Korean 
people and the movement was not lead independently by women groups but was joint in national 
democratic movement. See, Young Sub Jeong, 2005 and El- Li Kim, 1999.                
 
 136 
 
 
movements, three movements are representative; the anti-Gulf War and anti-dispatch 
troops, the peace settlement activity in the situation of the peninsula war crisis in 1994 
and 2002, the anti-Afghanistan and Iraq War in the 2000s.  
The first anti-war movement was anti- Gulf War and anti-dispatch troops. After 
Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the U.S. A. attacked Iraq on 
January 17, 1991. With the attack of United States, they asked Korea funding allocation 
for the war and medical troops as an ally. The Korea Women‘s Associate Groups 
presented the statement, ―Our position on the Persian Gulf War.‖ They hoped that the war 
would end quickly and reminded of the suffering of 6.25 War and the Vietnam War 
participations declaring that they will campaign against the dispatch troops. Also, 
Christian women formed representatives of each group as ‗the Meeting for Stopping the 
Persian Gulf War and Peace‘ on January 30, 1991 and they held women prayer meeting, 
―Church Women Prayer Meeting for Stop of Persian Gulf War and Peace.‖317 When the 
Gulf War looked prolonged and it was announced about additional support, the Korea 
Women‘s Associate Group made ―Mother‘s Meeting against the Gulf War and Korean 
Troop‘s Dispatch.‖ They raised the questions that what are the true national benefits, and 
what is the true peace? Also, they urged that it is time for ―mothers to go out from the 
kitchen and help build a peaceful world.‖318  
The second anti-war movement was the women‘ group for peace settlement 
activity, which, given the situation of the peninsula war crises, took place from 1994 and 
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2002. The first war crisis originated with the nuclear crisis of Yongbyon in North 
Korea.
319
 Thus, the women‘ groups responded to the situation. They made ―women‘s 
solidarity for building peace‖ in order to prevent the outbreak of war in the peninsula 
until the nuclear problems will be solved peacefully. They had a presses conference on 
July 20 and asked for an anti-war, peace treaty contract, the opposed the repression in 
North Korea, caused for the reopening the meeting between North Korea and U.S.A, 
fulfillment of the agreement between South and North Korean. Luckily, the North Korea 
and U.S. high level-talks reopened after the former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visited 
North Korea in June 1994. The crises hardly were over when Kim Il Sung suggested the 
South and North hold a summit meeting. With this situation, the women groups opened 
an emergency debate which met on June 29, with the theme, ―how can we agree to the 
South and North Korea summit?‖ They discussed the effects of the South and North 
summit which hopefully would bring about an improvement of the relations between the 
two Koreas.
320
       
The war crisis was browned one more time on the peninsula in 2002. U.S. A. 
president Bush included North Korea as an axis of evil. Bush named North Korea, Iran 
and Iraq as axis of evils who are threatening world peace. With his naming North Korea 
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as an axis of evil, Korea was put in fear that the next attack by the U.S. would be North 
Korea. Thereupon, ―the Women Peacemaking Meeting‖ criticized Bush‘s strong 
speaking that was forming war in the peninsula through a statement on February 7, 2002. 
Also, they asked the support of foreign international organizations to establish peninsula 
peace and protested the way of ―one person relay protests‖ in front of the U.S. embassy 
against Bush‘s visiting Korea. The 150 women who are the representatives of the 
women‘s groups held a press conference for proclaiming peace ahead of the South 
Korean and U.S. summit and asked to change the U.S.A‘s one way military policy and a 
meeting to open the way for North and South and North and U.S. dialogue.
321
    
The third anti-war movement is the anti- Afghanistan and Iraq war ground after 
9.11 in the 2000s. President Bush proclaimed the war on terrorism and Afghanistan that 
protected Osama Bin Laden. Accordingly, the women‘s groups were opposed to any 
violence whether it is war on terror or not and asked for peaceful resolve by protests; the 
women‘ street rallies against the war, cyber campaign, one person relay protests, and a 
memorial rally for the victims of 9.11. They also did international pressure activity by 
drafting an international journal and writing letters to the U.S presses. The 37 women 
groups constituted ―Women Peace Behavior Anti-War.‖  
C. North and South women‟s exchange movement 
Next is the North and South women‘s exchange movement for reunification.322 
This movement started from the fundraising of women‘s groups because of the serious 
food shortages in North Korea caused by the floods of 1995 and 1996, the droughts and 
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tidal wave in 1997.
323
 The North and South women‘s exchange movements in the past 
could be good examples for the future exchange movements and building up community. 
The women exchange activates stated after the 7.7. Declaration (1988) but it was slight 
until the 6.15 Joint Declarations in 2000.
324
 The four exchange programs will be 
researched; the women‘s reunion meeting during the national joint events from 2001 to 
2004, the North and South women unified conference in 2002, the women reunion 
meeting during the national joint events in 2005, and North and South women unified 
conference in 2005.
325
        
The first was the women‘ reunion meeting during the National Joint Events from 
2001 to 2004: the North and South civil groups made the meeting in 2001 for North and 
South exchange and reconciliation by the joint events from the South civil group‘s 
visiting to North Korea at the Labor party establishment events in October, 2000. Women 
commission was consisted in the national joint events‘ headquarters in 2001 and had 
chances to meet each other.  
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The second was the North and South women unified conference in 2002: the first 
independent women‘s events held at North Korea, Kum Kang River in October, 2002. 
There were 700 North and South women including those from politics, labor, academia, 
the arts, and religious sectors. They decided on the implementation of the joint 
declaration of peace.
326
 Every event was decided by bilateral consultations and the flag 
which was hung at the event was decided by mutual agreement.            
The third is the women reunion meeting during the national joint events in 2005. 
There was the women‘ reunion meeting during the national joint events which held for 5th 
commemoration of 6.15 Declaration in June 2005 in North Korea.
327
 Also, ‗the 8.15 
North – South Women Solidarity Meeting‘ held in August 2005 in Seoul.328  
The fourth is South-North Women Reunification Events in 2005: it was held in 
September from the 10 to 14
th
 in Pyongyang and Mt. Myohyang. There were 100 South 
women attendants and 300 North women attendants including those observing education 
related facilities and the attending cultural institutions from the North.
329
 However, after 
North Korea‘s missile launches in July 2006 and nuclear tests in October 2006, the inter-
Korea exchanges were stopped.    
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  The women‘s groups like the Korean Women‘s Association United, YWCA, and 
Women Peace Making Groups presented a proposition at the time of the North and South 
summit. In this proposition, the women‘s groups claimed a few things. The first was 
increasing women‘s participation in the delegate configuration and working group. 
Second was the government‘s active support in women‘s exchanges. Third was a 
suggestion that women‘s issues should be raised in the working meetings and also, the 
government‘s supports in economic exchanges and preferential action for women have to 
be considered. However, the result did not satisfy the women. There were no women in 
the process of the summit and only two women selected as special attendants and 
reporters. Nevertheless, they had only small results; the women‘s rate improved to 25% 
in the policy advisory committee of the Unification department and some female civil 
servants were promoted to the office of policy. Moreover, the government tried to fill 
30% of women in the role of visits to separated families.
330
      
   The inter-women exchange events increased which improved understanding on 
each other. However, the exchange depended on the political situations of domestically 
and in foreign matters. In evaluating the exchange event, Shim defines it in three 
levels
331
; the first was low level such as sports, arts, and social cultural exchanges, second 
as a middle level was economic cooperation and third as a high level was the exchange of 
political, military, and diplomatic matters. Also, in the intervention areas, first, 
humanitarian assistance and social and cultural exchange, second, human right issues, 
third, peace activities. If we evaluate the exchange events with these categories, women‘s 
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role in the inter exchange was limited in the first level, social and cultural exchanges and 
humanitarian assistance and social and cultural exchange.
332
 Nevertheless, these women‘s 
exchange events gave the chance to disclose the North Korean‘s thoughts, culture, and 
the position of women. Also, the images of being enemies and strangers that each woman 
had during the division was vanished and confirmed that they have the same blood, 
culture and inheritance. How can we know each other without meeting and how can we 
understand without knowing. These exchange meetings have to be held openly and have 
in many discussions.   
D. Women need the strategies for standing as subjects for the reunification 
 To be a subject in the process of reunification, women need their strategies. Jeong 
Hyun Back suggests two aspects that we have to consider: one is a diffusing of consensus 
and another is embracing of heterogeneity.  
 A diffusing of consensus between South Koreans has to be considered. Even 
though the women‘ raised questions and that are good for the government, the diffusing 
of consensus among South Korean is the first step. Thus, women have to diffuse the idea 
of peaceful reunification and try to make the support groups of the peaceful reunification. 
This is the same way the reunification is seen by the minjung of reunification theologians. 
For this, there needs to be the space for sharing their information and discussing their 
opinions. Jeong says that ―as there is need for South-South conversation in the South 
society, women need Women-Women conversation for the truly peaceful coexistence 
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system.‖333 This would be the first step to narrow the gap and conflict between South 
Koreans.  
 The second is an embracing of heterogeneity. The North and South Koreans have 
been experiencing the division since 1950, almost 61years. The gap of 60 years is not 
simple. Even though Korea would achieve peaceful reunification, the overcoming of 
differences would be another social issue. Reunification is the great hope of Koreans but 
it would be another trauma in a nation with differences. Thus, the effort to overcome the 
heterogeneity and preparation to be a nation are needed.            
Therefore, there are needs to be the process that each other finds what are 
homogeneity and heterogeneity. Thus, they can accept the difference and make the way 
to mutual understanding. By the inter exchange, women had five times forums since 1991 
and these gave the chance to confirm the homogeneity and heterogeneity. These 
exchanges would contribute to ―a mutual coexistence model‖ through the forums and 
dialogue. Jeong thinks that the women‘s heterogeneity among heterogeneities is greater 
than others. There would be a big gap between North and South women‘s perceptions 
and attitudes. Therefore, there needs to be a lot of chances to meet together.  To reduce 
heterogeneity, Jeong suggests two things. First, there are needed to be many channels 
which expose to women variety of information about relationships and reunification 
between North and South Korea. Second, dialogue between South and North Korean 
women are required for reducing heterogeneity. Women can share information and lessen 
their differences through the dialogue. Also, it could potentially be a gate to producing a 
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process leading to joint agreements and narrow disagreements and build a peaceful 
coexistence between the two groups of women. 
334
       
In this chapter we have considered in detail the issues of women‘s role in the 
family, in the work-force, and in political life. We have also seen that religion is a major 
factor for the Korean reunification program. Emphasis has been placed on the ―dis-
location‖ of women, physically, mentally, emotionally, and religiously. All of this 
provides a major contribution to my thesis which was stated as follows: ―My central 
position can be stated as follows. In the reunification process, cultural and religious 
factors play a central role. However, without women‘ perspectives and participation in 
rebuilding Korea, the reunification process will be seriously inadequate. Consequently 
both the cultural and religious factors must include an equalization of women and men.‖ 
The chapter indicates the lack of women‘s participation in the reunification situation to 
date. We turn to the next chapter which focuses on the Confucian position that men are 
more important than women and how this view remains unchanged in both North Korea 
and South Korea. Chapter Four continues to establish my thesis just as Chapter Three has 
done, but from a different viewpoint. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CULTURAL FRAMEWORK FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
  
 The goal of chapter is the following; I will consider the Korean culture effects on 
the reunification of the two Koreas. However, Korean culture is strongly Confucian and 
therefore the cultural effect involves Confucianism. There are two aspects to Confucian 
reality.  The first aspect centers on Confucius himself and his writings. A careful 
explanation of Confucius‘ thought can be found in chapter four Fung Yu-Luan‘s well-
accepted volume, A History of Chinese Philosophy 
335
 In this chapter, he carefully 
indicates what Confucius clearly taught and wrote. Another book that is necessary today 
for an understanding of Confucius is the volume by Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in 
Chinese Philosophy.
336
  
 The second aspect of Confucian thought is what many call ―Confucianism.‖ Over 
the centuries there have been many forms of Confucian thought, and Korean 
Confucianism has also been affected by several different historical forms of Confucian 
thinking. Wing-Tsit Chan notes that the Confucian interpretation of Chu Hsi (1130-1200): 
―He (Chu Hsi) gave Confucianism new meaning and for centuries [Chu His‘s 
understanding of Confucianism] dominated not only Chinese thought but the thought of 
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Korea and Japan as well.‖337 The Confucian idealism of Wang Yang-Ming (1472-1529) 
was also extremely influential in both Japan and Korea.  
 Hopefully, it is clear that I am making a major distinction between Confucius‘ 
own thought and writings and the multiple forms of Confucianism parts of which have 
little to no connection to Confucius himself. In Korea, Confucianism was very influential 
during the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910). The political leaders of Korea during this time 
used Confucian thought to maintain their male supremacy over the country. 
Confucianism, during this same period of time, strongly influenced family life with its 
own forms of male dominance. The Communist government of North Korea has openly 
stated that Korea should no longer be governed by the politics and thought of the Chosun 
Dynasty, and this included Confucian thought. However, the North Korean Communist 
government still honors certain aspects of Confucianism and they maintain this without 
mentioning Confucianism. These Confucian aspects are very beneficial to the Communist 
government itself. In this chapter, I call this form of Confucianism, ―Confucian socialism.‖ 
Moreover, in South Korea, the military government (1960-1988) also retained and urged 
certain aspects of Confucian thought. The Democratic Republic which took over in 1988 
also maintains certain aspects of Confucian thought. 
In this chapter, therefore, the term, Confucianism, refers to its use during the 
Chosun Dynasty, during the Communist government of North Korea, and during the 
military and then democratic governments of South Korea. In all three of these areas, my 
focus is on the Confucian influence which maintains a dominantly male government and 
which maintains a dominantly male family life. Both of these Confucian centers affect 
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Korean women: the education of younger women, their married life, their life in the work 
force, and their legal standing within the framework of the political life. 
With this clarification of the term Confucianism, we can now consider the theme 
of this chapter, namely the Cultural Framework for Korean Reunification. A major aspect 
of this cultural framework is Confucianism. The chapter is divided into three parts: the 
effect of Confucianism on Korean women‘s life, North Korean women‘s life with its 
Confucian background and the influence of Confucianism on the lives of South Korean 
women: their status and roles.  
 
1. The effect of Confucianism on Korean women‟s lives    
 We have seen how religions have had a strong influence in the culture and politics 
of Korean society, particularly in the areas which regulate women‘s lives. While the 
Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches prevailed in West German society, 
Confucianism has been the major influence in the Korean society. This influence began 
during the Chosun Dynasty. In contemporary Korea, Confucianism remains a very strong 
male-centered ideology and system. In order to strengthen patriarchal family systems 
effectively, there was a need for the absolute right of male power in the home. Therefore, 
women and children had to obey the men.  There were some moral laws for women, such 
as ‗Sam Jong Gi Do,‘338 ‗Chil Gyu Gi Ark.‘ 339 Women accepted these moral principles 
and their acceptance strengthened the male position in the home and in the state. 
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 Women could be driven from the married house when they did these things: when they did not obey the 
parent in law, did not have children, did obscene conduct, jealous, have bad diseases, do lot of talking and 
stealing.        
 148 
 
 
Therefore, the moral virtue of women became an unconditional obedience, for the role of 
women focused on supporting their husbands and caring for children.  
 In this section of my thesis, the topic focuses on understanding of the Confucian 
effect on Korean women‘s lives. This understanding of Korean women in their role as 
mother and wife has been deeply influenced by Confucian ideology. For centuries, the 
influence of Confucianism on women‘s life was strong, and because of the Confucian 
emphasis Korean institutions of political culture and family policy became a major 
influenced on women‘s position and life.  
1) The Confucian understanding of Korean women as mother and wife  
 Yin and yang are among the most basic theories of Confucianism and neo-
Confucianism regarding the union between man (yang) and woman (yin). Yin and Yang 
have modified all human relationships, morality, and ritual. The basic idea of yin and 
yang was to consider both as equally important because they have a complementary 
nature. This yin-yang principle, however, became the basis for the hierarchical sequence 
of Nam Jon Ye Bee.
340
 It organized a Korean society based on the relationship of the 
dominant and the dominated. Therefore, even though the principle of yin and yang 
emphasizes the complementary nature of male/female, it became a principle of 
subordination in the practical life of the Korean people. According to the Neo-Confucian 
philosopher Chu His (1130-1200), man could be expected to find heavenly principles by 
themselves through self-mastery, but women have an inferior yin nature which leads 
them to be dependent on the father, husbands and sons, and this structure mirrors the way 
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of conformity found the cosmic order. Therefore, for cosmic harmony, natural 
hierarchical distinctions are needed, such as yang over yin, male over female, and men 
over women.
341
  
   Shim Young- Hee and Kang Nam-Soon criticize this form of the yin and yang 
ideology. They argue that respect of women is one of the key elements of the universe, 
for the yin is the female dimension and the yang is the male dimension. Both should be 
equally important because they are complementary characteristics. However, the problem 
is that this principle has been used to make a clear hierarchical order according to a social 
structure of the relationship of ruler and ruled: yang as the ruler and yin as the ruled. 
Thus, yang implies strength, growth, light, and life and yin implies weakness, decay, 
darkness, and death. This hierarchical interpretation of yin and yang has also functioned 
as defining the human mind vis-à-vis their rational and emotional qualities, in which yin 
causes disorder and error and yang is highly regarded and morally superior.
342
  Also, men 
are seen in the outer or public sphere, while women are limited to the inner and domestic 
spheres of human life. This interpretation produces the separation and subordination of 
women. 
343
   Kang points out that the discrimination of women is usually justified under 
the name of noble of Asian values. Thus, women‘s issues and the demands for women‘s 
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rights were considered as too ‗Westernized.‘ This judgment ignores the Asian culture and 
as a result the inequality between classes, gender and age is mystified and concealed.
344
  
 Thus, the yin and yang cosmology reinforced women‘s subordination and led to the 
position that the women‘s sphere lies in domestic work.345 This defines women‘s primary 
work as service in the need of a larger family or state. In case of China, even though the 
People‘s Republic of China disengaged itself from the patriarchal Confucianism in 1911 
with the finale of the last emperor, Confucius and his ideology had been officially tossed 
away, but only officially since Confucian ideas are still present among many Chinese 
men and women. In the Maoist era, women‘s liberation was a party goal. The Maoist 
party‘s concern was to make the family an area of state-control, and this state-control 
included women‘s bodies and women‘s reproductive capacity.  
 It is the same situation in Korea. Like China, the Chosun Dynasty came to an end 
and the leaders began to build new states such as the ―Republic of Korea‖ and the 
―Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea.‖ Confucian ideology remained part of Korea‘s 
culture and politics.  However, according to Vivian-Lee Nyitray, the phenomenon was 
not new because the female ideal over the centuries had been: ―Be a virtuous wife and a 
good mother.‖ This indicates that a women‘s duty is to create the best family and home 
environment and in doing so they are also building a harmonious state. This goal and 
format were the only ways for women to enrich their lives on their own. The ideal has 
spread into the context of state welfare, and thus the women‘s labor force was influenced 
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whenever economic conditions demanded either expansion or shrinkage.
346
 This is the 
same case which we noted in Germany. The German leaders understood that a women‘s 
role was mother and house wife. This view strongly influenced the reunification of 
German society, and this view is strongly seen in the ways in which German leadership 
approached a women‘s role in employment and in politics. 
2) The influence of Confucianism on the lives of Korean women 
 Confucian ideology has influenced women‘s life throughout East Asia. Even before 
Confucius (551 bc -479 bc), in an East Asian family, the son – especially the eldest son – 
has great importance in the family. The importance of sons begins with the different 
treatment they receive from birth onward. The Book of Odes (Shijing),
347
 written before 
Confucius, describes the difference between son and daughter.  
A son will be born  
And put to sleep upon the bed. 
He will be wrapped in fine robes 
And given a jade scepter to play with.  
A daughter will be born  
And put upon the ground. 
She will be wrapped in cloths 
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And given tiles to play with.
348
  
 
 The poem describes the mind of people at the time and how they considered a son 
previously compared to a daughter.  
 According to the Book of Rites (Liji), in a Confucian ritual text during the early Han 
dynasty (202 BCE – 8 CE), women and men were distinguished in everything except at 
sacrifices and funerals; they cannot hand items to each other, not share the same mat for 
lying down, nor can they wear similar clothing and they cannot hang their garments on 
the same stand or rack.
349
      
 One of the reasons for the importance of the son is due to continuing the family 
lineage. The early Chinese thought that maintaining the linage is the most significant duty 
of the family, and it can be performed only by the son. According to Mencius, the 
greatest non-filial shame is having no posterity.
350
 Posterity means exclusively the 
presence of a son or sons not a daughter. In some cases, when the father was asked the 
number of children, the father would leave out daughters in the calculation. For some, 
only sons were considered as countable family members. Sons can play a potential role 
by providing his share of the family income, and he can glorify the family through 
official appointments, thereby continuing the family name. Moreover, after the parent's 
death, sons will perform the ancestor worship whereas daughters cannot perform the 
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ancestor worship. Therefore, women were under pressure to conceive and bring forth a 
healthy son because only sons can keep the clan lineage. The imperative idea of lineage 
by sons has had many impacts even in contemporary Korean society, e.g. an abortion 
when the baby is daughter.  
 The case of my father in law‘s oldest brother shows how the Korean family 
considers the clan lineage by the son as important. He had nine daughters. He named 
them with a number in their middle names followed by word ‗sun,‘ but he refused to put 
the number 9 to his latest daughter.  When his wife had the birth of daughter 8, he 
persuaded his wife to have one more child, because if he could not have a son, without 
clan linage, he cannot go back to his ancestors after death. They tired one more baby for a 
son but this time the baby was another daughter and the wife fainted recognizing the baby 
as a daughter. With a desperate mind, they expected the baby to die naturally and so they 
did not give her much care. The father did not even give a name to her. However, the last 
daughter‘s body was strong and she stayed alive. Finally, they accepted her as their last 
daughter and he gave her name ―Bandal,‖ meaning half moon, because she did not fulfill 
their last wish to have a son. The family story was not special when I was young and it 
was not a special case with daughters 5, 6 or 7 in a family that wanted a son.  Also, I have 
a few friends whose name is ―Humam,‖ which means that the next baby is male. Their 
parents were disappointed with their birth and put their expectation on their personal the 
preference for a son made a strange birth ratio in Korea.
351
  
Year Boys Girls 
Year Boys Girls 
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1983 107 100 
1988 112 100 
1994 115.4* 100 
*This number sets the world record.  
 The strange ratio of babies was possible with the development of embryo sex 
appraisal technology after the middle of 1980. When women became pregnant, they 
would go to hospitals and take an ultrasonography test to check whether the baby is a boy 
or girl. They did this especially if they wanted a son in the pregnancy. Following the test, 
when it is confirmed as female fetuses, the strange baby ratio was produced due to 
abortions. According to the Korean Sisal Journal magazine in 1993, some 620.000 babies 
were born in a year in Korea while 1.6 million fetuses were aborted. In actual numbers, 
the estimate is 2.5 times. According to the counting, the number of abortions is 2 million 
per year or an average about 6,000 per day.  The more interesting ratio is that the sex 
ratio of birth increased depending on whether it is the first, second or third child. If the 
baby is the first child, the rate was 106 for boys and 100 for girls; if the baby is the 
second child, the rate was 113 for boys and 100 for girls; and if the baby is the third 
child, the rate was 196 for boys and 100 for girls. 
 The reason that a son is considered important is filial piety; it was considered the 
most basic social and religious concept within a Confucian society. Confucius considered 
filial piety as a primacy in human moral development. Also, filial piety means ancestor 
worship which is another basic Confucian tradition. 
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 Sons will perform ancestor veneration after the parent‘s death; and the ancestor 
means ―male ancestor of the husband.‖352 Thus, a woman who is born into a family will 
not be an ancestor for she joins another family and their ancestor worship after marriage 
is on the side of her husband. Matrilineal worship cannot be accepted as a genealogical 
record. Only patrilineal lineage was the family lineage. Therefore, if they do not have 
sons in the family, the genealogical records will cease and this situation does not honor 
their ancestors. Therefore, the relationship of father and son is the center in a Confucian 
family. The importance of a son exalts the authority of the male and brings subordination 
to the wives to their husbands and daughters to the men in the family. Discrimination of 
society to women was considered as natural. 
 The next important influence of Confucianism on women‘s life was the 
oppression of women‘s sexuality, which is evident in the prohibition of a widow‘s re-
marriage which includes a chastity ideology. The early Neo-Confucian philosopher 
Cheng Yi (1033-1107) considered it important to preserve family integrity by prohibiting 
widow‘s remarriage. He says that ―to starve to death is a very small matter, but to lose 
one‘s integrity, however, is a grave matter.‖353  Even when the widow had no means of 
support, she should not remarry. Chu His (1130-1200) reproduced Cheng Yi‘s teaching 
about widow‘s remarriage with the hope to prevent a practice of remarriage that was 
widespread during the Song dynasty.  He admired widows who committed suicide rather 
than remarriage. 
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 Lee Eun-Sun has a different opinion with other feminist scholars. According to 
her, the prohibition of remarriages was to prevent the tendency of having second and 
third concubines which were appeared in Goyeo Dynasty. Therefore, a ban on remarriage 
was a guarantee of the wife‘s integrity and it was a way to keep the integrity of their 
family, society, and state. Thus, according to her, the prohibition of remarriage was a 
necessary choice in order to keep the Confucian virtue of preserving one‘s family, one‘s 
society and the state‘s integrity through the success by the original wife‘s children.354 She 
claims that patriarchy was one of the inevitable choices for keeping their lives honorable 
in the context of human conditions.
355
 However, even Lee asserts that they wanted to 
protect the status of the wife, since the practical status of wife in the Goyeo dynasty was 
dropped at the time of Chosun dynasty.  For example, a remarriage of women in Goyeo 
was restricted by rules, but it depended on the reputation of her husband. If the husband‘s 
reputation was low, remarriage of women was no problem but it became a problem if her 
husband‘s reputation was high. Also, there were other cases in practice, such as: if the 
second husband‘s reputation is high, then, the children remain with their father.356  Also, 
when we compare the Goyeo dynasty with the Chosun dynasty, Goyeo can be defined as 
monogamous and women can remarry after her husband dies. In contrast, the Chosun 
dynasty was polygamous and women cannot remarry after her husband dies.  
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 The Bucheoje in Goyeo dynasty,
357
 the custom of marriage supported women‘s 
status and led women to control the family. In the Bucheoje, the son in law lived a long 
time in the wife‘s house. During the time that the lived in the wife‘s house, the son in law 
served mother and father in law as his parents and the mother and father in law also 
considered the son in law and grandchildren as their son and children.  Thus, women had 
almost equal status with men in the Goyeo Dynasty.
358
 But with the change of the 
marriage system in which women go to men‘s house after the wedding, the society 
experienced a change to the patrilineal clan centered system.  It means that women‘s 
status had dropped with the Chosun dynasty which based the state‘s principles on 
Confucianism.  Therefore, Lee‘s protection of the Chosun dynasty‘s prohibition of 
remarriage is not reasonable.           
 Ping-cheung Lo described Chu Hsi‘s understanding of sex and gender in the 
statement: ―preserving the heavenly principle and mortifying human desires.‖ 359 Lo 
concludes that ―Chu His‘s condemnation of the erotic ballads of the Book of Odes, his 
understanding of marriage as undertaken for the survival of the family rather than for 
companionship, and his general advocacy of eliminating ―selfish desire‖ combine to 
render romantic love obscene and licentious (even between a married couple), and sex 
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acceptable only for procreation.‖360  Therefore, there was no room for sexual pleasure for 
women in A Neo-Confucian society. With the ideology of yin and yang, the segregation 
of women and men was strong and it applied within the household. Thus, husbands 
stayed in a separated space, called sarangchae near the front gate and the wife‘s 
separated space was anchae where she was hidden behind the middle gate.  The husband 
and wife slept together but only on certain days which were arranged usually by the 
husband‘s mother for procreation. Thus, sex was only a matter of procreation for a wife 
and wife has no rights for asking sexual pleasure.  However, men‘s cases were different. 
Men were allowed to take multiple wives in accord with his official ranking. So, men 
could enjoy sexual pleasure with secondary wives and also, there were entertainment 
houses for men. Thus, men could enjoy sex for procreation in a formal home sector and 
sex for pleasure in many informal sectors. 
361
  
     Moreover, the oppression of women‘s sexuality did not end at this level for there 
was the further, stress on chastity. Chastity or wifely fidelity was the greatest virtue and 
moral quality of women and they were encouraged to devote themselves to one husband 
during their entire life. According to the rape law of the Quing dynasty (in China, 1646), 
rape victims could be forced to defend their chastity with their lives. 
362
 Adultery was not 
allowed in the Confucian social context and it was severely punished during the Chosun 
dynasty. For example, if yangban (an aristocratic woman) committed adultery with a 
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distant relative, she was decapitated and her partner was exiled. 
363
 If a yangban woman 
was confronted with a male assault, it was the virtue of women as a ―virtuous wife‖ that 
would urge them to willingly commit suicide. Thus, most of yangban women carried the 
―silver decorated knife‖ at all times.  
 The stressing of chastity was not only at the individual level but it applied to the 
social and family level as well. The government honored young widows of yangban who 
did not remarry for the rest of their lives by establishing a yollomun. The yollomun means 
a gate of the virtuous woman which was located in the front of the village and became a 
pride of the village.   Also, the women‘s chastity was encouraged in economic and 
institutional ways. The widow women who preserved their chastity were provided special 
economic measures which are called susinjon, ―land to preserve faithfulness.‖ However, 
it was abolished due to economic reasons in 1466. Another restriction to prohibit of 
remarriage was the legal sanctions. According to Gyeongguk Daejon
364
 (in 1471), there 
was a provision that the sons and grandsons of thrice married women could not advance 
into higher officialdom. Furthermore, King Songong reinforced it to a second marriage 
and printed it with the name samgang haengsil yollyodo (―Conduct of the Three Human 
Bonds with Illustrations of Virtuous Women.‖)365  The Gyeongguk Daejon was revised in 
1485, and it prescribed that the sons and grandsons of adulteresses and remarried women 
would not be able to take civil or military office. Also, a child born of a concubine was 
not allowed to apply to the lower and higher civil service examinations. Therefore, even 
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though remarriage was not outlawed, it was impossible to consider its practice because of 
their consequences.
366
  Therefore, Shim defines that there were no women who held 
official posts in Confucianism society, and this was the order of the day so that in order 
of Confucian hierarchical order might be preserved.  
3)   The influence of the political culture and family policy institutions on 
women‟s position and employment     
 The Confucian ideologies deeply influenced women‘s lives. The Chosun dynasty 
accepted Sungrighack and distributed Jujagayee
367
as an important principle of the 
dynasty. The Jujagayee influenced many parts of the family systems, especially women‘s 
positions.   
 First, it applied Sang yee (the etiquette for after a death). One of the important 
Gayee (etiquettes of a family) deepened the reason for preference of son in the family. 
Shrines were highly recommended by the government during the time from the Goyeo 
dynasty to the Chosun dynasty. In the Buddhist tradition (in the Goyeo Dynasty), a family 
kept the Sangyee for one hundred days; later it changed to three years. However, the 
customs of Confucianism strengthened the segregation between women and men and 
reinforced the male dominated system. When a mother passed away, the Sangyee was 
shortened to one year. Different lengths of days of Sangyee were for the husband‘s side 
of the family from those for the wife‘s side.              
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 The second is Jaeyee (Memorial service etiquette). Building Jaeyee was the most 
fundamental power of patriarchy during the Chosun dynasty. The Neo–Confucianism 
considered Jaeyee of ancestor as one of the basic control principles of the country. Jaeyee 
was strongly recommended but usually it served only elite groups. In the Chosun 
dynasty, Jaeyee was performed by the oldest son of one‘s original wife. Through this, the 
principle of equal distribution was eliminated and patrilineal kinship organization was 
strengthened. Gradually, it became a source of power to form Munjung.
368
  The Jaeyee 
was the basic duty of families and social groups. Thus, for the Jaeyee, the adoption 
system expended to the sixth chon (the degree of kinship)
369
 in late Choson dynasty.
370
  
The strengthening of Jaeyee which was performed by the oldest son of the original wife 
led to an even stronger culture that discriminated against women. 
 The third is an inheritance. Inheritances and memorial inheritances were shared 
equally between sons and daughters during the Goyeo dynasty. The Chosun dynasty 
inherited this without discrimination until the seventeenth century. From the middle of 
the seventeenth century down to the middle of the eighteenth century, the eldest son was 
the preferential heir. This issue of inheritance gradually formed gender discrimination 
which became the dominant inheritance form for the nineteenth century and the early part 
of the twentieth century. According to Gyeingguk daejeon, there is a clear path of 
inheritance to women, and this form of inheritance was based on the principle of equal 
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distribution to men and women by law. Women who were married did receive some 
portions of the inheritance. Even though practice of the law was different in diverse areas 
of the Asian world, there were some women who could take a share in the inheritance 
after their marriages. Thus, husbands and wives had the same rights and benefits when 
they inherited their properties after the death of their parents. The slaves of the wife 
passed into the husband‘s control whenever the wives did not have an inheritance, but if 
the husbands remarried, the slaves of wife returned to the first wife‘s home. 371   
However, women had to have their husband‘s permission when they tried to manage or 
dispose of an inheritance even though the inheritances belonged to the wife.  
 The equal inheritance situation, which took place from the Goyeo dynasty to the 
early Chosun dynasty, began to change at the end of the 17
th
 century.  In the 17
th
 century, 
the portions for women were barely considered and the inheritance was male centered in 
a very strong way. Eventually, the inheritance passed to the sons of the original wife. 
Therefore, the status of inheritance for women gradually disappeared, and once again 
there was a severe discrimination between men and women. According to Deuchler, the 
Chosun dynasty decided that they could not divide small sizes lands when the Chosun 
dynasty experienced large population growth during the middle of the 16the century and 
the late 17
th
 century. The leaders took into account the effect that land-division would 
have on the food supply for the population. Thus, the dynasty appointed the oldest sons to 
receive the main inheritance and, as Deuchler infers, the dynasty restricted the inheritance 
to married daughters which only confirmed the role of patriarchal families.
372
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    Confucianism formed the basic principles of the Chosun dynasty, and these 
principles changed the role and status of women. Women were confined like inside 
persons who are passive and obedient, while men are active and dominant as outsider 
persons. The legal regulations decided their roles; men are meant to rule the world and 
family, while women are meant to take care of the family and especially the children. 
Because of the Confucian mentality, the status of women was worse in the late Chosun 
dynasty. The images and roles of people that were determined by Confucianism became 
the ideological basis of North and South Korea and this attitude is still working in those 
societies.  
 In this section of chapter three, we have considered how Confucianism affected 
Korean women during the Goyeo and Chosun dynasties. Let us now consider how 
Confucianism has affected the lives of North Korean women during the 20
th
 century.   
 
2.  The Lives of contemporary North Korean Women and the influence of 
Confucianism   
          North Korea has guaranteed women‘s right in their constitutions in a way similar to 
the constitutions of East Germany. These constitutions support a maternal system. 
However, since the Marx –Leninist ideology did not eliminate the gender gap in attitudes 
about gender, work and family, the North Korean society is a socialist country based on 
patriarchy. Thus, North Korea has the characteristics of patriarchal socialism. Both the 
patriarchal ideology and the socialist system of logic work together in the society. Park 
Hyun-Sun defines the patriarchal socialism as ―the system that sexist patriarchy 
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characteristics are accomplished under the principle of socialism in which equality 
achieved by revolution.‖373 The patriarchal socialism has three level of patriarchy. The 
first is public patriarchy which is performed at the state level. The second is social 
patriarchy which is applied to the level of economic, social and culture except the family 
area. The third is patriarchy in the family in which women are controlled directly and 
indirectly by patriarchal socialism.
374
 I will explain in detail how the each level applied to 
North Korean society in a later part of this dissertation. There are also other problems, 
namely the right of North Korean women to participate in social regulations. These 
regulations should not simply be given to them. Thus, the actual rights and positions of 
women are low in both family and work.  The North Korea women‘s situation will be 
researched more specifically in the following study on the economic situation of women, 
the maternity support systems, and the women‘s position in a family. 
1) The economic situation of North Korean women  
 The North Koreans abolished feudal gender roles and established equal 
relationship between men and women by law through the ‗Democratic Reform‘ in 1946. 
The ―Men and Women for Equal Rights Law‖ and the ―Socialist Labor Law‖ were also 
made part of North Korea‘s legal structure.375 These laws opened the way for a better 
social and economic life for women and equal work and equal pay was applied. The 
defining moment to increase the women‘s labor force was the Korean War. The lack of a 
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labor force for reconstruction after the war and the thinness of the men‘s labor force 
made the situation positive for using the women‘s labor force.376  
 Table 8: The increasing trend of woman‟s labor force in North Korea 377 
Year Whole employee 
(1000) 
Male                 
(1000) 
Female                
(1000) 
The Rate of 
Female (%) 
1953 628 463 165 26.3 
1956 850 680 170 20.0 
1957    20.0 
1958    29.0 
1959 1,459 948 511 35.0 
1960 1,506 1,014 492 32.732.7 
1961  1,609 1,073 536 33.3 
   
1962 1,865 1,214 651 34.9 
1963 1,924 1,228 696 36.2 
1964 2,095 1,287 805 38.5 
.     
1976    48.0 
.     
1987    57.0 
1988    49.0 
    
 As we see in Chart 1, the women‘s labor force between 1956 and 1964, the year 
of activation for the women‘s labor politics, increased 3.8 times: a yearly increase rate of 
17%. Also, the number of women workers increased 19.4% every year while the male 
labor force rate increased 1.9 times or 8%. The women‘s labor force in 1958, the year of 
the completion of collectivization of agriculture after the war, was 29% of the whole 
labor force and it increased to 35% in 1959. The rate of the women‘s labor force dropped 
to 32.7% in 1960. By 1963, due to the women‘s revolution movement and labor 
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classification policy, the women‘s labor force increased to 48% in 1976 and 57.1% in 
1987. However, it dropped again to 49% in 1988. These rates indicate the speed of the 
women‘s labor force growth and how women contributed in the economic construction 
and the post-war reconstruction process.
378
 Furthermore, according to the statistics of the 
United Nations Population Fund, 90% of North Korean women who were age 20 to 54 
participated in economic activity in 1993 and women provided 50% of the labor force. 
The rate of women‘s participation is very difficult to find in other societies. 
 One can ask, were there really equaled rights and participation in the labor force 
in North Korea? Even though women‘s participation in the labor force was high, the form 
of work and the income of women were different from that of men. We can see that there 
is clear gender division of labor in the North. In North Korea, taking a job is determined 
by the government‘s workforce deployment rather than by personal taste and 
competition. In the beginning of establishing socialism, every labor force was controlled 
by the central government, in which the government planned labor distribution and 
decided on the number of workers needed in each part of the economy in late 1960‘s. But 
this system was changed so that local districts arranged the labor on the basis of their 
local needs, and this was a step to solving the problem of a centralized disposition of 
labor. Taking a job is not a personal choice for it has been given by the government even 
though the administrative organization changed from the central government to local 
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districts.  However, a more serious matter is that women were placed at a low income 
bracket and a low density occupation in the process of the distribution of labor.
379
      
Table 9: Women professional division of labor rates in 1980 
380
    
Agriculture 55.5 
Industry 45.5 
Mining 20 
Heavy Industry 15 
Light Industry 70 
Forestry 30 
The People‘s School 30 
High Middle School  35 
Technical Schools  30 
Universities  15 
 
North Korea‘s Socialist Labor Law No.84 reads: ―About the women‘s income in 
each national economy sector,‖ the government has decided to increase women‘s jobs to 
over 60% in education and health areas and over 30% in other areas. Moreover, women 
have to be posted in jobs which women can do. The Chosun Central Yearbook describes 
the situation as follows: women should be posted by personality in office work and light 
industry compared to men who are posted in important and heavy industry work like 
underground digging in mines, logging in forestry, the steel sector, farming, and 
especially grain production.  As we see in Chart 2, women were centered in light industry 
and agriculture. It looks as if the government considered women‘s physical condition. 
However, placement was connected with income and the influence of women‘s position 
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in the society. Thus, sexism governed the workforce arrangement, and this shows that in 
North Korea the recognition of women‘s work is ―light and easy work.‖  
Table 10: Average wage levels by industry type after 2002 Economic reform 
action
381
 
                                                                                   (Unit: Wages in North Korean won) 
1. Average wage levels by the industry type 
Type of industry Wages 
Farming, forestry, fisheries 2,161 
Light industry* 1,623 
Heavy Industry 2,329 
Service Industry*  1,676 
Total 1,888 
2. Average wage by level major sector of light industry 
Type of industry Wages 
Textiles 2,055 
Leather* 1,400 
Footwear 1,583 
Beverages* 1,373 
Basic Food 1,548 
Total 1,623 
3. Average wage level by major sector of service industry 
Type of industry Wages 
Electric 2,388 
Shipbuilding 2,370 
Rail transport 1,980 
Car transport 1,805 
Culture 1,515 
Business* 1,321 
Food* 1,300 
Total 1,676 
*A high percentage of women sector 
There is also discrimination in wages which was revealed in the economic reform 
action in 2002. The 2002 economic reform action had five kinds of standards: 1) inflation 
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and increase of wages 2) partial reform of the distribution system 3) rescheduling of the 
foreign exchange rate 4) autonomy in corporate management 5) The strengthening of 
incentives. The 2002 economic reform action raised prices and wages 18 to 25 times. 
However, there was still no equal wage program between men and women and there was 
still discrimination. North Korea follows the principle of ‗Distribution According to 
Labor‖ as in other socialist countries. This means that the wages of women and men in 
the work place are still different. As we see in chart 3, the wages of light industry and the 
service industry are lower than farming, forestry, fisheries and heavy industry. This 
means that women‘s wages are lower than men because women‘s employment rate is 
70% in the light industry according to Chart 2. Also, work with leather and beverages are 
listed among light industry, and business and food services industry is the lowest in 
wages. Women have a high rate of employment concentrated in these sectors.  
One of the reasons why women were concentrated in light industry and why there 
was wage discrimination was due to the North Korea industry policy favoring heavy 
industry. Heavy industry factories had strict production rules and party rules, compared to 
light industry and local industry. The factories which produced the necessities of life 
were not as important as the male centered heavy industries which were focused on 
production, culture and discipline to achieve the goals of government. The concentration 
of women in certain industries was due to the government‘s concentration on heavy 
industry while providing few or no management skills in light industries. Also, there was 
the atmosphere in heavy industries of not accepting women as equal workers among 
factory executives and workers. Therefore, the factory executives did not control and 
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provide the necessities of life in the factories where most of the workers were women.
382
  
Thus, we can see clearly that the division of the labor force was determined by sex, and 
women were concentrated in light industry, service industry and office work which was 
regarded as easy and light. This is in contrast to ―the principle of equal work and equal 
pay‖ which No. 37 of the socialist labor law states: ―All workers should receive the same 
wages when the workers are performing the same labor regardless of sex, age, ethnic 
group.‖ 383 Yoon Duk-Hee describes.  
In the process( in building a socialist country), most of women experienced social 
work outside of the home and had chance to be an economic subject with a 
position that is equal to men. However, even though there is a wide range of 
economic activities for women, the gender division of labor is working as a fact 
that advantages men and enslaves women.
384
    
 
  Moreover, North Korea‘s economic difficulties become serious after 1990, and 
women became the first target of unemployment. Thus, women returned to the home. 
Most of the unemployed were women.
385
 This was the same situation which happened in 
East Germany. When Germany reunited, the unemployment rate rose, and women‘s 
unemployment rate was almost double that of men.  
2) The political position of North Korean women 
 The establishment of women‘s organizations and the expansion of women‘s 
participation in political activities contributed to the increase of North Korean women‘s 
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political position. North Korean officials considered the formation of women‘s 
organizations as an important task of government so that there might be solidarity of the 
people who are organized in social groups. During one of his speeches, Kim Il-Sung 
asked that public democratic women‘s groups be organized ―. After the speech ―The 
current international and domestic situation and work of women‖ delivered on October, 
15, 1945, the Democratic Women‘s Union of North Korea‖ was established in 
November, 18 1945. Later it was developed as ―Korean Democratic Women‘s Union‖ on 
January, 20 1951. Women who are between 18 to 55 years old, especially housewives 
and women with jobs joined this union. Women who were members of the higher level of 
the Political Party and those with jobs belonging to other groups did not join. With the 
participation of women who were the wives of senior executives and fighters against the 
Japanese colonists, the Korean Democratic Women‘s Union expanded and the 
membership reached 2,700,000 people in 1971.
386
  But after the Kim Jong-Il 
government‘s acceleration in 1983, the union was reduced and weakened. The activity of 
the Korean Democratic Women‘s Union focused on the abolition of feudalism and on the 
construction of a socialist country with advocacy of women‘s rights and an effort to 
overcome gender discrimination and solve social ills. However, this, too, did not work as 
a social critical role in practice, for it functioned as a secondary role for the strengthening 
of the father and son heritage systems and the strengthening the patriarchal order.
387
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          The Workers‘ Party of North Korea tried to expand women membership with the 
organization of the Democratic Women‘s Union. The membership of the Party was 4,530 
people on December 12, 1945 but after the proclamation of land reform and gender 
equality, there were over 36,600 people in August, 1948. Moreover, among the 990 local 
representatives in The Worker‘s Party of North Korea - 2nd Congress, women 
representatives totaled 142 people (14.4%), and Park Jung-Ae and Huh Jung-Sik were 
selected as members of the Central Committee of the Party in March, 1948. After that, 
North Korea has kept the rate of women in the central committee at 20% except for 
1962.
388
 Among the Central Committee members (those who can exert direct political 
influence), the women‘s rate on the standing committee was low. The average rate was 
11%. The 1
st
 (1948) was 3%; the 2
nd
 (1957) and 4
th
 (1967) were 6%; and the 9th (1990) 
was 13%. Women‘s political activity was limited to the activity of the Party. Thus the 
women‘s committee did not act in a special way for women‘s rights nor did it represent 
the voice of women. Also, the women‘s rate in the Local People‘s Assembly was 13.1% - 
33.1 %, a percentage which was higher than that of the Central Committee. The rate in 
which women were selected as representatives in the Local People‘s Assembly election 
in 1999 was 20-30%.
389
        
      In 1998, the Women‘s Central Committee was 20% of 687 people, while in South 
Korea the average rate for congresswomen was only 2%.
390
 The rate of political 
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participation of North Korean women was higher than that of South Korean women, but 
the numbers of rate of North Korea do not by themselves indicate a women‘s position in 
politics and society. Women representatives did not contribute very much for the 
development of women‘s rights in society. There are three reasons for this. First, the 
women‘s representatives were those who were recognized for heroic efforts by the Party 
in their job places and sales. This means that their political reputation was concentrated 
on the ideology of the government and focused on the fidelity for the father -- Kim Il-
Sung and Kim Jung-Il. Second, even though the policies claimed the abolition of 
feudalism and discrimination against women, there were no voluntary commitments of 
transformation, nor did they come from women‘s experience and the struggles in their 
lives. The policies for women given by the government to build up a socialist country, 
therefore, were not powerful policies and women were generally not powerful politicians. 
Third, the women politicians as well as most women of North Korea did not recognize 
their discriminative situation in their mind, life and systems.
391
          
      There are two the reason of lack of feminist awareness. First, as was mentioned 
above, the Confucian tradition continued to hold sway: men are the rulers and women are 
the ruled. Thus, women are inferior to men. Therefore, there was no need to establish 
strong political positions for women. Second, the education of one‘s self- consciousness 
during the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il was minimal. The Kim 
governments did work hard to develop consciousness education, but they did this only to 
maintain their regime. Therefore, North Korean people believed that Kim Il Sung and 
Kim Jong Il were correct when they established the goals and meaning of Korean lives. 
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Be royal to the Kims was the order of the day. To be skeptical or critical of the Kim‘s 
government was considered as disloyalty to the Kims. All of this shows that North Korea 
with its communist government is based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, the 
North Korean style communism was also built upon the Confucian and patriarchal 
tradition.           
3) The Policies for North Korean women 
A. Maternity Support Systems  
North Korean policies for women were based on a Marxist-Leninist theory. 
Political leaders thought that women‘s liberation can be achieved by abolishing private 
ownership of property, eliminating feudal patriarchal family systems, and increasing 
women‘s participation in social and economic activity. Thus, North Korea tried to 
establish the social condition for using the women‘s labor force. They defined ‗the 
business with working women‘ as the center of the women‘s liberation policy. Kim Il-
Sung emphasized the socialization of child rearing through nursery and kindergarten 
establishment.
392
  Kim‘s government tried to make women the subject of building 
socialism. North Korea‘s constitution enacted equal rights for women and men and a non-
discrimination principle. Constitution No.65 states that ―Citizens have equal rights in 
every state and social life.‖ No.77 states that ―women have the same status and rights as 
men.‖ The state guarantees maternity leave, reduction of working time for the mother 
who has many children, and the expansion of maternity hospitals, day care centers, and 
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kindergartens. Furthermore, the state protects mothers and children with other policies. 
The state makes it possible for women‘s social advance.393      
The North Korean women‘s policy was changed by the reconstruction of the 
nature of the socialist system and the economic situation. The North Korean women‘s 
policy was influenced by two ideologies: socialistic gender equality ideology and the 
Confucian patriarchal principle. Thus, the two ideologies co-existed, although at times 
there were contradictory situations. These can be divided into three steps. First, from the 
regime establishment down to early 1959 there was a claim that the socialist revolution 
needed to be completed. Consequently, the political leaders focused on eliminating the 
feudal patriarchal family system and encouraging women to join the social labor force. 
However, it was the Korean War itself which gave North Korea a strong national 
government system. The war also strengthened the power of president Kim Il-Sung. Also, 
the atrocities and massacres committed by the occupying forces during war time provided 
legitimacy for North Korea‘s monitoring and control system. With this situation, North 
Korea tried to integrate the nation and the family and this led to women‘s integration in 
both family and nation either by force or in a voluntary way. Because of this, women 
experienced a setback. Women were identified not only as mother and wife but also as a 
nationalistic citizen. Women were asked to be loyal and devoted to the nation which 
guaranteed their happiness. Their loyalty and devotion were advertised as Chosun 
women‘s traditional moral and character. ―The Labor Newspaper‖ on March 9, 1951 
appealed to women; ―All women! Fight bravely for the country and people instead of 
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husbands, brothers and daughters who go out front of war! Make more brilliant 
distinguished services with effort.‖394  
 Secondly, from 1960 to 1970, various social welfare policies were promoted for 
maximizing the women‘s labor force. However, the preference for heavy industry by the 
North Korean government produced a hierarchy of production. North Korea provided 
first and foremost labor forces, materials, and supplies benefitting the heavy industry. 
The status of workers in heavy industry was extolled while light industry and local 
industry workers were treated as inferiors. More serious problems occurred: the hierarchy 
in the production system deepened the hierarchy of workers between men and women. 
Women‘s role was defined as a male worker‘s assistant in a certain field of endeavor. 
Women who assisted the work of her husband were considered honorable. Women‘s love 
and sacrifice improved production, and this was presented as a correct form of life. This 
led to a gender hierarchy structure at homes and factories and also it is connected with 
North Korea‘s political society‘s hierarchy structure. By the time, feudal patriarchy rose 
increasingly. In this point, Park defines; North Korea‘s equal rights of women 
experienced a second step back. 
395
   
 Thirdly, from late 1980 onward, there was a deepening of the economic crisis, and 
because of this the economic role of women was expanded. However, the women‘s 
policy in North Korea began to turn away from the earlier socialist women policy to 
move toward the traditional patriarchal role. In a special way, the family law act in 1990 
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emphasized the importance of women as mother and wife. By this time, the women‘s role 
in the family was emphasized and there was a downplaying of women liberation 
ideology.
396
 Women took over the family‘s livelihood after the famine in 1990‘s; in fact, 
women did about everything they could do during the famine years. The most popular 
work was selling or peddling. The selling was difficult because there was a limited travel 
authorization system, requiring bribes to the officer of travel authorization and delays in 
the transportation systems. With such hardness of life, women did the selling or peddling 
because men thought that such selling was shameful work. Other women did side jobs or 
they cultivated the side land of a home for the family‘s food. Nevertheless, women were 
not freed from house work even though men stayed at home without work. Consequently, 
women had a double burden.
397
  
 Among the North Korean state policies for equal rights for women is ―The Labor 
Law‖ of June 24, 1946, and July 30, 1946. ―The Labor Laws‖ were contained 26 
sections. These sections guaranteed maternity protection and labor rights, such as ―same 
labor, same pay for men and women‖ (article 7), a paid leave system, improvement of 
labor safety and hygiene conditions. There were 35 days of paid leave before childbirth 
and 42 days after (article14). Also, these laws established the foundation that men and 
women should become equal workers by adopting maternity protection laws, such as 
maternity leave, light labor   guarantees during pregnancy (article 15), ensured feeding 
time, e.g., women who have children under the age of one are guaranteed 30 minutes of 
feeding time twice a day (Article 16), prohibition of night work while pregnant or breast-
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feeding (article 17), and a provision of social insurance. The second clause of this social 
insurance is that there is a pay subsidy during the period of pregnancy and childbirth 
(article 18).
398
 North Korea called it the policy of women‘s liberation and advertised it in 
two parts. The first part states that women have to cooperate with the government and 
have to execute their tasks because the government gave them the condition that they 
could live a better life. Secondly, women have to compensate to the government by 
increasing production.
399
    
  However, women‘s participation in production was not easy for two reasons. 
First, these regulations produced a negative reaction by men and by society at large; 
secondly, there was some resistance by a certain number of women. North Korea was 
also based on the ideology of Confucianism and therefore the leaders urged a large family 
system. Thus, some people expressed a very negative reaction to women‘s entering 
society. They said: ―these days, women have become crazy‖ or ―it is indecent.‖ 400  Kim 
Il-Sung‘s openly criticized the resistance of women. He said: ―Some women think that 
women could not do anything… Thus, they hesitate to participate in the state founded 
industries and furthermore, they criticize women who participate in the work. They say 
that behind their back.‖ Kim thought that the reason for women‘s resistance was ―a 
remnant of the colonial history of Japan and feudal ideas.‖401 Kim saw that the Confucian 
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mindset was a barrier to build the Communist country and he tried to join women‘s labor 
forces with his government‘s development. 
   The second important policy for the equal rights of women was ―the legislation 
for equal rights of men and women‖ which was established on July 30, 1946. One month 
after the announcement of ―the labor law,‖ the temporary People‘s Committee of North 
Korea established a goal that ―we clear the remnants of colonial history of Japan and 
reform the feudal ideas. Thus, women could participate entirely in culture, society, and 
policy.‖402 The main points of the law were making nuclear families on the one hand and 
empowering individual women for the socialist modernization on the other.
403
 If we 
acknowledge the specific instructions for each section and their main implementations, 
women would have equal rights with men in the fields of state, economic, cultural, 
societal and political life (article 1). Women have the same right to vote and be elected in 
local and national elections (article 2). Women do the same labor for the same pay as 
men and they have the rights of social insurance and education (article 3). Women have 
the right of freedom of marriage just as men have. This right prohibited non-freedom and 
forced marriages without the partner's consent. This right stated clearly that in marriage 
the women‘s self-choice has to be honored (article 4). Women have the right of freely 
divorce like men – the laws even permit women to sue their ex-husband for child support 
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(article 5). 
404
 The minimum age of marriage was at 17 years old for women and 18 years 
for men. This regulation prevented early marriage which had engendered many evil 
practices as feudal remnants. Early marriage was the reason for unwanted pregnancy, 
polygamy and the strengthening of a patriarchal family. Moreover, the government tried 
to force women to participate in production and construction by encourage late marriage. 
Polygamy and the sale of a wife or concubine were prohibited.  The North government 
tried to prevent the empowerment of blood groups and tried to eliminate the exclusivity 
by the blood tie (Article 7). Women have the right to own property and inherit land and 
when they do divorce, women can share their joint property and land inheritance (article 
8). In this presentation of legislation, Japanese imperial laws and regulations about 
Chosun women‘s ―rights‖ were invalidated. This indicates that women had become 
socialist and modern subjects. 
405
    
B. Socialization of childcare and housework 
 The North Korean government tried to bring about a socialization of housework 
and childcare to remove the barriers for women‘s participation in production activities 
and to encourage the economic independence of women. Thus, North Korea established 
―The Nursery Rules‖ on June 13, 1947, ―the provisions relating to child care‖ in 1949 
and ―the child care act‖ in 1976, all of which reduced women‘s burden of child rearing. 
As a maternity protection policy, ―the child care regulation act‖ in 1993 regulated 150 
days for maternity leave, 60 days before the baby‘s birth and 90 days after the baby‘s 
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birth. 
406
 Also, the state and social organizations were instructed to operate nurseries that 
care for the babies from 1 month to just under 3 years old, but the installation of these 
nurseries were not mandatory. There were 10 nurseries and 116 kindergartens in 1949 
because of the nursery installment movement urged by the Women‘s Alliance of North 
Korea and by ―The Rules about Nurseries‖ in 1949. With the duties of the nurseries and 
kindergartens decreed by cabinet decision in 1958, the number of nurseries was increased 
dramatically, which brought about an increase of 340 nurseries (1956 to 1960).  
 The nurseries were divided: a nursery worked from Monday to Saturday. The 
parents picked up the children at the end of a week. From 1961 on, there were only 2 or 3 
―week nurseries‖ in each province, city and county. The nursery of the month took care 
of children for a month and was installed in only 2 or 3 places in the main cities from 
1965 on. With the increasing number of nurseries and kindergartens, the government 
needed to strengthen their management so, they raised the standard of the teachers of the 
nursery and kindergarten from high school graduates to college graduates. Also, they 
built an education system of nursery and kindergarten care by establishing the 
kindergarten mapping agency in the ministry.
407
 Thus, North Korea since 1970 has 
provided nursery and kindergarten schools for 80% of the children in those age groups. 
When we consider the fact that some children lived with their grandparent or housewives 
who had stopped working, an 80% of capacity is quite enough to meet the demand. Also, 
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the teacher who are hired for these nurseries and kindergartens, were not allowed to take 
care of own children in order to avoid favoritism. When the teachers take care of other 
children in addition to their own, it could give the other children a problem in their 
mental development. We can see how North Korea tried to provide high quality childcare 
even though they could be criticized for some of their methods.
408
     
 Later, research about children who were raised in the nursery and kindergarten 
system in North Korea might consider their emotional, physical and intellectual ability as 
they grew up. This would be helpful for understanding the socialization of childcare 
which allows women‘s greater participation in society. The childcare systems were 
meaningful arenas for women‘s social activities and economic independence. Therefore, 
research about the operation of public childcare systems and the development of children 
compared with other systems would be excellent. It could be a good alternative for 
helping women‘s social advancement.  
 Also, the socialization of housework was promoted. The North Korean 
government stated in the Jeongmuwan decision No.11 in March 1973: ―In order to fulfill 
our great leader Kim Il-Sung‘s suggestion that the technology revolution task for 
liberating women from the burden of kitchen work and heavy housework: an increase in  
the source of soybean paste plants, vegetables, and meat as well as an increase in Tofu 
processing plants which needed to be modernized; and further production of rice plants, 
as also noodle processing plants to be built in each area. However, the government‘s 
effort did not contribute to reducing women‘s housework. The rice plants and side dish 
factory were for women‘s liberation from the kitchen but the women avoided the rice 
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plants and the side dish factory established in Pyongyang in the beginning 1980 quickly 
disappeared. The reason why women disliked the rice plants is that they did not want to 
waste the rice in the process of cooking. It shows how the North Korean society has 
struggled with food supply. Also, the policy for reducing housework was not helpful for 
women as we saw above since these plants operation did not work. Thus, the duty of 
housework turned back to women again and they had to do outside work as well; it was a 
double burden for women.         
4) North Korean women‟s position in the family 
A. Women have the primary education responsibility for children and 
should be a “revolutionary mother.”   
 ―Chosun Women‖ is the only women‘s magazine which is a bulletin of ―Korea 
Democratic Women‟s Union.‖409  If we make an analysis of ―Chosun Women,‖ we can 
see that North Korea is redefining the traditional roles of a mother, a wife, and a 
daughter. The new gender roles follow the principles of socialism. Among them is the 
role of an ideological mother who is called the ―revolutionary mother.‖ North Korea has 
asked all women to be ―revolutionary mothers.‖ Motherhood is emphasized to women as 
a mission and honorable work.  Thus, Kim Il-Sung says that ―mothers have the heavy 
duty of educating children to be great communists, and for this goal the mother‘s role is 
more important than the father‘s as regards the education and character development of 
children.‖ Also, according to Chosun, even though a father affects the children‘s 
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education, a mother has more responsibility because the mother gives birth and takes care 
of them.
410
 According to Chosun, the revolutionary mother is described as one who every 
day cleans the street with her children so as to improve their education, and she provides 
an example of motherly etiquette. She should make any of her children who are poor 
learners study hard and let them do their work by themselves. A common value for 
mothers is that they not only correct children‘s bad habits and tendencies but they also 
lead children toward developing one's role in the community and country. 
 Moreover, loving all children as well as one‘s own is emphasized. For example, a 
story was introduced in ‗Chosun‘ about women who took care of children who did not 
have parents at home.
411
 Her name was Cho Go-Bun and she lived in Danchon city 
Kwangchondong at the 15 neighborhood unit. She took care of seven brothers and sisters 
who did not have a mother and she raised them as great workers for the state.
412
 Kim 
Sun-Kum who lived in Hamkungbukdo Hwasunggun, nourished thirteen war orphans.
413
 The revolutionary mother‘s most important role in 1990 was to raise their children 
as ‗loyal communists.‘414  The role of women is explained in some detail in an article in 
―Chosun Women.‖  
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A woman is a wife of a husband and she is a flower which makes for a 
harmonious atmosphere. A woman‘s role is to help old parents for what is left of 
their lives and to help her husband for his role as a revolutionary comrade. All of 
this is also a woman‘s role. Also, women who give birth and nourish children are 
the first educators to daughters and sons, and women must prepare the children to 
become faithful successors of the revolution. 
415
 
 
Even though North Korea defines revolutionary mother as their ideological 
mothers, the specific role of women is to support husbands and be caretakers of children 
and older parents. Women are assistants to their husbands, and this role has been 
emphasized in the North Korean society.            
B. Women as assistants for their husbands 
 The role of North Korean women was said to be as an assistant for her husband 
who is a revolutionist and she is also meant to be a trainer of next generation of 
revolutionists, namely her children. She is a key person who makes the family a 
revolutionary family by her own embodiment of socialist culture.
416
  Kim Il-Sung 
established absolute power in 1967. Kang Ban-Suk, who is Kim‘s mother, became a 
model for women. According to the North Korea Labor Organization ‗Rodong Sinmun‘, 
on July 31, 1967, the leaders of this organization introduced her as ―she is a mother of all 
of us.‖ From that time on, all women, especially married women, had to learn from Kang 
Ban-Suk. The Korea Democratic Women‟s Union made all members read 100 times the 
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book of ―Let‟s learn from Mrs. Kang Ban-Suk‖ and they made them memorize it in 1970. 
They advertise her such as;  
Kang Ban-Suk was a good supporter and sacrificed for her husband, Kim Hyung-
Gik, who fought for the independence of the country. She was a comrade in war 
and a great mother of Kim Il-Sung who was elected as a great leader of the 
Chosun nation. Also, she was a great revolutionist who organized directly fighting 
for independence of the country and liberation of women and evokes all women 
to be revolutionist. .. She is a model of women who teach how to support a 
revolutionist husband, how to nourish children, how to serve parents in law and 
how to be a revolutionist in family to all members of the Korea Democratic 
Women‘s Union.417  
  
However, this model of women in North Korea, Kang Ban-Suk, is not different 
from traditional women except for her revolutionary ideology. When she was young, she 
obeyed her father, and after her marriage, she obeyed her husband‘s will, and after her 
husband‘s death, she obeyed her son.  With Kim Jeong-Il‘ succession in late 1970, both 
Kim Jeong-Suk, who was Kim Il-Sung‘s wife, and Kim Jeong–Il‘s mother, who was 
known as ―a subjective revolutionary fighter‖ faithfully obeyed the great leader. Kim 
Jeong–Il‘s life was dramatized by Juche ideology and this helped to reinforce all women 
to follow her
418
  
The emphasis on Kim Il-Sung‘s wife and Kim Jung-Il‘s mother does not mean the 
strengthening of maternal rights. Instead, they tried to justify that a mother‘s good 
discipline had brought her child to his succession as supreme leader. In emphasizing 
Kang Ban-Suk and Kim Jung-Suk as models of mother and wife, they tried to stabilize 
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the role of mother and wife in a North Korean family. They were not models for men or 
for fatherhood. Kang Ban-Suk and Kim Jung-Suk became models of women as a wise 
mothers and wives. Kim Il-Sung‘s father, Kim Hyong Jik, is not described as a model 
father but as a fighter against Japan. This means that they politicians tried to make the 
image of Kim Il-Sung the only father of the people of North Korea and thereby he 
became a man of eternal existence.
419
           
 North Korean women are required to be ―revolutionary mothers‖ who are 
revolutionists ready for sacrifice. They also have to be models of morality and raise their 
children to follow their mothers‘ example and be good communists without selfishness 
and with a collective spirit. The model of a ―revolutionary mother‖ and the 
advertisements about Kang Ban-Suk and Kim Jeong-Suk show what type of women the 
North Korean government is looking for. The government officials are asking North 
Korean women to be revolutionists for the country, but if one analyzes model for women, 
it is no different from the traditional model for women which was based on Confucian 
ideology. Even though women are revolutionary in character, North Korean women are 
required to be mothers who have to provide primary education for their children and to 
do this with unconditional sacrifice. In the concept of ―revolutionary mother‖ there are 
two factors; socialist, communist women and traditional, sacrificing women.    
C. The position of women in family and division of the role of husband and 
wife 
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 The family law which was enacted in 1990 (No. 18) prescribes that ‗husband and 
wife in a family have the same rights.‘ A book which was published in 1994 describes 
this position and role. 
Husbands in our society are not the head of family but the householder who 
represent the family and who has the duty and responsibility to support and 
educate the family group. Also, wives are not under the oppression of their 
husbands and his family as in feudal time. All family members have the same 
rights and the wife organizes and operates the household. Legal equivalent rights 
and the chance to attend social and political events are open to all by the gender 
equality legislation after liberation and the implementation of democratic reforms. 
Thus, the position and role of the wife was upgraded as she operated the 
household and raised the children.
420
 
 
 In spite of this family law, can one argue that in North Korea there are equal 
rights between husband and wife? According to the testimony of a person who escaped 
from North Korea and also according to North Korean literature, North Korea family life 
is centered by the husband. The husband is called head of household and has absolute 
authority for decision making in the family. Even though North Korea abolished the 
Family Register system in which paternal lineage was inherited, the Family Law act 
No.26 which was established in 1990, states that ―children take the father‘s last name.‖ 
Thus, the relationship of relatives is centered by the husband‘s side. In dialogue between 
the couple, husbands can use crude language to his wife but the wife has to talk using 
terms of respect. Wives call their husbands ‗the head of the household‘ or ‗the host.‘ 
There can be no disputes, and wives are meant to be obedient and dedicated to their 
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husbands.  A husband‘s cheating is not a major problem considering it is a common 
happening. Moreover, he is allowed to beat his wife.
421
       
 In the short story, ―The Weight of Happiness,‖ one woman who is a doctor and 
has experienced family‘s disagreement, is talking to her friend who has a job as a 
researcher.  
Yu-Gyeng, I cannot see you. Of course, I know that the work of research is a 
noble and good job. Thus, I do not want to say that you should quit the job. But 
we are mother, wife and housewife in a family. What will be left if women lost 
family…Do not be angry. I do not want your family to be like my family that did 
not feel comfortable with a lot of discord….Women have families, but it is 
women‘s ideal to raise children well, make husbands successful, and want to be 
successful by herself. But that is not easy. The family which supports a woman‘s 
success in business has already destroyed the balance and the family is in a 
mess.
422
  
         
 Also, in the short story, ―Flavor of Life,‖ a college professor is talking about the 
role of wife in a family.  
How women can have ambitions…. Women have to know that raising children 
well and maintaining family harmony and frugal housekeeping is the major parts 
of a woman‘s hope… Why has a wife‘s listening to her husband‘s words become 
weakness? Helping husbands is a duty and a virtue.
423
  
    
 These two stories show how North Korean women identify themselves as a 
mother and assistant husband and how hard it is to do housewife‘s work when one is also 
working outside the home. All of this indicates that North Korea is based on the ideology 
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of subjection of women in accordance with Confucianism. Even though the law of North 
Korea prohibits the ideology of subjection of women and contempt of women, the 
practical life is different. There are strong aspects of the ideology of the subjection of 
women in the North Korean society in contrast to the legal equal rights between women 
and men.      
 There are two testimonies about the position of women in family and society by 
persons who have escaped from North Korea.  
North Korea women until now did not feel free from the ideology of the 
subjection of women… Men say easily ―men and women cannot have same 
situation after they have reached seven years old.‖ Men hate women who pass in 
front of men. For example, when my school became a coeducational school, 
school girls could not enter the class room because there was a school boy in 
it….More pathetic was that school girls could not go to bathrooms during the 
break time because they had to pass in front of school boys and they had to avoid 
passing in front of school boys… I thought that men were great and women had to 
act in that way as a correct manner of women at that time.
424
     
 
 Another testimony considered the situation after the crisis of food shortage in 
North Korea.  
There is still a strong ideology of the subjection of women. The major way of 
living as men and women at that time was that women could feed men. It was the 
way of making family. Women have to work hard to be a bread winner for their 
husbands. The view that husbands have to be a bread winner is less than 20-30 %. 
Women go to work and they have to do house work after coming back home. 
Almost half of Korean men ask women to feed them even if the woman has to sell 
her body. I saw that when wives did not make money, husbands beat them 
physically…. They just hit their wives and then go outside…‖425       
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 The North Korea society has experienced major changes in family life due to the 
economic crisis and food shortage. Most husbands did earn enough so wives had to start 
earning a salary. By doing this they tried to solve the problem of food. However, this 
caused the authority of husbands to become weak. 
 Nevertheless, according to the testimony of persons who escaped from North 
Korea, women think that by admitting the husband to be head of house there is a way of 
keeping peace in family. This results in the tendency for women not to resist the 
husband‘s unequal treatment to them. There are cases that women escaped from North 
Korea because they could not endure their husbands‘ abuse.426  Lim Sun-Hee argues that 
these cases show that the patriarchal culture is deepening in many North Korea families 
who suffer from the food crisis.
427
  After the food crisis, the role of a housewife became 
more emphasized. The family law amendment of 1990 was meant to strengthen family 
life in this situation. 
  In practical life, we see that the house decision making was determined by 
husbands and mothers-in-law rather than by the women who actually take care of the 
children and do household chores. There were clear divisions of the role of husband and 
wife. The husband represented the family and had the responsibility and duty to support 
and educate the family; the wife had the role and position of maintaining the household 
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and nourishing the children.  In general, a woman‘s obedient attitude to her husband 
became the basic marriage relationship. Another woman who had escaped from North 
Korea felt that her husband had treated her as a servant rather than as a wife. He 
supervised all her activities. She said that her husband inspired fear in her, that she had to 
live in a way which always respected her husband and that there was no equality between 
husband and wife even though law requires it.
428
  Another woman testified that before 
she got married, her mother had taught her that women have to obey their husbands 
unconditionally and she had to be patient, acting life a dumb, deaf and blind person. 
During her married life, she had to prepare her husband‘s dinner every day when he 
returned on time from his office. She could not visit even her parent‘s home which was 
near her house. Until she left North Korea, she had not skipped any single dinner for her 
husband.
429
   
 With this kind of treatment, North Korean women did not raise questions. Women 
had to prepare food, to purchase groceries, and provide fuel for cooking, such as coal or 
wood. Often, there was not enough electric power and water. Husbands did not help in 
meeting these problems. North Korean women simply accepted their role: ―of course, 
women had to take on these responsibilities;‖ of course ―there are differences between 
women‘s jobs and men‘s jobs;‖ of course ―women were born to be destined to be a very 
obedient girl.‖  Thus, women think that women should handle all the housework even it 
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is hard, and they should consider a husband‘s help when offered as a thankful kindness, 
but should also handle the house work by herself if husbands refuse to help. After the 
food crisis, to be a bread winner by peddling became a women‘s duty. These women 
described their husbands as ―Dogs,‖ who do not so anything at home.  
Men are called as ‗Dogs‘ in our area, because they do not have any willingness to 
help. They are called ‗Dogs‘ because they simply live in the house. Women at 
times have to leave the house with their children because they cannot care for the 
stupid ‗Dogs.‘ Thus, the women and children who leave the house can live, but 
the ‗Dogs‘ die from starvation not long after. There were many ‗Dogs‘ in our 
area.
430
        
 
 Nevertheless, some feminist scholars see that in the 1990‘s the role and position 
of women was changing when compared to the 1980‘s. The first change was the division 
of housework. Housework had been the women‘s responsibility in 1980‘s but there was a 
gradual increase of husband‘s sharing in the housework from 1990 onward. In the 1980‘s, 
husbands after coming back to work simply waited while the wife prepared his meal. In 
the 1990‘s, husbands began to help the wife prepare the meal. Decision making in a 
family also changed. Husbands and wives made decisions together. However, these 
changes occurred not because of social and legal recognition but because of the food 
crisis. The food crisis forced women that did not have a regular job and to go outside for 
food. Men began to help with the housework even though there are many testimonies that 
husbands did not do housework. The decrease in population promoted a situation in 
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which women had to join farm labor. Even though the change was not a change of 
recognition, the change did have some positive influence on the future.
 431
  
 The magazine ―The Nation‖ had an interesting article by Kang Yi-Reuk, entitled: 
‗March 8, the day of the woman is the day when husbands cook.‘ 
Husbands prepare meals for their wives on the ‗‗Day of the Woman.‖ This was 
not decided by anyone nor was it regulated by law. Nonetheless, the custom 
spread out widely. So, on the day of March 8
th
, the husbands of this house and of 
that house did the cooking and this makes the flowers laugh. This occurs in the 
area of North Korean society where there is a breaking with the old custom which 
treated women as inferior to men.
432
  
 
 The food shortage of North Korea brought about two effects on the lives of 
women. It gave women the burden of being a breadwinner on top of her housework. 
Nevertheless, it started to enhance women‘s authority in families regard to economic 
decisions and at the same time it brought about a husband‘s participation in housework. 
Even though these are small changes, they are still changes for the better.                     
5) North Korean Women and Confucianism 
A. North Korean Women have a dual burden 
 Some North Korean women are considered valuable in a way similar to men for 
they are active, aggressive, and dedicated workers in the economic world. However, they 
are also required to shoulder another role within the family, for they should be wise 
mothers and good wives, respecting their husbands, their children and their parents in 
law. A contradiction and strain between the public women model and the family 
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relationship model cannot help but occur. Women are asked to take on a dual model: she 
is required to be a revolutionary woman and at the same time to be a traditional wife. 
Therefore, women are not removed from housework simply because they participate in 
social work. Rather, women end up doing more work for they are in the economic work 
place and in the home. Women have a dual burden with housework and social work.
433
      
 Even though North Korean women are living in a dual burden situation, they 
think that they are living in a system of equal rights between women and men. According 
to Kim Suk-Hyang, this judgment is the result of North Korean government education. 
North Korean women are the people who live as subjects in society and are ‗one wheel of 
the revolution.‘ South Korean women are in the plight of capitalism. The North Korean 
newspaper, ‗The Rodong Newspaper,‘ and other North Korean broadcastings emphasized 
that ―South Korean women are under exploitation and oppression and are under the 
situation of being frisked by U.S. troops.‖434   ‗The Rodong News Paper‟ describes this. 
 Let‘s view the picture! Two south women who were on the way are frisked by 
U.S. troops commanding the women to lift their arms above their head. What kind 
of rights do the U.S.A. Invaders have? They are not in their land but in another 
country. Yet the put their hand on the women‘s bodies without a second thought. 
This is the culmination of human rights abuse… The humiliation of these women 
is the humiliation of all South women and the misery is the misery of South 
Korea.
435
       
 
 In contrast, the article in the newspaper states that North Korea is the only place 
where women can enjoy a dignified life and women can live proudly like men escape 
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from the old, the capitalist and feudal society in which women were considered as 
slaves.
436
  
B.  North Korean women and Confucianism 
 Even though a new ideology has emerged in North Korea and has become a 
dominant ideology, the dominant older tradition and culture continues to affect people‘s 
mind and life. It may seem correct to say that a new socialism has defeated the feudal and 
old Confucian tradition. In actually, the North Korea‘s new systems and law have given 
major changes to women‘s positions and roles. However, as we have seen above, the 
roles and positions of North Korean women have not changed in actual life. The ideology 
of subjection of women to men is still evident, and a woman‘s role is still defined as 
mother and supporter for her husband. Gender equality was established in the legal 
system and the tradition that the father is head of a family may have been legally 
abolished, but women are still forced to be obedient to their husband and parents in law. 
The role models for North Korean women are Kang Ban-Suk and Kim Jung-Suk. These 
women never talked back to their husbands and parents in law. They remained obedient 
to their husbands, supporting them as much as possible. They were great trainers of their 
children. According to Kim Il-Sung, Korean women have to sound wise mothers and 
good wives. Women need to show gentle manners and absolute obedience to husbands.
437
    
 Yun Mi-Ryang remarks that the new policy which was based on socialism did not 
eliminate the feudal tradition; rather the new legal policies and the older Confucian 
qualities were fused together. Thus, the North Korea society is neither a totally socialist 
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country nor is it totally a Confucianism country. Yun argues that the North Korea society 
has a mixture of the both ideologies and practices. The North Korean socialism could be 
called ―Confucian socialism.‖ 
 To understand North Korea‘s ―Confucian socialism,‖ we can see that the North 
Korea ideology and system is not just ideology and system but it is a kind of religion. 
Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jung-Il have not been just the country‘s leaders but they have also 
become fathers and Gods. North Koreans confess that everything they have achieved and 
enjoyed comes from the leader‘s grace and benevolence. The goal of their life is, 
consequently, allegiance and dedication to the great leaders. A woman who is Japanese 
but lives in North Korea confessed this stance to an author.  
She feels strongly that during the 50 years of her life she enjoyed a good and real 
life in the arms of the republic. This arm was the arm of our father and great 
leader. The arm of socialism country is the real warm arm in which life bears 
flowers meaningfully… The lady, Su Song-Man, says that ―I found a home of real 
life in the arms of the republic. During the war time, I became a soldier in the 
army of great leaders and I grew up as a member of a party. I cannot imagine my 
happy family life without the grace and love of the great leader. Fatherland is not 
the place where I was born but it is the place where I was taken care and my fate 
and future blossomed. Really, the socialism Juche country is the home of real life 
of all of us.
438
   
    
 Her testimony shows well how the North Koreans feel as regards their system and 
leaders. The North Korean ‗Confucian socialism‘ did not function as a system in their 
life; rather, it was a belief and a form of worship. Therefore, the worship of the leaders 
became a religion which is mixed into their patriarchal tradition and culture. Without the 
change of religion and consciousness, there would have been no foundation for 
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overcoming the reality of discrimination against women. These testimonies and other 
phenomena raise questions: is it possible for North Korean women to stand as co-fighter 
with South Korean women in order to change inequality for a future society? Do North 
Korean Women see themselves as subjects in ‗the Confucian socialism‘ situation even 
though they have lived their life in a governmental structure which has provided them 
with benefits? 
         The analysis of the unequal rights and positions of women in Germany might 
provide a better format as we prepare a reunified Korea. The analysis could also serve as 
a guide to protect North Korean women during the process of reunification in 
employment and rights.   
3. The influence of Confucianism on the Lives of South Korean Women: Their 
Status and Roles  
 South Korea‘s Constitution guaranteed legal equality between men and women in 
1948 and Article 8 prohibited any political, economic, and social discrimination by 
gender, religion, or social status. However, the Constitution‘s guarantee for equality did 
not improve South Korean women‘s status very much.  According to the Ministry of 
Gender Equality and Family in South Korea, South Korea‘s National Equality Index 
Value was 62.6 in 2010 compared to 2009, it increased o.8 percentage.
439
 The National 
Equality Index Value was categorized into eight parts; family, welfare, health, economic 
activities, decision-making, education and vocational training, culture and information 
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and safety. Among them, the decision making part was the lowest part in the level of 
gender equality.
440
  
Also, 2010 EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) reported the WEOI (Women‘s 
Economic Opportunity Index). They measured the economic environment of women 
workers and employees of 113 countries and they defined whether women are allowed 
the same conditions of economic participation in law, system, customs and attitudes.
441
 
The ranking of South Korea of WEOI was number 35 of 113 countries. By looking for 
each area, the financial area was number 21 which was the best part while legal and 
social status was number 66 and lowest. Even though South Korea‘s ranking was in the 
middle among the entire measuring nations, South Korea is at a very low level in OECD 
countries; number 30 of 34 OECD couturiers. Also, the score of South Korea was below 
average of OECD countries. The women‘s legal and social status got the highest score, 
78.3 compared to other areas but the ranking is number 66 of 113 and number 33 of 34 
among OECD countries (number 34 is U.S. of America). Especially, discrimination 
against women is low (38.8%) compared to developed countries.
442
   
 In order to research South Korean women‘s status, South Korea women‘s 
economic and political position, family policy and social support systems and women‘s 
position in the family will be investigated.    
1) The Economic position of South Korean Women 
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South Korea has had rapid economic development since the 1960s and the 
economic development strategy was labor intensive, and export- oriented 
industrialization. Thus, exports increased from $41 million in 1961 to $65 billion in 1990 
and the most part was manufacturing industries. The manufacturing industries took 83% 
of South Korean exports and were a crucial reason for the economic development at the 
time. It was concentrated in low wage and unskilled labor jobs to raise revenue in such 
industries as textile, clothing manufacturing, rubber and plastic, electronic goods, shoes 
and china and pottery manufacturing.
443
 Also, the female labor force participation rate 
has increased since 1963
444
 and female workers were more than half of all workers in the 
manufacturing industries.  This fact shows that women took a leading role in the South 
Korean economic development.
445
 
The South Korean government has been the authority in economic development 
and has controlled industry with the slogan, ―development first, distribution later.‖446 In 
this structure, women‘s labors were sold cheaply. People believed that the Korean 
economic development would lead to equal distribution but the economic development 
made the rich richer and did not make for equal work and equal wages. This phenomenon 
caused starts the labor movement along with the democratic movement for human rights 
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and political change. Also, the women‘s movement in South Korea rose actively with the 
labor and democracy movements.
447
     
A. Women‟s labor force participation     
The table 11 below shows South Korea‘s labor market participation rate and the 
female labor force participation. These rates have gradually increased but decreased in 
1998 and 1999 with the IMF economic crisis. With the economic recovery, the female 
labor force participation rate increased from 50.1% in 2005, 50.3% in 2006. However, it 
deceased again due to the financial crisis of South Korea in 2009 (49. 2%) in 2009 and in 
2010 (49.9%).
448
  
Table 11: South Korea‟s labor market participation rate and the female labor 
force participation 
 The labor market participation rate The female labor force participation rate 
1963 56.6% 37.0% 
1970 57.6%  39.3% 
1980 59.0% 42.8% 
1990 60.6% 47.0% 
1997 62.2% 49.5% 
1998 60.7% 47.0% 
1999 60.5% 47.4% 
Source: Tae-Hong Kim 
449
 
Another of South Korea‘s development strategies that increased the rate of the 
female labor force were the changes in the labor supply: namely, women‘s high education 
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levels, women‘s conscious change about working, and a better child care system. Also, 
some scholars think that the small electric appliances for the home contributed to 
women‘s participation in working. 450 
However, women‘s employment structure is different because of the number of 
workers in the establishments and their working status. Sixty- nine percentages of women 
were employed in small businesses: 18.8% of women in places with 5to 49 workers, 
8.9% of women in business with 50 to 299 workers and only 3.3 % of women were 
employed with more than 300 workers. Thus, 54.4% of women were employed in small 
establishments with fewer than 4 workers and they were not protected by the Labor 
Standard Act as temporary or daily workers. Also, in the women‘s employment structure, 
55.3% of all employed women were non-wage workers; employers were 1.2%, self-
employed were 17.1%, and unpaid family workers were 37.0%. Among wage workers 
(44.7%), regular employees were 53.1% and temporary and daily workers were 46.9%.
451
     
According to the labor participation rate by marital status, the married women‘s 
participation in the labor force is the same pattern with the increasing women‘s 
participation which had dramatically increased in the late 1980s.
452
 It means that marital 
status did not affect the participation in the labor forces and furthermore married women 
were a bigger part in increasing the labor force participation. Nevertheless, by marital 
status, the employment rate was different; 23.9% were underemployment worker 
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(incomplete employment) among married women while only 4.7% of unmarried women 
were underemployment workers.
453
  Also, the married women‘s labor force participation 
has a characteristic. Married women who have children less than 6 years old influenced 
negatively in their participation. For example, women who have children under 6 years 
old showed a 13% lower participation in labor force than women who do not have under 
6 years old children in 1985. The difference was 10.9% in 1992 and 20.6% in 1997. It 
means that taking care of young children make it most difficult to participate in the labor 
force for married women.
454
 Thus, South Korean women‘s employment activity rate is 
like a capital M (twin peak type). According to the National Statistical Office‘s Annual 
Report on The Economical Population Survey in 2000, the female labor force 
participation rate increased in the age group from 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 and over 60. The 
curve of M means that women exit the labor market because of marriage and child 
rearing but they return to the work places after children have sufficiently grown.
455
 
Especially, the age group from 25 to 29 years old engaged in productive related jobs, 
technical and related jobs and especially clerical jobs were about 20%. It peaked at the 
shape of the M as the age group of those who are between 30 to 39 years old reentered 
the job market
456
 However, females who were engaged in professional, technical, and 
administrative jobs remained regardless of age.
457
 Also, the husband‘s attitude toward 
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female labor participation is an important factor. According to the Female Employment 
Status Survey, husbands who live with employed women have a more positive attitude to 
their wives than unemployed wives‘ husbands. Working women‘s husbands answered 
53.7% at ―welcome and agree‖ and 22.1% at ―object‖ while non-working with hope to 
work husbands answered 49.4% at ―welcome and agree‖ and 30.9% at ―objection.‖458          
Another characteristic of female labor force participation was that the more 
educated women‘s labor force participation rate is high; college and university graduates 
- 90%, high school graduates – 80% and middle school graduates – 60%. 459  The age of 
15 to 19 group‘s labor force participation rate decreased from 1980.460 It indicates the 
increasing of female education in university or college. Moreover, female college 
enrollment was 80.5% compared to male college enrollment at 77.6% in 2011: the rate of 
female college enrollment beat males for two years. 
461
  Even though the high female 
college enrollment produced many professional female workers
462
, the female labor force 
participation graph still shapes a capital M.
463
 It means that the South Korean social 
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systems and society do not support women‘s pregnancy and child rearing.  Also, 
women‘s labor force participation rate passed male (women- 72.9% and male-70.0%) but 
women‘s regular worker rate is 34.5% compare to males 47.9%: the other women are 
non- regular workers. There are still lot of gaps in the quality of employment between 
women and men.
464
     
B. Women worker‟s wage 
Even though women workers have contributed to the South Korea economic 
development, the status of women in the economic area is low. The average women 
workers‘ wage was less than half of the wage of male workers until 1987and women 
workers began to receive at least half of male wages from 1988. The majority of women 
were employed in the manufacturing industries where were the lowest.
465
 Also, women 
workers average salary was 1,396,000 won in 2005, 1,693,000 won in 2009, 
1,772,000won in 2010 while men averaged 2,109,000won in 2008, 2,546,000won in 
2009, 2,648,000won in 2010. Even though women‘s wage growth was higher than men 
(women- 4.7%, men – 4.0%), still women‘s wages are lower than men: the gender gap of 
gross monthly salary was 66.2% in 2005, 66.5% in 2006, 66.5% in 2009 and 66.9% in 
2010.
466
        
The principle of equal pay for equal work was introduced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act acted as the Labor Standard Act in 1953. The Labor 
Standard Act in article 5 indicates that ―an employer shall not discriminate against the 
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labor conditions of workers by the reasons of gender, nationality, religion or social status, 
etc.‖467  However, Article 5 could not work in South Korea because discrimination was a 
common habit in companies. Accordingly, women‘s organizations requested a new 
special law for the Equal Employment Opportunity Act which was from 1988.
468
  
For example, salary discrimination, according to the research of Kim Tae-Hong 
and Yang Seung-Joo, there were 33 companies in which female college graduates were 
recruited. The companies set starting rank and grade by educational attainment and sex. 
Twenty-three companies answered, and only 7 companies provided equal starting salaries 
by gender, but 16 companies had different starting grades (10 companies) or different 
grades (6 companies) by gender. Also, the case of high –school graduates, among 31 
companies in the job of clerks and production workers, only 4 companies assigned equal 
grades while 27 companies had different grades. Twenty companies out of 27 companies 
had different starting grades and ranks by gender. Especially, in production workers, only 
3 companies out of 31 companies assigned equal ranks even though both the males and 
females graduated high-school. When the representatives of labor unions or managers 
were asked a question why they assigned different ranks and grades to workers with 
equal education, they responded that male and female‘s job duties are different. However, 
even the production workers were engaged in different job duties by gender, the clerks 
had almost same job duties. It proves that the salaries are not decided by their duties, 
education attainment but by gender.
469
 Another example, in the case of Doosan company 
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(one of the beigest companies in South Korea), a female worker who graduated from 
college and worked continually for more than 10 years received much lower wages than a 
male worker who starts work with a college degree. Nevertheless, a more serious 
problem is that wage discrimination is not the only problem, for it further effects 
discrimination in the wage management system and in placement or promotion.
470
  
However, the principle of equal pay for equal work brought a side effect caused 
by the implementation of the principle. When companies try the equal pay principle, they 
may experience that the cost would be raised by female worker‘s maternal expenses. It 
could lead to their avoiding hiring female workers and reducing the number of female 
workers. Therefore, Kim and Yang suggest that the government should try to solve and 
minimize the side effects by the implementation of the equal pay principle and by 
supporting the maternal costs. Furthermore, society‘s custom and consciousness needs to 
be challenged and the employers mind about women‘s employment and wages have to be 
changed. 
471
     
C. Women worker‟s working hour 
Another problem for women is their working hours. Women workers are working 
more hours than men. South Korea was the only country in which women worked more 
than men among seventeen countries in 1983 and among fifteen countries in 1988. For 
example, in the manufacturing industries, women workers worked an average of 245 
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hours per month in 1984 which was four hours more than men. This problem decreased 
from 1989 but this pattern is still continuing in South Korea.
472
 Also, gender division in 
labor has not changed. For example, women administrators and managers were only 
1.9% of the total in 1989 compared to clerical workers who were predominantly 
female.
473
         
In South Korea, the rate of female part time workers is increasing. One of the 
reasons for the increase female part-time workers is that companies‘ growth is stagnant 
and sluggish which leads to female worker‘s being cut back first. With this result, women 
have to reenter the job market as contingent workers. Also, the transition of female 
workers‘ jobs place from the manufacturing industry to the service industry. For example, 
in 1986 male part–time workers peaked at 6.0%, but 10 years later it was at 3%, while 
female part-time workers peaked at 20.2% in 1985, but the ratio was17.7% in 1988, 
26.1% in 1989 and 21.4% in 1994. It shows that the rate of male part-time workers was 
reduced over this time, but the rate of female part-time workers increased. Accordingly 
female full time workers were decreased in companies which had more than 10 workers: 
38% in 1981 and 29% in 1994. Another example, companies with less than 10 female 
employees increased 26.0% in 1983 to 34.4% in 1993, while companies with more than 
100 female employs decreased 41.8% to 28.0% during the same time. However, male 
employment rate was not much different regardless of the size of the company.
474
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 The minimum wage raising campaign from 4,320Korean won ($ 4) to 5,410 
Korean won ($ 5) was sponsored by the Korean Women Worker‘s Association (KWWA) 
in 2010. South Korea became one of the lowest countries in the OECD in the rate of low 
paid workers and inequality in wages. 198 million workers were paid less than the 
minimum wage. A more interesting fact was that 61.5% of them were female workers 
and they were not-regular workers; regular workers were only 5.7%. This indicates that 
women workers are not only minimum wage workers but also not– regular workers. 475      
Thus, the unstable female employment structure has appeared to be another trend 
since the late 1980s much as part time and leased work.
476
 The South Korean companies 
wanted the labor flexibility strategies in order to respond quickly to their economic 
internal and external changes. The most significant impact by the economic environment 
changes was toward female employment. In South Korean industry, the decrease in the 
female employment rate has a characteristic which is shown in the manufacturing 
industry. According to the Ministry of Labor‘s Monthly Labor Statistics, the decreasing 
rate of female employment in large company manufacturing plummeted from 53.2% in 
1982 to 33.6% in 1994, while the S&M firm‘s decrease rate was 7%. Then, what is the 
difference between the two types of companies? According to Kim Youngock, the 
manufacturing companies, in which most females were employed such as the large textile 
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and shoe firms, went bankrupt and this brought most of the layoffs to female employees. 
In contrast, the reason of slow rate of decrease of female workers of S&M firms was that 
they usually hired middle aged women as part-time workers. Married women, who do not 
need to be paid as much as part-time workers replaced the young women workers.
477
 
Also, part time worker‘s salaries are not based on an hourly payment system even they do 
the work of full-time workers under the company system. The part–time worker‘s salary 
is 60% of full-time workers. In addition, the part-time workers have to renew labor 
contracts every year.
478
 Therefore, Kim Young- Ock claims that ―the unstable trend of 
female employment is becoming more visible and the prospect is expected to become 
worse. Therefore, it is very urgent to take steps to establish a stable employment structure 
for female workers.‖479 Also, it means that when the country and its economic 
environment change, the worst impact may be on women.         
2) The Political position of South Korean Women   
South Korean women‘s participation in politics started from the resistance movement 
against Japanese colonization. Women actively participated in the independence 
movement. One of the examples is the March First Movement in 1919 in which many 
women devoted their lives to the nation‘s independence as fighters, financial supporters 
and contactors. However, these female independent activists
480
 were unknown and were 
hidden in history until they started to be introduced recently by feminist scholars. Among 
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the women‘ resistance leaders, three women became active politicians in the newly 
established South Korean government namely Yim Young-Shin, Park Soon-Chon, and 
Park Hyun Sook. After the liberation from Japan, the populace formed political parties 
for women. Yim formed the first political party, called Taehan Yoja Kukmin-dang 
(Korean Women‘s National Party) in 1945, and Park Soon-Chon organized Konguk 
Bunyo Dongmaeng (Women‘s Alliance for Nation Building) which tried to promote 
women‘s participation in South Korean government building projects in 1948, and Park 
Hyun-Sook organized Ibuk Yosong Tongi-hoe (Northern Women‘s Fellowship 
Association).
481
   
A. Women‟s political participation 
  The South Korean women‘s political participation can be divided into three 
phases; first, there was the national period from 1948 to 1961; second, there was the 
modernization period in the 1960s to the 1970s under the Park regime; and third, there 
was the democratic transition from the mid-1980s on.
482
 According to the observation of 
Bong-Scuk Sohn, women‘s participation in politics during the first period was by a few 
women pioneers. Moreover, they were not aware that they were representing women and 
were passive on women‘s issues.  For example, there were only two assembly women in 
1963, and the number was only twelve in 1973. Also, women assembly members were 
not elected by the people but were appointed by indirect elections by the party under the 
national constituency system which was enacted in 1963.  With the Confucian tradition, 
women‘s participation in politics was very limited in contrast to men who were 
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encouraged to succeed as scholar–bureaucrats with Confucian teachings.  Thus, only a 
few elite women who were in well known, privileged families and had social background 
were appointed to public positions by the government.  
In the second period, some notable women participated in supporting the authoritative 
government, but also there were changes which were influenced by two things. First, 
there was the democratic movement in South Korea from 1982 to 1997. This movement 
strengthened the awareness for the need of women‘s political participation. During this 
period, there were rapid social changes; both low- wage earning women and educated 
professional women participated in social and economic activities. Second, the women‘s 
movement was influenced by the global tide of women organizing such as the United 
Nations Proclamation of International Women‘s Year in 1975, and women‘s movements 
became more active from this time on. Also, with the implementation of local autonomy, 
the change to a democratic political government and the rapid economic development in 
the 1980s stimulated women‘s political participations, and this became one of the 
important parts of the women‘s movement. Assembly women brought a lot of attention to 
women‘s issues. However, even though their political part had grown with democracy 
from the former authoritarian regime, women‘s participation in politics is still slight. 483                                               
According to recent statistics, the number of women in congress in South Korea 
in 2004 was 39 out of 299, and only 41 congresswomen in 2008. This shows that the rate 
of congresswomen increased slightly. Also, the rate of women who were elected to 
congress was 10. 3 % lower than the OECD average and 25.4% lower than the 
                                                          
483
 Ibid., 439 -441. 
 
 213 
 
 
Netherlands which ranked first. Those in positions of administrative decision-making, 
such as women civil servants who were in grade five and above, increased slightly. 
According to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family research, the status of women 
on the director at level or above in private and public companies increased continually 
but currently the level seems to be deteriorating. 
484
    
      2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Congressman 14.6 14.6 14.6 15.5 15.5 15.6 
Civil servants grade of 5 above 11.0 11.9 12.6 11.1 13.1 13.8 
Manager (at least director) 22.6 23.1 25.0 34.5 30.3 28.3 
Source: 2011 National Gender Equality Report, The Ministry of Gender Equality and 
Family in South Korea.  
B. A need for women political representatives and CEO 
 Then, why is there a need for women political representatives to expand in 
society?  According to sociological research, women‘s political participation can expect 
to bring about a reduction of corruption in society.
485
 There is a strong indication that a 
higher rate of women representatives in countries has the tendency to lower the rate of 
corruption in political and economic life.  According to Bernhard Goetz, the reason for a 
lower possibility of corruption is that women are excluded from the back-door network. 
Thus, being excluded from the back-door network of men, women can limit the men from 
the corrupt conduct. Women are not as familiar with illegal actions for their benefit but 
are committed to keeping their actions honest and trusted.
486
  Also, many scholars have 
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stressed that women are less selfish and have higher ethical standards. All of this means 
that women have more possibilities for less selfish conduct and more influence over 
moral conduct. Therefore, increasing women‘s participation in the economic and political 
parts can produce not only social equality but also a reduction of corruption. 
487
    
 Moreover, according to the Governance Metrics International Research, gender 
equality is positive in economic life because women‘s participation in the labor market 
increases economic growth. Also, women‘s participation on boards of directors has a 
positive impact on business accomplishments with the promotion of creativity and 
innovation. A company could employ people who want compatible work and a family 
through women -friendly culture. Thus, they can hire talented persons and can make a 
positive image for business. According to the Finnish Business and Policy Forum, EVA, 
comparable companies which have women CEO and more than half of the board of 
directors are women raised more revenue than companies which have more male 
directors. The companies with women CEO‘s revenue was 14.0% compared to 
companies with male CEO‘s which was 12, 2%. The companies which have more than 
half women board of directors had 14.7% revenue, compared to male dominant board of 
directors‘ company which was only 11.5%. 488  The research shows the need for women‘s 
participation in the company‘s decision making processes. Norway is a representative 
country which adopted a women‘s quota system. Norway adopted the system for its Joint 
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Stock Companies and they adopted it to private, state enterprises and local public 
corporations from 2003 on, and they had a goal to reach: a board of directors which has at 
least 40% women. Also, Spain, Iceland, France, and the Netherlands adopted a quota 
system in 2010. Therefore, improving women‘s political participation is not only for 
women‘s rights, but it also helps build an ethical and productive society.   
3) The family Policy and Social Support Systems of South Korea 
For the social roles and gender equality for women, international organizations
489
 
created international treaties from 1975 on. The UN‘s Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979 is representative.
490
 South Korea 
ensured gender equality and labor rights in the Constitution and prohibited discrimination 
by employers against women workers by the Labor Standards Act of 1953. Also, the 
South Korean Congress ratified the elimination of all forms of discrimination in 
accordance with the UN‘s Convention and Women‘s Policy Review Committee which 
adopted affirmative action policies related to women‘s employment in 1985. Even though 
South Korea has guaranteed gender equality in work and life, discriminatory provisions 
still exist in both in law and in the work place.  
A. The Family Head provision   
In family related laws,
491
 the most discriminative law was the family head provision 
which was built on the Confucian family head system. The law enacted in 1960 worked 
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until 2007.
492
  The family head provision allowed that only a male can have the head 
position in a family and lead family members as a representative called the hoju. When 
the family head, usually the father, died, there is a succession order: first son, the other 
sons, daughter who did not married, wife and mother of the family. Because oldest son 
becomes the head of the family, even two year old boys could become head. Women can 
be a head of family only when there are no males in the family or male members refuse to 
be the head. But the female head loses the position when she gets married. The law 
defines that ―if female family members want to maintain the family head position even 
after they get married, they ought to register their husband into their own family register.‖ 
(Family Law, Article 980)
493
  Also, according to Family Law article 862, clause 3, the 
bride has to register her name in her husband‘s family and have her name removed from 
her original family register. It means that a female loses the possibility to be a head of 
family by marrying. If there is no one eligible to be head of the family, the register of the 
family will expire and this has an important meaning to Koreans. They think that if the 
family register expires is the extinction of the family. Thus, the male centered family 
succession encourages automatically the preference for a son. Another male oriented 
family system is following the father‘s surname but a more interesting aspect is that the 
father can register children by another woman without the wife‘s approval while wife 
cannot register other children without husband‘s approval. Also, wife and children have 
to follow the father‘s status when he changes his nationality (article 3, clause 8). 494     
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With the struggles of sixty-one women‘s organizations from 1973 through the 
revisions in the family law, the provision of head of family was abolished in 2008. Also, 
there were three changes in the law in 1991. Women‘s obtaining a divorce was revised. 
Women had no rights previously to the assets when she is divorce but the amended law 
allowed that women can seek the proportion of their accumulation by the corresponding 
amount of a women‘s contribution.495 Prior to this, women had felt little freedom when 
they wanted to obtain a divorce due to their worry about their livelihood even if they had 
been abused by their husband. A second worry was the issue of child custody. When 
couples divorced, the father had child custody automatically. But according to the revised 
law, the right of custody is determined by their mutual agreement or by the Family Court 
itself. Thus, women could participate in the decision making process regarding child 
custody.
 496
  This change in the law should help women who were in an abusive marriage 
but could not divorce because of the fear of losing her children.
497
 A third worry focused 
on, succession law. Daughters could have only one quarter of a son‘s inheritance, but the 
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revised law eliminated the discriminative law with the result that daughters can receive 
the same proportion as the sons.
498
      
B. The Military Additional System 
The Military Additional System, which gave extra points to males who completed 
military service, became an issue for organizations which focused on the rights of both 
women and the disabled. According to the ―Act a Person of Merit for the Nation‖, article 
70, males who complete military service can get extra points – from 3 to 5 % -- on 
entrance examinations of public companies. This law was established for the purpose of 
guaranteeing employment to war veterans and males who had completed military service. 
However, this law worked as an unfair opportunity for women and disabled persons vis-
à-vis entrance examinations in applying for a government positions also the eligibility of 
later promotions. Some people argued that it is not a gender discrimination law because it 
gives benefits to the people who fulfilled military service. But the women‘s organizations 
and disabled organizations pointed out that the law stipulates the military service of 
males only since the service is compulsory. A woman enters the military only by way of 
a voluntary application.  Finally, the Constitutional Court decided that the Military 
Additional System was unconstitutional in discussing this problem and the benefit points 
were reduced from 3 to 5% to 1.5 to 4% in 1999. Nevertheless, the indirect sexual 
discrimination is still at work in the entrance examinations and in the public servant 
training institutions.
499
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The Military Additional System was submitted again to Parliament by some 
conservative legislators in 2008 which aroused opposition by the civil society. The 
women‘s and disabled organizations warned about their intervention. They argued: ―if 
women and disabled persons do not have the opportunity even in the civil service 
examination which is the only fair competition career test in South Korea, then the equal 
rights of women and the disabled are seriously violated as regards the freedom of career 
choice.‖500 The main point of the criticism of these organizations was that the 
reinstatement of the Military Additional System would significantly affect the 
employment of both women and the disabled.  When one considers the current situation, 
they argued, in which part time workers are expanding among women and the disabled in 
South Korean society, and then a reinstatement of the Military Additional System would 
only increase discrimination.
501
  
C. The Child Care Act 
Korean law guarantees maternity leave and child-care leave which are based on 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (article 11). The Child Care Act which called for 
the installation and management of child care facilities was institutionalized on April 1, 
1989 and was enacted in January, 1991. Women‘s expanded education opportunities and 
the reduction of house chores and the low birth rate promoted women‘s labor 
participation.  The South Korean government had already tried to utilize the women‘s 
labor force for economic development in the 1980s. As we have seen above, the biggest 
barrier to working women who wanted to marry was child rearing. Child-care-leave 
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systems guaranteed that the female worker‘s request for leave would be granted that their 
salary would continue up to the child‘s first year of birth when they have a child under 
one year old. The length of leave is one year which includes paid maternity leave before 
and after childbirth. If employers reject the request, they should be punished and the 
period of leave should be counted as part of time served.
502
 However, this situation was 
not always followed in practice, because employees considered pregnant employees as 
surplus. For example, the following is an office worker‘s testimony that lived in Massan-
Changwon, ―I got forced to resign the moment I told my boss that I would like to have a 
maternity leave.‖ Another testimony by an English tutor in Seoul, ―the company insisted 
that they will not offer a new contract to employees who will possibly request a maternity 
leave.‖503  A more serious problem is that about half of the women workers are in part 
time jobs. This means that the Child Care Act does not apply to them. It can be said that 
both the government and the company‘s need the women‘s labor forces and abilities 
when women can work, but when women need support for child care, they say that the 
child care is your personal matter.           
Thus, when the South Korean Equal Employment Opportunity Act is compared 
with the UN Agreement on the Equality of the Sexes, one sees a difference in doing away 
with gender discrimination. The interesting factor is that the South Korean Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act includes an assumption that child care is the responsibility 
of women. Article 1 states: ―Besides guaranteeing equal opportunity and treatment 
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between man and women according to the Equality Act, it aims to improve the welfare of 
the female worker and promote her status by protecting maternity and developing her 
career.‖ And also, article 3 defines that woman workers contribute to the nation‘s 
economic and social development and also contribute by rearing the next generation. 
504
 
Both articles define that women have the responsibility to take care of children; no 
mention is made regarding the father‘s responsibilities. Thus the government guarantees 
the systems which help women workers during pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing, 
and in doing so the law looks like it helps women workers. But this is only a surface 
view. In actuality, women are under dual burdens, one in employment and the other in 
child care and housework. Kim points out that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is 
similar to the Japanese enactment, ‗Women Workers Welfare Act.‘ However, compared 
with other international agreements of this nature, the laws of South Korea apply only to 
women while other international agreements apply to both males and females.
505
              
Thus, the first action of the working environment improvement campaign was 
this: ―Demand your maternity leave when you need it.‖ This position was started by 
KWWA on the 4
th
 of May, 2011. The campaign involved ten women‘s associations, and 
they asserted that ―In 2012, the movement for the reduction of working hours and men‘s 
responsibility regarding child-care are scheduled to be enacted. We expect a working 
environment that respects both maternal and paternal rights without any sort of sexual 
discrimination, for a higher quality of life.‖506   
                                                          
504
 El-Im Kim, ―Child Care Leave Systems: Setting A Research and Policy Agenda,‖ 3. 
 
505
 Ibid., 4. 
 
506
 KWWA website, ―Working environment improvement campaign to find a balance between work and 
 222 
 
 
Men‘s right and responsibility to child–care is an important issue in improving the 
child care leave system. The Korean tradition has implied that the child care 
responsibility is a responsibility of women and this emphasizes the sexual division of 
roles. Therefore, when South Korea designed the Child Leave System, it was meant to 
protect mothers but it was based on the idea that women are the primary child caretakers. 
We need to recognize that child care is a communal responsibility of both mother and 
father, but child care is the responsibility of the nation and society. Furthermore, the 
nation needs to acknowledge that child care leave is not only for maternal protection but 
also for equal rights for men and women.
507
 Therefore, the Child Care Leave system has 
to include male workers. If this occurs, it would allow men to share child care duties. 
However, even though many countries have already adopted systems which include male 
workers, the transition from law to practice is difficult. Sweden guaranteed a paid leave 
system for child rearing, but only a small percentage of men stay at home in order to 
share child-rearing duties.
508
       
In the actual carrying out of the Child Care Act, one sees that it is both a positive 
and a negative phenomenon in South Korea. As a positive phenomenon, the South 
Korean government enacted the policy that companies with more than 300 female 
employees should establish daycare centers. However, only 5.4% of the 329 companies 
had daycare facilities in 1996. In response to this disregard of the Child Care Act vis-à-
vis the companies which established the daycare centers, statistics indicate that the effect 
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of the daycare centers was very positive and they helped promote productivity. The direct 
effect was an enhancement in recruitment, and a decreased turnover of workers as well as 
a decreased absenteeism of workers. The more effective results were increased 
motivation for workers and improved cooperation.
509
 Even though a small percentage of 
companies followed the daycare center rule, the result was a boon for the company‘s 
productivity and a guarantee of a viable work environment for women workers. A 
negative fact was the burden that the companies had to provide the costs of full wages 
because of the Child Care Act. It is also true that many companies would experience a 
financial burden if they applied the positions of the Child Care Act. Oddly enough, some 
women workers have tended to avoid these benefits. For example, among 520 companies 
with at least 300 employees, 317 companies (61%) were implementing the child care 
leave system in 1994. However, only 88 companies (27.1%) utilized the systems during 
the past 5 years. According to the Ministry of Labor, even though the companies which 
implemented the Child Care System are improving, 39% of companies have not 
implemented the system. Some women workers have tended to avoid using these benefits 
because of fear of dismissal, discrimination and other forms of disadvantages. When 
women workers take child care leave, they cannot be assured their job is secure and that 
they would have the same position when returning from leave. Moreover, there are no 
legally binding measures in the Child Care Act, and there are no regulations for labor 
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supervisory boards. Thus, the employers avoid the system because of the burden of 
finding substitute workers and also the burden of increased financial need.
510
     
In actual practice, under the Child Care Leave system, companies provide all the 
costs of full wages for maternity leave, menstruation leaves, and paid nursing leaves. The 
companies are also legally unable to ban pregnant women from overtime and other 
maternity protection policies. However, companies may experience financial burdens and 
this continues to discourage the companies from hiring women workers. Therefore, this 
system cannot be accomplished without some regulatory forms of national and local 
government. For this involvement, Elim Kim suggests that the government should help 
the companies by providing administrative guidance and giving economic support 
through subsidies for those workers who are on leave. The government can accomplish 
this by a series of tax breaks. In fact, South Korea has been providing tax breaks for 
businesses which have child care facilities since 1994.
511
         
4) South Korean Women‟s Position in the Family   
A. Housework 
According to the National Gender Quality Report of South Korea, women do 
most of the housework regardless of whether they are employed or unemployed. Even 
though male participation in housework has increased, there is still a severely unequal 
situation. 
512
    
  2005 2009 
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Male Employed 31 minutes 36 minutes 
Unemployed 55 minutes 1 hour 4 minutes 
Female  Employed 2 hours 36 minutes 2 hours 36 minutes 
Unemployed 4 hours 53 minutes 4 hours 41 minutes 
 
Source: 2011 National Gender Equality Report, The Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family in South Korea 
 
 In this table, we can see that employed males engaged in house work for 31 
minutes in 2005, while and females for 2 hours and 36 minutes. It is clear that the 
difference in house work activity makes a big difference. It gives us a picture of a family: 
both husband and wife come back from their work places, but women are simply coming 
to another work place -- the house. Also, a more interesting comparison focuses on the 
unemployed; Male unemployed house work time was 55 minutes in 2005 while female 
unemployed time was 4 hours and 53 minutes. Both cases show that Koreans consider 
housework a woman‘s responsibility. By and large, South Korean society considers 
house works as primarily a woman‘s responsibility, and therefore when husband share 
household chores, they think that it is not ―sharing in a duty‖ but only ―helping the wife‖. 
A laid-off husband often comments on what it means for him to be engaged in house 
work. He is taking care of his children; he is bathing them and preparing breakfast for 
them. He is driving them to kindergarten. However, he expresses his feelings about doing 
house work and taking care of the children when he says: ―I am doing something that I 
don‘t have to do. Before, I would have gladly helped out and I would have been thanked 
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for helping out. Now, my wife takes it for granted that I will do housework but there are 
times when I don‘t feel like doing it.‖513  
 Hyekyung Chang and Youngran Kim have analyzed the situation of men when 
their work role changed, After a husband‘s lay off, Change and Kim found no change in 
the men‘s viewpoint.514 The same judgment remained: housework for the male is only 
helping out, for the primary responsibility to do the housework lies with the woman. 
When doing housework, he husband feels uncomfortable and at times he feels his self-
pride is diminished. A more interesting part in their research is this: if the husband‘s lay-
off period is prolonged, the leadership of the household shifts from the husband to the 
wife. This change seems to be a switch from a patriarchal family to a matriarchal 
family.
515
 It shows how economic power influences the position of head of the 
household, and also it indicates that women have to participate in the labor force in order 
to have equality in the family. Nevertheless, the lack of outside support, such as 
governmental support, for childcare systems and the lack of husband‘s doing their 
responsible share in household duties make it harder for women to participate in the labor 
force.    
B. Women‟s position in the family     
 As to the status of women in the family, Korean women leave their father‘s house 
permanently upon marriage in the Confucian custom. The woman then had the lowest 
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position in her husband‘s family. She had to show respect to all members of her 
husband‘s family, even to younger brothers and sisters in law. Also, she was openly 
abused and mistreated by her mother in law and her husband‘s family members in 
general. This was especially true if she had not yet given birth to a son. The birth of a son 
gave her some status in the husband‘s family. Also, men should have final authority in 
Korean families. An old Korean saying puts it this way: ―If the hen cries, the house is 
ruined.‖  Men as the head of the household have every right for decision making. Thus, 
after marriage, women have to live in unquestioning obedience to their husbands.
516
 The 
Korean Women‘s Improvement Center poll in 1985 showed what the status of women in 
the husband‘s family was. 89.1% of urban males and 76.3% of urban females supported 
the following statement, ―The wife should follow her husband.‖ Only 9.7% of males and 
21.9% of females disagreed with this opinion.
517
     
However, women‘s status has improved with modernization, economic 
development, the improvement in women‘s education level and the growth of women‘s 
percentage of labor participation. Today, the status of women is different. Older 
generations still keep to the old order between husband and wife. However, today the 
divorce rate has rapidly increased. The younger generation‘s sees the relationship 
between wife and husband in a much different way than that of the older generation. 
They are beginning to consider each other as partners or friends, so that there is no more 
insistence on obedience or on a relationship of inferiority. In colleges, the number of 
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women today has risen to almost 50% of the student body. In young families, the 
preference for a daughter rather than a son has also increased.  
 Obviously, changes have occurred in South Korean society. Does this mean that 
the relationship between women and men in South Korean society is more equal today? 
Even though there is reduction in the abuse and mistreatment of women, South Korean 
society still discriminates against women. Connie Chung points out that women‘s 
situation has in many ways worsened even though rapid industrialization gave some 
degree of participation and recognition to women. Economic development did not bring 
about a major improvement to the status of women. Rather, women in the work force 
gave women a double burden: women have to do work both as an employee and as a 
housewife. Without social support and lack of recognition by their family members, 
especially their husband, women still struggle with their double burden.
518
 Forms of 
subjugation of women are still present in general life.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
A FEMINIST REUNIFICATION THEOLOGY 
 The culture of North Korea and South Korea is strongly Confucian.  During the 
Chosun Dynasty, Korean Confucianism maintained male supremacy over Korean life in 
general so that there was a male dominance in politics, in female and male relationships, 
and in the way Korean families lived. The influence of Confucianism is still operative in 
the lives of women in both North and South Korea.  
 Even though North Korea declared that the Korean people should no longer be 
governed by Confucian ideology in their law, the role and position of women in North 
Korea have not changed in actual life. For example, North Korea socialism tried to give 
equal rights and participations to women and men in the labor force. However, there 
remains a gender division of labor, for women are placed at a low-income-bracket 
position, and women are low as regards the density and importance of their occupation. 
Also, the role of North Korean women has remained in its Confucian-influenced 
situation, for women should be an assistant to their husbands and they should also be 
obedient and dedicated to their husbands.  Thus, North Korea‘s socialism could be called 
―Confucian socialism‖ because this is the way it is in the practical lives of North Korean 
women.   
 In South Korea, Confucianism influenced is still maintained for the government 
remains dominantly male and family life also remains male-dominated. This dominance 
affects the lives of Korean women in their married status and in their work-force status, 
and in the way women are educated.  . For example, even though South Korea was the 
 230 
 
 
economic miracle of Asia and hosted the G20 meeting in 2010, women’s rights ranked 
61
st
 among 109 countries according to UNDP in 2009, and Korean women in the sex gap 
index, issued by the World Economic Forum in 2010, ranked 104
th
 among 134 countries.  
Moreover, women’s average annual wage in South Korea is about $16,931 compared to 
the average wage of men which is about $32,668.
519
 The wage of a woman is just a little 
more than half the wage of a man. In this regard, South Korea had the biggest wage-gap 
between women and men among all advanced countries.  
 Furthermore, the patriarchal Christianity was mixed with Confucianism, and this 
helped to produce a conservative Korean Christianity. Korean Christianity has indeed 
contributed to the betterment of women‘s awareness and participation in society, but at 
the same time, Korean Christianity has reinforced the view that women are in a second-
position status and that women should continue to exhibit a passive image in church, 
family and society.  
 We analyzed the German reunification case which caused a major loss of status 
and economic opportunities for German women.  The process of German reunification 
also gave us a lesson that unequal situations and systems in society are not only political 
but also have a strong religious base. The ideology of religion has influenced the culture 
and politics of German society. In the process of the reunification of Germany, there was 
no essential participation of women and the German Christian religion gave no support 
for the establishment of an equalitarian community in the newly-formed Reunified 
Germany.      
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 North and South Korea are currently in the initial stages of a process for their 
reunification. If the process does not include a major participation by women as also a 
major participation by the religious community, Korea will simply repeat the failures of 
the German process that did nothing to improve the lives of German women. For the 
Korean process of reunification, the involvement of women and the Christian Church are 
essential. 
 In chapter five, I will investigate how the South Korean Christian Churches have 
influenced women‘s lives and these same churches can contribute positively to the 
reunification process. I will also try to uncover the reasons which brought about the 
negative influences on the status of women in South Korea, and I will also offer some 
remedial situations which will counteract these negative influences. Furthermore, I will 
try to present some basic theological principles that will help build an egalitarian 
community.  
1. How has Korean Christianity influenced Women‟s Lives?  
 Christian traditional ideologies of women and Confucianism have many things in 
common. These ideologies have built a political culture which was against women. Also, 
they have also brought about the labor division between men and women, and they have 
strengthened women’s role as mothers in both Korean societies.   
How did Korean Christianity influence women’s lives? In 1886, a modern 
women’s education institute was established by missionaries, and later many more 
schools were established. In Korea, women’s education was developed by churches and 
church institutes. Attending church meant that women could escape from the old custom 
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that locked women inside their house. Moreover, it gave them the opportunity to escape 
from the ideology of predominance of men over women since they listened to the same 
sermons in the same churches.  According to Lee Man-Yul, churches were the centers for 
improving women’s rights and status, and they played a major role of pioneering for 
women’s education that furthered the equality of women and men.520 In 1901, the 
newspaper, “Christ”, strongly asserted the churches’ role in women’s education:  
Now in a civilized country, the countries prosper and fail depending on education 
of wives.  Therefore, the education of wives is the first job of a country. However 
Korea does not do it. So, the Christian, who knows about the importance, has to 
work diligently for the education of women.
521
  
 
Many other church articles asserted that the prosperity or failure of a family and 
even of countries is dependent on women’s education.  Christianity in Korea influenced 
women’s life and status, for it improved the opportunities for women’s education through 
the founding of many women’s institutes. The opportunity for education improved 
women’s self -identities and opened the way to move from the hidden life of the house 
into the wider society.  
Nevertheless, even though Christianity gave Korean women liberation from 
oppression, there were also negative influences on women’s lives which are still working 
in women’s minds and in various social and church systems. Even though Christianity 
contributed to women’s life in many positive ways and even though women contributed 
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strongly to the miraculous Korean evangelical expansion, there was little to no 
recognition about women’s contribution and women’s voices. Even though women have 
played an important role in the growth of the churches, women were excluded from 
leadership positions in the Korean Christianity. Why did this exclusion take place? Why 
did the leaders of Korean Christianity continue to assert that women should obey men? 
Was Christianity liberation for women or a reinforcing of oppression?  To answer these 
questions, I will present how the Christian influences affect women’s lives positively and 
negatively and what the basic reasons underlie both the positive and negative stances.  
1) Korean Christianity‟s Positive Influences on Women‟s Lives 
A. Educational opportunities were open to Korean women  
 Korean Christianity, which was introduced in the late 19century, played an 
important role in developing openness for women in education, culture and the social 
areas. As I mentioned, the contribution in education was especially significant. The 
introduction of Christianity gave the chance to liberate the people from illiteracy because 
early missionaries emphasized the educational ministry by the church. The Bible, which 
was translated into Korean and this helped many people to move out of illiteracy. The 
church’s educational programs gave the opportunity to learn reading and writing in the 
church school education and activities. This education contributed to people’s 
enlightenment, and in a special way it helped women. 
An example of how Christian leaders found it difficult to collect people in school. 
Missionary, Mary F. Scranton had a hard time meeting Korean women, because Korean 
women would hide quickly by closing their door when Mary appeared in the street and 
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children cried out her name. At best, Mary Scranton at times could hold only a short 
conversation with the mothers. The first Korean women’s institute, Ewha Hackdang, was 
established by the North Methodist Church in 1886. But there were not many responses 
to women’s education and people were skeptical about it. Missionaries tried to visit door 
to door but there were only one or two who might show interest; often these women were 
orphans or concubines. In time, the interest in education for women increased with the 
improvement of trust of the missionaries.
522
  These women’s missionary education 
programs contributed to Korean women’s awakening at that time.523   
The educational programs held by churches were like women’s Sunday schools, 
women’s churches, bible classes, and bible institutes. These programs were very 
interesting to Korean women and the churches experienced an increase of women 
membership. Representative women churches were inside the Sangdong Church, 
Dongdaemun and Baewha institute.
524
     
 According to Su Kwang-Sun, women missionaries challenged Korean society by 
educating women and slowly developed a women’s true position with improving her 
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social status. Therefore, the early women missionaries’ vision and mission was the 
liberation of women who were not educated and who were socially oppressed.
525
    
B. Increased women‟s self- identity   
The opportunity for education contributed to increasing women’s self-identity. 
Korean women’s identity was low because of the ideology of Confucianism at that time. 
However, the introduction of Catholicism and the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement 
began to influence Korean women’s self-identity. Also, women’s educational institutes 
offered the opportunities to raise their thinking, for they learned that everyone is made in 
God’s image and all are equal in front of God. It produced the ideology of gender 
equality. Thus, women began to understand themselves as independent and free from 
tradition and suppression. This Christian teaching helped women be aware of their unique 
individualities as human beings and as equal in front of God. Thus, the idea of equality 
based on the Bible awakened women’s consciousness. Even though they were treated as 
inferior beings, they started thinking that they are equal to men.      
C. Education provided a female centered community and a place to use their 
talents
526
 
In Korean history, women’s outside work and activities were restricted by the 
traditional rules, and most of a women’s life was spent in the domestic sphere. However, 
the Christian Churches provided an important extra-domestic-sphere for women, namely, 
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a female centered community. Cell meetings, bible study meetings, evening prayer 
meetings and bible class activities became the center for women and women were 
required to meet several times a week. These meetings gave women a “resting place”527 
from an area which was male dominated and oppressive.  By these meetings, women 
built their community and a network in which they could make friendships. Also, they 
could deal with their personal difficulties and share good information.     
The churches also served as a place where women could use their talents. They 
were able to exercise non-domestic talents and have a chance to experience achievements 
outside of the domestic area. They served not only as workers for the Church kitchens, 
but they also served as teachers of Sunday school, directors of the choir, musicians and 
cell leaders. These works provided an opportunity for women to discover their talents, 
use their brain and also develop leadership skills.   
2) Korean Christianity‟s Negative influences on Women‟s Lives 
 Even though Christianity provided many opportunities to improve women’s 
identity and status, there were negative effects also. One of the major reasons was that the 
church leadership simplified the gospels. In Korea, both Protestant and Catholic 
Churches were deeply conservative. As a result, the churches did not, at least in any great 
degree, enhance women’s leadership positions. In the Korean Churches women were not 
equal to men. Since the Christian missionaries targeted the working class as well as 
Korean wives, they had to adjust their teaching level concerning the Gospel; these Gospel 
explanations had to be simple and they presented church doctrines in a very conservative 
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way. Also, the theological seminary education was simple and conservative and thus 
provided the churches with conservative pastors. The missionaries thought that the 
Korean pastor’s level was beneath the missionaries themselves, but the pastor was in 
charge of the general church members.
528
 The Gospel education did remove women to 
some degree from a state of ignorance and oppression. Rather, these groups of women 
could accept the Gospel as escapism and personal salvation.
529
 Pak Sun-Kyung asserts 
that the faith of Korean Christian women did not allow them to escape totally from the 
shamanistic border.
530
  The Christian mission opened the way for women to escape their 
limits and achieve social advancement, but they had a limited goal. In reality, women to 
some degree did improve their personal status and some finally became bourgeois elite 
groups.     
A. Mistakes in helping women‟s independence and leaderships 
 According to Jang Byung-Uk, missionaries made mistakes in helping Korean 
women to gain personal independence. First, missionaries were reluctant to hire Korean 
women in leadership positions in their mission. Korean women were neglected in 
planning and organizing church activities. Women had no power at meetings for they 
were seen simply as women who served their churches. Second, missionaries did not 
allow women to on any mission or other church activity without their permission. This 
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led to a form of oppression of Korean women’s autonomy and made them passive and 
dependent even within the churches. 
531
       
 Thus, there were no women leaders. For example, at the beginning of Korean 
Christianity, there were “Bible Women” who visited door to door to meet women 
personally and evangelize, teach them the Bible and teach Hangul for illiterate women. 
They led women to churches in the closed society of Korea and their contribution to 
Korean Christianity’s expansion has been recognized recently. However, the system of 
the Bible Women had many problems. The Bible Women were largely widows and they 
missed marriageable age and they did not have any other systematic education for the 
work. They just were sent out only after a short term of training. Therefore, they could 
not be long-term and professional workers for they were just temporary helpers and 
assistants for missionaries. Also, they were not allowed to preach and teach men. All of 
this indicates that they did not have leadership in the churches because church leadership 
usually starts from preaching and teaching.  
B. The wrong image of women ministers and the unequal systems in Korean 
Churches for women ministers 
 The image of women ministers comes from the images of the Bible women. Thus, 
treatment of women ministers today has had many problems concerning their positions, 
roles and paychecks. Usually the Christian Churches expect the women ministers’ 
qualification to be not highly intellectual and professional, but women should image a 
vocational awareness, strong faith and a service spirit which are similar to the images of 
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bible women.  According to the research of Korean Gallup in 1983, the images of women 
pastors have problems in their families and are often single or widows. Also, male 
theological seminary students think that women as pastors are not following the 
principles of the Bible. Thus, the Korean church members expect women ministers to be 
humble, faithful, patient and obedient.
532
       
 Therefore, the work of women ministers is basically the following: taking care of 
church members, evangelical work, and counseling. Their jobs are usually the work of an 
assistant for the male pastor. They are asked to visit church members, and in these home 
visits to discuss their problems, to collect information about absent church members, and 
to guide the way for the senior pastor’s visit. Even though they know the church members 
situations and problems, they cannot attend policy decision meetings. Therefore, the 
women ministers are in assistant positions and not allowed to be independent. Women 
ministers cannot stand officially before the public and they have to be quiet in their 
church work. Thus, churches prefer middle aged or older women as ministers rather than 
young and unmarried women.
533
 Today, there are some denominations of Christianity in 
Korea that do not allow women’s ordination. Thus, it is hard to find senior women 
pastors.
534
 Kim Un-Ju points out that the reason for these images of gender discrimination 
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inside of churches came from a wrong interpretation of the Bible and to some degree 
from the women ministers’ lack of self-identity. 535                    
 These wrong images of women ministers produced unequal systems in Korean 
Churches for women. 70 percent of Korean Church members are women but most 
leadership and operating roles are taken by men. Women are lower in the church 
hierarchy and authority structure. Women were called as helpers or service workers; 
women participate in every church task, easy and difficult, and in unnamed tasks, but 
there were/are no women in decision groups or leadership positions.  The problem of 
ordination shows the phenomenon of the Korean Churches; in the Presbyterian Church of 
Korea, women who have graduated from a theological seminary could not have been 
ordained until 1996.  Women ministers had to choose either to stay as an assistant 
minister or to go to rural districts where male ministers do not want to go. Thus, women 
ministers have to serve male ministers who are younger than themselves in age and 
experience. It was not hard to listen to the sad experiences of women ministers who 
became pioneers in the establishment of new churches and communities. But after the 
church had developed, the church members wanted to have male ministers because they 
know that women ministers who are not ordained could not administer sacraments such 
as communion and baptism. Thus, women ministers were asked to leave the church 
where they had devoted tears and sweat.      
C. The process of women’s ordination and the current situation of women 
ministers in the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) 
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 In section three, I will describe briefly the process of women’s ordination in the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (Toghab). The Presbyterian Church of Korea passed a law 
permitting the ordination of women in September 1994 and the General Assembly’s 
resolution finalized women’s ordination in 1995. The issue of women’s ordination was 
seriously raised in 1933. However, it took 60 years before a woman was actually 
ordained. The process of the struggle for women’s ordination is still in my mind. During 
my years in the seminary, I attended the meetings for women’s ordination in PCK held by 
the National Federation of Sisters in Ministry. Every year women ministers and seminary 
students attended the General Assembly meeting of PCK as an audience, and we watched 
the process of the proposed agenda. We prayed and demonstrated for women’s 
ordination. We asked why women could not be pastors and elders. Many Presbyterians 
simply answered: the Bible does not allow it. Over many years of prayer, demonstrations 
and persuasion, we had many helpers urging the passage of the issue. In 1992 with the 
expectation that this year will be the year to accomplish women’s ordination, many 
women ministers and students gathered in the assembly place and watched the process. 
But the result failed narrowly because of lack of a few votes. The disappointment was 
big. We gathered again in another room in the assembly church and prayed with great 
sorrow not to lose hope in our mission. Everybody prayed and cried which was focused 
toward the all Christian newspapers. Every women minister and student was in deep 
sorrow feeling the big barrier which we could not overcome in this denomination. 
However, God heard the cry of the women and the next year the ordination of women 
was finally passed. With the grace of God, I was ordained as a pastor in 1997 with the 
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feeling of sorrow for senior women ministers who waited 50 years. I had waited only 5 
years after graduation from the theological seminary.   
 What was and is the women ministers’ situation after the ordination of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK).
536
 According to The National Federation of Sisters 
in Ministry statistics of the Presbyterian Church of Korea in 2007, Korean women 
pastors’ number 667 persons and not ordained women ministers are 1,393. These 
numbers reflect a period after women’s ordination in 1997. Women ministers who are not 
ordained are twice as many as the ordained women. 27% of women ministers who are not 
ordained are working full-time at churches and most ordained pastor’s work is as assistant 
pastors (35.8% in 2007) and pastors of a church institution (16.9% in 2007). These 
figures show that many women ministers did not ask to be ordained after women’s 
ordination had been accepted. However, even though some women are ordained, but they 
are concentrated in the assistant pastor position and work in Christian institutions.  
 Also, the women senior pastors have difficultness in their ministry; even though 
25.3% pastors are seniors among the women pastors, most of them are in small churches 
and not in independent churches (Table 12). While the number of delegated male pastors 
is 2,253, female delegated pastors are only 4 (Table 13). To be a delegated pastor, the 
church has to be an organized church which has Danghoe (Session Metting).
537
 Women 
senior pastors who are in the larger churches are very few. Therefore, the reality leads 
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women pastors to be assistant pastors with the thinking that the assistant pastor positions 
are more stable.
538
  
 Even though women’s ordination in PCK was accepted after 50 years of fighting, 
the women ministers in PCK are struggling to find their positions. Why they did not 
break the barriers? We can see three reasons; first, the Korean society and churches did 
not change from the stereotype that women are assistants. Even many women think that a 
church leader has to be male, who is the same sex as Jesus and who has a leadership 
position in society. Therefore, church members including women avoid appointing 
women pastors as their senior pastors. The phenomenon is shown in the percentage of 
elders in churches. With the accepting of women’s ordination, women elders were also 
approved in churches. However, the number of women elder is very low in churches 
today, and only a few women with education, social position, and economic ability, were 
selected as elders in their churches. This shows us that the Korean Churches have not 
accepted the idea that the church’ leadership positions belong to both women and men. 
Second, there are many women ministers who lack their self-awareness as ministers. 
After male seminary students finished their studies, more than 90% of them decided to be 
ordained. However, as we see in the statistics, half of women ministers did not get 
ordained. This indicates that they have a lack of self-awareness as ministers. Many 
women ministers try to settle in their places, for they think that it is good enough for 
women to work in churches and Christian institutions as non ordained ministers or part 
time workers. They would struggle for their family and children. However, they do not 
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think about why senior women ministers fought for ordination and how their position will 
affect the future of women ministers.  Third, one of the reasons that only half of the 
women ministers are not ordained is due to the difficultness in finding churches that 
support their ordinations. The PCK denomination has legislated that preliminary pastors 
be placed in supporting churches. Also, the increasing number of women free pastors 
who have no places for work shows the difficulty of finding work places. All of this 
indicates that the Korean Churches are still built on male-dominated churches.   
Table 12: Women pastor’s present condition in the Presbyterian Church of 
Korea.
539
 
 2004  2007  
 The number   The percentage The number The 
percentage 
The senior pastor 140  25.0% 160 25.3% 
The assistant pastor 188 33.45 226 35.8% 
The institute pastor 104 18.5% 107 16.9% 
The missionary & 
student in foreign 
country  
54 9.6% 54 8.5% 
The part time pastor in 
education part   
41 7.3% 37 5.8% 
The free pastor 28 5.0% 42 6.7% 
The retired pastor 7 1.2% 7 1.0% 
Total 562 100% 631 100% 
    
   Table 13: Pastor‟s present condition in the Presbyterian Church of Korea on 
December 31, 2006. 
540
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 Male  Women  
 The number The percentage The number The percentage 
Commissioned Pastor  2252 18.3% 4 0.7% 
Temporary Pastor 3779 30.7% 99 17.0% 
Evangelism Pastor 1201 9.8 161 27.8% 
 Associate Pastor 2408 19.6% 212 36.5% 
Special Evangelism 
Pastor  
47 0.4% 0 0% 
Institutional Pastor 317 2.6% 32 5.5% 
Mission Pastor 423 3.4% 21 3.6% 
Pastor Emeritus 216 1.8% 0 0% 
Honorary Pastor 326 2.7% 0 
Retired pastor 463 3.8% 9 1.5% 
Undesignated Pastor 841 6.9% 43 7.4% 
Total 12273 100% 581 100% 
 
3) The reasons why Korean Christianity has not overcome the Discrimination  
towards Women 
A. Christian theology is based on the patriarchal theory and was built on the 
Confucian culture in Korea. 
In early Christian time in Korea, women who were influenced by Christianity 
tried to liberate themselves from the culture which ruled their lives. Thus, they started to 
find their identities and they rejected being called only someone‘s wife and someone‘s 
mother. They ran away from their houses and attended bible classes, revival meetings and 
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mission schools. Therefore, high education opportunities opened. Nevertheless, they felt 
the limitations of Christianity because it was built on the Western patriarchal culture. 
Even though Christianity taught that everybody is equal, they restricted women with the 
words, ―women be still and obey their husbands.‖ There were taught to listen to 
authorities who are inconsistent with the essence of Christianity. Therefore, the 
patriarchal Christian doctrine did not contribute to real women‘s liberation and the 
Christian women‘s movement stayed at the level of individual enlightenment. 
Moreover, Confucianism was the background for Christianity. Thus, the Christian 
doctrine addressed Confucianism‘s conservative perspective about women. These lead 
women were more passive in churches and home and did not allow women in positions 
of leadership.     
B. The Bible was interpreted from the perspective of androcentrism 
 In oppressing and subordinating women, the interpretation of the Bible had a big 
role.  Sexism or patriarchy ideology was not considered as a problem in the Bible. 
Moreover, it was considered as a necessary system for maintaining the social order. In 
this situation, women could not raise their own voices. However, by the development of 
various ideologies of modern society, there were many thinkers who felt that patriarchy 
and androcentrism are sins which destroy the relationship between women and men. 
After the 19
th 
century, there are many developments of women‘s liberation thoughts like 
liberal feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, and radical feminism. Thus, 
feminist theology tried to reconstruct the Christian tradition and seek women‘s dignity. 
Nevertheless, the Korean Churches are not trying to open themselves to hear the voices 
of feminist theologians. Having good faith means accepting the teaching and direction of 
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church leadership and obeying what the Bible says literally. Therefore, it is a major task 
of all Korean Christian Churches to resolve the interpretation of Bible. Christian scholars 
of all denominations need to hear in a serious way what feminist theologians are saying: 
the restoration of the humanity of women in the perspective of feminist theology based 
on the Bible. 
C. Feminist perspective reunification theology must build up on overcoming 
Confucianism and patriarchal Christianity   
 As we have seen above, without changes in the Christian theology against 
women, there will be no change in women’s life in churches and homes. Furthermore, the 
situation would be repeated after reunification. For the new generation of reunification in 
Korea, the change of Christian theology would be the first task. Many Christian 
theologians were interested in the national task and developed Korean reunification 
theology. Even though the reunification theology has good will toward healing the 
divided nation, most theologians are male and the male reunification theologians could 
not overcome the androcentrism in constructing the reunification theology. The Korean 
reunification male theology indicates there was suffering of oppressed and alienated 
people caused by the Korean division. Also, they point out the Christian’s role as people 
to reconcile and proclaim the year of God’s grace, Jubilee. Reunification theology is in 
connection with Minjung theology and shows interest about the poor and oppressed 
people. However, there are no women in the category of suffering people caused by the 
division of the country and its dictatorships. They are looking for the way of liberation 
and peace but women’s space in that is too narrow. Thus, even though the problem of 
division is solved and peace comes, women experience is still oppression and division.     
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Therefore, the Christian reunification theology has to be developed with the 
feminist mind and theology because it influences not only the churches‘ system and 
women‘s status but also, social systems and the life of Koreas next generation.  For this 
reason, a feminist reunification theology based on the right interpretation of the Bible is 
necessary.  
2. A Community based on the Right Interpretation of the Bible 
Today, there are many different hermeneutical approaches to the Bible. Raymond 
E. Brown and Sandra M,. Schneiders, in their essay ―Hermeneutics‖ present us with a 
large number of hermeneutical positions which scholars use today such as, structuralism, 
deconstruction, contextualism, rhetorical criticism, sociological criticism and 
phenomenological criticism.   These forms of hermeneutic are, in some way or another, 
valid ways of interpreting scripture.
541
  
Feminist reunification theology, today, focuses on a woman‘s perspective, but this 
perspective is only one among many. Nonetheless, today the view of women has become 
an important issue in Christian theology. In the following pares, I will use feminist 
hermeneutics as expressed by Anne E. Carr, Elizabeth Fiorenza, Dorah Setel, Rosemary 
Ruether, Hyun-Ju Bae and Carolyn Osiek.  
My material could be enlarged by liberation theologians such as Clodovis Boff 
and Jon Sobrino.
542
 The volumes by John P. Meier should also be considered.
543
 Although 
these authors provide a solid hermeneutic for their interpretation, they do not raise 
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question regarding the role of women in society in any prolonged way. Therefore, in the 
following pages, I will use the feminist authors mentioned above, since my focus in this 
dissertation is on the role of women in the Korean reunification process.    
Where did the definition begin that women‘s primary responsibility was as wife 
and mother and assistant to males? The major problem of the Christian culture was due to 
the wrong interpretation of the Bible. For many centuries, the Christian Churches did not 
overcome patriarchalism, androcentrism and sexism and did not provide human liberation 
to societies.  
Feminist theologians understand the Bible as the Gospel for liberation and 
salvation for women but at the same time, they realize that it has been used as a tool to 
oppress women.
544
 Anne E. Carr claims that the Bible made women‘s lives impossible in 
their self-realization because the Bible asserts an unequal relationship between women 
and men in public and social lives. This includes such issues as a negative description of 
a woman‘s biological body; the sin of a woman as we read in Genesis caused the fall 
from grace for all human beings; women are to be subordinate in their relationship to 
husbands because of their inferior status; and there is an interpretation of biblical 
passages which reject a woman‘s full actualization and participation in churches 
including ordination.
545
  Elizabeth Fiorenza indicates that not only are the interpretations 
of the Bible problematic, but also the Bible itself is male-centered. Nevertheless, the 
reason Christians cannot give up the Bible is that the Bible is the source of revelation to 
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both men and women. For Fiorenza, the Bible is the foundation of religious power but at 
the same time, it is the foundation for religious oppression to women. Arthur Waskow 
confesses that we cannot simply accept or reject the biblical tradition. More than that, we 
need to fight with the tradition but at the same time we need to struggle with it in love. 
Furthermore, we need to allow our lives to embrace the tradition.
546
  
How do feminist reunification theologians read and interpret the Bible? Fiorenza 
claims that we need to see the Bible as a mythic archetype moving to a historical 
prototype. The mythic archetype understands the Bible as ―the Bible as archaic myth 
therefore constitutes the enduring order and perspective of biblical religion, reflecting 
unchangeable ontological patterns and perennial models for human behavior and 
communal life.‖547 Thus, even though the Bible has historically limited experiences and 
texts, the Bible is authoritative and normative for all times and cultures because it is 
God‘s word which is immutable truth. 548   In contrast, the historical prototype, ―a 
formative root-model of biblical faith and life,‖549 includes a critical evaluation of the 
Bible. Therefore, the historical prototype proclaims that the sexist texts in the Bible are 
not God‘s words but these were reflected by patriarchal and male dominated thinking and 
culture. Thus, the equality of life which is found in Jesus and in the early church 
community is a model for our faith today. Fiorenza raises a question: how can the 
collection of documents which are past history and which reflect the faith of an earlier 
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community – a faith which has historical, cultural and political situations of a different 
age -- can set the standards and norms for today‘s faithful life. 550  
Rosemary Ruether uses the Bible as a resource for feminism, but she defines 
patriarchy as the social context not a faith context. Therefore, feminist reading of the 
Bible needs to be critical and reject patriarchal ideology and needs to rediscover the 
prophetic context. Thus, it goes beyond the letter of the prophetic message and stresses 
the prophetic liberating principle as it applies to women. She makes a further claim:  
―The prophetic-liberating tradition of Biblical faith is a norm‖ 551   and therefore the 
normative tradition of Bible has to criticize and renew itself. The prophetic principle 
criticizes sexism for it includes social sin. This procedure has its religious justification 
and it also expands the vision of messianic expectation.
552
     
In Ruether‘ opinion, the prophetic messiah tradition shows God as a liberator and 
biblical texts support the liberation of women. Fiorenza criticizes her perspective since it 
is not an analytical and wise way of interpretation, because she relies on the Bible‘s 
authority as God‘s Holy Word in looking for supportive texts for women‘s liberation. 
Furthermore, she criticizes sexist texts of the Bible which depend on the Bible‘s authority.    
Fiorenza suggests a way of interpreting the Bible which discloses the Bible‘s 
sexist characters and rejects its authority in four ways; a hermeneutics of suspicion, a 
hermeneutics of proclamation, a hermeneutics of remembrance and historical 
reconstruction, and a hermeneutics of reutilization and celebration/creative actualization.   
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First, a hermeneutics of suspicion is a starting point and defines that androcentric 
languages used in all of the biblical texts together with a patriarchal social structure. The 
Bible was written by male authors and the biblical interpreters were also male. Thus, the 
Bible cannot avoid the andocentric and patriarchal perspective. Fiorenza asserts that we 
have to find the lost tradition and vision for liberation.
553
  
Second, a hermeneutics of proclamation insists that the androcentric and 
patriarchal interpreted bible does not proclaim Christian worship or catechesis. Also, a 
feminist critical translation has to be applied in evaluating those biblical texts.
554
   
Third, a hermeneutic of remembrance recovers/reclaims all biblical tradition in 
which women were in the center of the Christian community. It reveals the early 
Christian movement in which women were equal disciples and women‘s leadership and 
devotion worked. Thus, the memories of women in which their struggles, participations 
and leaderships were acted through the power of Holy Spirit, have to be reconstructed in 
the history and theology.
555
  
Fourth, a hermeneutics of creative actualization proclaims the ―historical 
reconstructions of women‘s biblical history‖ through women‘s active participation for the 
future. It asks for a reform of patriarchal prayers, and calls for a formulation of feminist 
rituals and renaming the God. Thus, it seeks a transformation from the patriarchal religion 
and evidences the true biblical story which is a resource to give vision for all and liberate 
all from oppression.
556
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Thus, Fiorenza stresses reconstruction of one‘s memory and solidarity of the past, 
present and future women‘s struggle for liberation. She writes:    
    
We participate in the same struggle as our biblical fore-sisters against the 
oppression of patriarchy and for survival and freedom from it. We share the same 
liberating visions and commitments as our biblical foremothers. We are not called 
to ―empathize‖ or ―identify‖ with their struggles and hopes but to continue our 
struggle in solidarity with them. Their memory and remembrance-rediscovered 
and kept alive in historical reconstruction and actualized in ritual on celebration- 
encourage us in historical solidarity with them to commit ourselves to continue 
our struggle in solidarity with them. Their memory and remembrance–
rediscovered and kept alive in historical reconstruction and actualized in ritual 
celebration-encourage us in historical solidarity with them to commit ourselves to 
the continuing struggle against patriarchy in society and church
557
  
 
The weak point in the interpretation of Fiorenza , according to Carolyn Osiek, is 
the limited and narrow understanding about revelation. While she considers the texts 
which are suitable for the emancipation of women as ―scripture in scriptures,‖ they lack 
consideration about the other texts. Furthermore, Western feminists, including Fiorenza, 
could have risks trapped in white and middle class women‘s limited experiences. It could 
limit the Bible‘s broad revelatory dimensions which are sources of overcoming the third 
world poor women. The third world‘s poor women‘s problems are not only the problem 
of gender discrimination but also class discrimination, racism, and imperialism. Therefore, 
even though Fiorenza‘s interpretation criticizes churches and society‘s sexism and 
paternalism and provides visions for transformation of the world in the perspective of 
women, it needs to include the third world women and black women‘s sufferings and 
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doubly oppressed situations. 
558
     
 Kwok, Pui-lan also raises the question whether Fiorenza‘s interpretative model is 
enough to integrate Asian women‘s struggling for liberation under multiple oppressions 
such as neo-colonialism, imperialism, racism and militarism.
559
 Furthermore, she asserts 
that one needs to consider Asian women‘s heritage as following: ―However, it has also 
oppressive connotations insofar it has been used to encourage Christians in Asia to leave 
behind their cultural heritage to join the Christian community whose style of worship and 
church structure follow exactly the pattern of the ―mother‖ church in the west.‖560 
Bae Hyun-Ju introduces a transformationist interpretation of the Bible according 
to Carolyn Osiek and Sandra Hack Polaski‘s theory.561 It considers the Bible‘s authority 
and creative responsibility for the future as important things. But also, even though they 
accept the authority of the Bible, they reject the literal and authoritarian interpretation 
about the Bible‘s authority. They understand that the Bible is the living tradition which is 
made by the relationship between God and God‘s people and they understand themselves 
as members of the living tradition community. The living tradition means that it is not an 
invariant but it creates and forms continuously a dialogue with the tradition as beings that 
are responsible and subjective. Therefore, rather than transformationist readings which 
are limited to the Bible authors‘ intent and their cultural and historical limitation, the 
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three theologians respect the contents of faith and the vision of theology which they tried 
to testify at a particular time. Thus, they try to accomplish the vision of today with a 
critical and responsible attitude.
562
    
The transformationist interpretation of the Bible gives us an example of how 
feminist reunification theology uses the Bible. A feminist reunification theology 
considers the Bible as the foundation of revelation in a way similar to Fiorenza‘s 
approach, but it rejects the literal and authoritarian interpretation. Feminist reunification 
theology is looking for what God‘s will is today with the Bible, and is looking for our 
responsibility in the current divided and unequal society of women and men. With this 
responsibility, we pray to do God‘s will with the power of the Holy Spirit who makes and 
renews the world. When a feminist reunification theologian reads the Bible in this way, it 
gives the power to change the corrupted society and it gives the churches the power to 
build a new community. In many ways, this interpretation aligns us with the Lord‘s 
Prayer: ―Your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven.‖(Mattew6:10)    
 
3.  A Feminist Reunification Theology is looking to build up a Community  
 There are and will be tremendous needs to build up a community for an 
egalitarian society in a reunited Korea. For this, the first thing that has to be considered is 
attention to alienated persons. Who are alienated and who are oppressed is the first step. 
Fiorenza reminds us of the work of Jesus who called “marginal people”563 to be his 
followers and to create a community. The community creates liberation and healing for 
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the broken hearted. The community has the ideal sociopolitical goal one finds in 
Galatians 3:28
564
 which proclaim the equality of all people no matter what their religion, 
status and gender. This is the basic principle in building a new society for a reunited 
Korea.    
 Therefore, the feminist reunification theology searches for an effective social 
change in church and society. The model of community by Fiorenza, Diaz, Rita and Min 
show the way of searching to effect social change. Their model of community will give 
the principles for making an egalitarian community for Korean society.   
1) Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza‟s the Basileia of God 
Fiorenza introduces a new understanding of the community of God, the basileia of 
God. The community focuses on inclusiveness and wholeness. Thus, the community has 
a deep interest in alienated people, in its solidarity in struggling for them and in its 
reconstructing the Basileia of God.   
She does not use the word kingdom for the New Testament discussion; instead 
she keeps the Greek word basileia.
565
 She reserved the word “kingdom” for the Old 
Testament ideas because the word, “kingdom,” has the image of a triumphant king and 
territory; she uses an alternative image word, Basileia. The  Greek word is more inclusive 
and the word “Basileia” has a better image as the reign of the Messiah which is implies 
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the ‘nearness of the liberator.’ When she uses the word, she brings a feeling of the notion 
of a discipleship of equals. 
566
 
Thus, she points out that Jesus’ vision of Basileia is inclusive wholeness. 
According to Fiorenza, when Jesus says “thy kingdom come” in the Lord’s Prayer, it does 
not focus on territory or reign in the time of non- Israel rule. Rather, it focuses on the 
wholeness of the people, a new consciousness concerning inclusive wholeness.
567
  Thus, 
to Jesus, according to Fiorenza, the proclaiming and restoring the vision of Basileia goes 
beyond the Temple and Torah horizon.
568
  To Jesus, moral pickiness and ritual purity 
were not his concern, even though it was typical with the Pharisees and Sadducees of 
Greco-Roman Palestine. Jesus’ vision of Basileia is shown in his ministry, his preaching 
and his parables. The Basiliea includes all persons not only men but also women, healthy 
persons, good persons, and rich persons.  Jesus’ vision of Basileia includes all people who 
are blind, sick, dead, prostitute, tax collector, and poor. (Luke 7:22) Jesus’ healing the 
blind, the deaf and the sick, his cleansing of the lepers and his preaching of good news 
are experiences of wholeness. Firorenza indicates that the awaited future is made present 
in and through these experiences or as Jesus says “the Basileia of God is in the midst of 
you.”(Luke 17:21) 569     
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Therefore, according to Fiorenza, Jesus did not use the image of feasting with the 
cultic Temple and Torah horizon. The central symbolic actualization of the Basileia 
vision of Jesus was the festive table of a royal banquet or wedding feast instead the cultic 
meal.
570
 This vision of Jesus was probably a major conflictual point between the Jesus 
movement and the Pharisaic movement. Jesus did not stress the importance of God’s 
power and presence in the cultic Temple and Torah.
571
 Jesus’ new image of the Basileia 
of God is a festive table in which all people are included. His festive table represents an 
inclusive symbol. No one is excluded from the festive table.
572
 
 For whom is the Basiliea proclaimed? Fiorenza names three distinct groups of 
people who were in need of new hope in the time of Jesus. These were the sick and 
crippled the tax collectors, and the prostitutes.
573
 The first group is the poor. Fiorenza 
understands the poverty as a result of social injustice. She defines the poor and alienated 
persons in this way: “The power of God’s Basileia is realized in Jesus’ table community 
with the poor, the sinners, the tax collectors and prostitutes – all those who ‘do not 
belong’ to the ‘holy people,’ who are somehow deficient in the eyes of the righteous.”574 
Even though they do not belong to the holy people, they are called the righteous and they 
are the subject of the Basileia of God.  
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The second group of people includes those who needed healing. Firorenza 
understands dehumanizing power and oppressive power as “Satan,” “Beelzebub,” and 
demons because the dehumanized powers they cause disconnect social relations in people 
lives. Jesus’ exorcisms can be acknowledged as healing the dehumanizing power and 
making wholeness. For example, there was the woman with seven demons and the 
woman with the flow of blood for twelve years. They were separated from their family, 
society and religious rituals. They had to recover from the alienation and make new 
relations for recovering their whole life. Thus, feminist reunification theology proclaims 
the liberation from all dehumanizing power in the sociopolitical structure and it denies all 
demonic power. She points out that healing and eating is basic to human life. It means 
that illness and lack of food is a major point of dehumanizing people. Therefore, the 
vision of Basileia is restoration by healing and eating at this festive table. Fiorenza 
writes: “Everydayness can become revelatory, and the presence and power of God’s 
sacred wholeness can be experienced in every human being.”575  
The third group of people s those who are usually condemned on moral grounds. 
They were the tax collectors, sinners, and prostitutes. Fiorenza says that they were not 
liberated from a holiness perspective and they were in a predicament socially.
576
 There 
were categorized by the society’s moral standard and ideology and prohibited from 
joining in their community. However, Jesus called these sinners and invited them to his 
table community and declared that “the tax collectors and harlots go into the Basileia 
before you.”(Mattew21:31) Parents should accept their children no matter what their 
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status, morality, health condition or gender. Jesus called them children of God. Therefore, 
the vision of Basileia to Jesus means wholeness which puts a relationship into 
“emancipator praxis” for equality of rights and struggling toward a disciple of equals.577                           
 Therefore, the feminist reunification theology includes the meaning of Basileia of 
God and is looking for inclusiveness and wholeness in the society. The Basileia of God 
does not discriminate people by their religion, status, morality, health condition or 
gender. The feminist reunification seeks the community including all people. It leads to 
participation in the struggle for freedom against patriarchal religions and social systems.     
2) Isasi-Diaz‟ the kin-dom of God‟s community  
Isasi - Diaz asserts that a community is based on solidarity and mutuality and looks 
for justice. Marginalized persons are in the kin-dom of God. This is the major theme of 
her book, Mujerista Theology. Isasi-Diaz uses kin-dom where many English writers 
prefer the words reign of God. To her, the words reign of God have the feeling of 
hierarchy and aristocracy and of elite who control. Therefore, she brings the word kin-
dom which she heard from a Franciscan nun, Sister Georgine Wilson. The use of the 
word kin-dom emphasizes the importance of family and extended family. She 
experienced an insight while reading Matthew 25. The image of kin-dom of God 
describes being hungry, in prison, and naked. The Bible says, ―Whatever you do to one of 
the least of these my brothers and sisters, you have done to me.‖ This reminded her of the 
family of God depicted in Matthew 25 -- and kinship seemed to her to be a better 
expression than the Kingdom of God.
578
  Thus, she says that ―the concept of kingdom in 
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our world today is both hierarchical and elitist which is why I do not use the world reign. 
The word kin-dom makes it clear that when the fullness of God becomes a day to day 
reality in the world at large, we will be sisters and brothers – kin to each other.‖579 Thus, 
the kin-dom brings the whole notion of family dynamics which is more immediate and 
personal than the kingdom. 
―Friendship‖ is an important word in the meaning of kin-dom. Isasi-Diaz says that 
friendship is the path to personhood and the path to the kin-dom of God. Friendship does 
not consider women as commodities and each individual‘s worth is confirmed by deep 
friendship. Thus, one‘s experiences, visions and hopes are considered as an important 
concept in one‘s personhood. Isasi-Diaz says that Hispanic women can participate in the 
kin-dom of God through friendship as the family of God. This can be a positive force 
which will change their world. Therefore, the value of personhood is experienced, 
liberated and saved through friendship.
580
 Diaz defines friendship as ―we are guided and 
motivated in and through your hope for a future in which we can live fully.‖581      
Her vision of kin-dom of God gives an important meaning to the construction of a 
new Korean community. As she mentioned, when people consider each other family and 
friend and kin to each other, the societies‘ problems which produce hierarchy, class, 
discrimination and violence would be erased. The community does not define who is 
subject and who is object and does not force them into special jobs because of their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(University of Manitobai, 2001), 83. 
 
579
 Anselm Kyongsuk Min, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Post Modern Theology after 
Postmodernism (New York: T&T Clark International, 2004), 103. 
580
 Verna Elias, 101. 
 
581
 IsasiAda Maria Isasi-Dias, ―Defining Our Proyecto,‖ Feminist Studies in Religion, Vol.9, No. 1 (1993), 
17. 
 
 262 
 
 
gender or status. Friends do not force their opinion on other friends and they dialogue and 
share their thoughts. For example, women are not considered secondary persons who 
only stay and care for their house. All people are friends in the kin-dom of God so, 
everybody is considered an important being and they could express and develop their 
interests and talents. Also, the hungry were fed, the thirsty were given something to drink 
and the strangers were received in their homes -- in the kin-dom of God. The community 
fulfilled their sister‘s and brother‘s needs. Therefore, there are no super rich and absolute 
poor and all people can experience fullness in their lives. Friendship and being a family 
are important factors in the new Korean community.        
3) Rita Brock‟s Christa / Community  
Brock sees Christology in the perspective of relationship and community because 
Christianity is not Jesus centered but centered in relationships and community as a whole. 
Thus Christianity makes a healing center which is called Christa/Community.
582
  
She describes Christa/Community in relational images in which erotic power is 
evident. She emphasizes that the true Christological revelation of divine power and 
salvific power must live in connectedness. It cannot be revealed in a single individual. 
Therefore, the Christa/Community cannot be described as a patriarchal family structure in 
which broken hearts, crushed selves and “one heroic historical person” is identified as 
Christ. The Christa/Community understands Jesus as “the members of his whole 
community who generate erotic power”583 and he is “the revelatory and redemptive 
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witness of God/dess’s work in history.”584 Jesus is a moderator between God and people 
as well as people and people and people and nature. Therefore, the Christa/Community 
announces the defeat of oppressive powers and reveals the healing power of the human 
heart.
585
 The community rejects all forms of oppression and ruling over by one special 
group or status or gender. Instead of that, the community focuses on Jesus’ work in 
redeeming and healing broken relationships.         
Erotic power is the basic power of the Christ/Community. It heals suffering and 
broken hearts and gives courage to the discouraged person. Thus, it is grounded in 
relational lives and binds broken relationships. Also, it enhances erotic power through 
their connectedness to others.
586
  Furthermore, the erotic power integrates all aspects of 
the self and makes us whole.
587
 
Brock points out that the feminist power is not a ruling power. Instead, it is the 
power of serving others such as Jesus did in his ministry. In serving others, it cannot 
work to fulfill one’s own desire and greed but with self-denial and suppressing the self-
desire. Thus, Brock says that it is the way of extensions of self.
588
 By losing his life, Jesus 
gave life to all people who were suffering and tortured by broken relationships. Serving 
others and denying selfishness is the first step to create community. Thus, as Bernard 
Loomer says, power is extended when we are open and are committed to relationships. In 
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contrast, excluding others from our world is an act to reduce our power and it brings fear 
into our lives. Hierarchical relationships are an example of limiting our relational powers. 
Brock says that “the final source of any power is through mutually internal 
relationships.”589   
Her Christa/Community shows a possible way of the new Korean community. 
The community should defeat the ruling power which creates benefits for certain groups; 
the rich have more benefits, the higher class enjoys their freedom by oppressing the lower 
class, and males go back to depressing women. Thus, the community tries to heal the 
broken relationships and lives by erotic power. The power comes from serving others. 
Rich persons, governors, male, healthy persons have to serve others in economic, 
political and practical ways. Serving other persons is a means to make others successful. 
Jesus did by his dying, through which everyone has life. Serving other persons is not a 
way to gain privileges. Instead, those who serve other persons use their properties, 
talents, and health for others. Thus, they experience a giving up what they have and they 
share, so that many other people enjoy their lives together.              
4) Anselm Min’s Solidarity of Others 
 Min explains the triune of God which makes a community. The Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit make community and share the totality of their own being. Thus, the 
triune of God is “the ultimate theological source of all solidarity.”590 The community is 
recovering the true meaning of the triune of God. He defines it as “the triune God is a 
                                                          
589
 Ibid., 37. 
 
590
 Anselm Min, The Solidarity of Others in A Divided World (New York:T & T Clark International, 2004), 
65. 
 
 265 
 
 
community of three persons each of whom shares the totality of his own being with the 
others while remaining different from them, a primordial solidarity of Others.”591       
 Thus, a triune God is a relational existence and each shares the totality of his own 
being with others. However, each remains different from others. Min defines it as “a 
primordial solidarity of others.” In the triune of God, the Son is the exemplary source of 
all creation, redemption, recreation and the mutual love of the Father and Son. Also, the 
Son constitutes a theological source such as making possible incarnation, Jesus’ life, 
ministry, his death, and resurrection. By his sacrifice, he liberates all creation from 
selfishness and reconciles creation with God and with others in the Son. It leads us to “the 
ultimate divine purpose of creation.”592 
 In the Hebrew Bible, the Holy Spirit functions as the divine power that creates 
and renews all creation and changes personal and national life into a new people.
593
 Thus, 
the Spirit leads us to make a community in which justice and peace reign and lead to the 
liberated life. Also, in the New Testament, the Holy Spirit, ―the Spirit of God‖ can be 
understood in a Trinitarian relation with the name, ―the Spirit of the Jesus‖ (Acts 16:7), 
―the Spirit of Christ‖ (Rome 8:9; 1Pet 1:11), ―the Spirit of the Lord‖ (2 Cor 3:17; Acts 
5:9), ―the Spirit of Jesus Christ‖ (Phil 1:19), and ―the Spirit of his Son‖ (Gal 
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4:6).‖594These show that the works of the Holy Spirit are in relation with Jesus Christ and 
also the function of Jesus Christ in the relation with God, the Father. 
595
  Therefore, the 
Son as ―first –born of all creation‖ (Col1:15) and ―the first-born among many brethren‖ 
(Rome8:29) 
596
 has a mission to overcome division and hostility and to reconcile all 
creation as children of God. 
597
  Leonardo Boff describes it ―The mission of the Spirit 
consists in permanently actualizing the significance of the incarnation as a process 
through which God the Son takes on history with all its changes and makes it holy history, 
the history of the blessed Trinity.‖598          
 The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of relations and solidarity, and thus the Spirit reunites 
all alienated and separated beings. Whenever the Holy Spirit works, there happens 
reconciliation and reunion between woman and man, nation and nation. As the fruit of the 
Spirit is peace and love, it forms all in one in Jesus Christ. Therefore, the Spirit is the 
Spirit of relation and solidarity through which the alienated and separated persons are 
reconnected.
599
  
 Therefore, we have to be a witness to the solidarity of others in the triune of 
God.
600
  Min explains that human identity is not from an individual or particular group; 
―the deepest human identity and destiny are not those that derive from the achievements 
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of an isolated individual or from membership in a particular clan, region, gender, class, 
nation, or even religion, but those derived from being the children of the same Father and 
brothers and sisters in the Son brought together in a solidarity of others by the Holy 
Spirit.‖601 His emphasis on the community is very important because the community is 
not for some specific group and not made by an individual. Therefore, the making of a 
community starts by avoiding the interests or benefits of a special group. It means that 
when someone or some group have certain benefits, other persons or groups have losses. 
Feminist theologians do not ask for women‘s benefits. Instead, they try to find the lost 
parts in their history and their lives. Thus, if we ask for God‘s help so as to give us a 
loving mind and make harmony, the community is possible.   
Humans have the ability to make harmony with those who are similar and 
understand them. However, Min points out that real solidarity is making community with 
different people, strangers and others who are not familiar and furthermore, you might 
dislike. Therefore, we need to extend the solidarity level more universally, profoundly 
and overcome our temporary interests.
602
Then, how can different people live together? 
Min claims that public means can help the way of living together, by instituting policies 
and laws which increase tolerance and exact a penalty for crimes of hate.
603
  Differences 
must be overcome for the common good which has to impact not on a particular group 
but on all groups.
604
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The solidarity of others has a different meaning than solidarity with others. 
Solidarity with others considers others as others and sees them as victims who need my 
help. It is not a horizontal relationship but a hierarchical relationship. Solidarity with 
others considers others as those without privileged perspectives and they are equally 
responsible and all are subjects.
605
 It denies who is giver and who is taker. Min’s 
definition of the solidarity of others provides an important meaning in social action and 
political practice because supporting and helping others who were suppressed and 
alienated is not simply helping them but it is recovering their rights as God’s images. 
Therefore, in making solidarity of others, we need to be careful that it is not helping but 
recovering, giving back what they ought to have. Making community between females 
and males and also between North Koreans and South Koreans implies the principle of 
solidarity of others and with others. Therefore, Min claims that the solidarity of others is 
possible through the recognition that we are all children of God and we are brothers and 
sisters in the Son who brought solidarity to us by the Holy Spirit. 
606
  
  
4.  The Community of Restoration, Love and Forgiveness through the Power of  
Cross  
 How can we form a vibrant Christian community? I will try to explain what kind 
of attitudes and characteristics are needed for the development of a Christian community, 
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using the insights of the many scholars we have just considered. It is also for what the 
Christian Community can do to help bring about reunification.    
1) Broken Hearts have to be Healed 
The division of Korea has made deep wounds in the hearts of men and women of 
both sides of the divide. Many Koreans lost their parents, brothers, sisters and children by 
this separation. Many Koreans also lost their hometowns, their property and their 
livelihood. Many were confronted by new ideologies. Many considered each other 
enemies and some Koreans on both sides had looked for the day when the two sides 
would be unified. South Korea at times has wanted to attack North Korea and North 
Korea wanted to attack South Korea. Too often there seemed to be no room for accepting 
and understanding each other. In the South Korean society, whenever they experienced 
conflict with a northern group, the Northerners were called communists which applied to 
all areas in North Korea, such as politics, education, churches and social movements. 
North Koreans, for their part, tend to call the South Koreans “puppets of the USA.”     
 To make a community, broken hearts have to be healed. For this, the Korean 
churches have to study their broken hearts and see what happened. Only then will they be 
able to accept the heartburns of history. The Korean churches have to understand Korean 
history; why they were divided; what serious consequences have happened because of the 
division; and how the division produced a dictatorship government in South Korea and 
the all-powerful role of the Kim Il- Sung government in North Korea. Korean churches 
need to answer the questions; why did the Korean War happen and why has it caused 
painful experiences on both sides? The Korean churches need to see exactly what 
happened in Korean history and see each other not as enemies but as sisters and brothers 
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who were victims of the Cold War conflict and Capitalism. The Korean churches need to 
realize the pains were not caused by individual sins but by structural sins. Also, in the 
broken relationship between females and males, both have to see what happened to 
women’s lives and how women’s rights have been ignored. The Korean churches also 
need to consider the reason that churches and society allowed and justified the oppression 
of women. What were the fundamental reasons to make the churches and social system, 
the laws and customs in the society?     
2) The Expression of Forgiveness 
When we have truly studied the reality of the Korean problems, the most 
important next step for the healing of broken hearts is express forgiveness. Learning how 
to forgive is only possible if there is a deep feeling of compassion.
607
 Even though our 
hatred for each other was deep and the wall between us was high, it can be opened for a 
peaceful reunification if there is a willingness to forgive. Only when we decide to forgive 
each other, can we begin to understand the other’s difficulties. Forgiveness opens the way 
of understanding. Some might want to continue to argue over the cause of the separation, 
but the past cannot be changed. The major question is: what is the goal of a future 
reunited society? 
608
 
Forgiveness has to happen not only at the individual level but also at the 
community level, if we wish to support the process of healing.
609
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Aware that forgiveness often is misused and trivialized among Christians as a way 
of baiting victims to “forgive” those who have wounded them, I suggest that we 
cannot comprehend the Sacred Power of forgiveness unless we realize that it is, 
above all, a moral foundation of our life together in a community, Forgiveness, to 
be granted and received in a sustainable way, requires not only that individuals 
repent and make amends, but moreover that our communities support the process 
of healing and reconciliation and that all of us seek to build new ways of living 
together.
610
   
 
The broken heart caused by the nation’s division and gender discrimination has to 
be dealt with at the community level and at the national level for forgiveness. In order to 
give and receive forgiveness, there are five issues that we have to consider
611
 ; the first 
one is solidarity. As mentioned, it is the necessary for an individual and community level 
of forgiveness, for the forgiveness, solidarity through community and friendship is 
needed. Separated situations cannot lead to restoration. When communities join in the 
work of forgiveness, it gives power to the struggle for justice and love.  The second is 
compassion. Heyward says that when we join solidarity with forgiveness, we can learn 
compassion; with the understanding of what happened and what were the fundamental 
reasons behind the problem. It makes a way to understand the opponents and leads to 
decisions not to harm one another because they know how the broken relationships were 
painful. Therefore, it leads us to a commitment to heal the pain by forgiveness. The third 
issue is humility; we need to be humble. All people are living on common ground and 
have the same rights. All people are made in the image of God, no matter what their 
color, gender, ethnicity, class, and government might be. The fourth issue is honesty. It is 
the starting point at which we repent of what we have done and also of what others have 
                                                          
610
 Ibid.   
 
611
 Ibid., 161. 
 272 
 
 
done to us. Thus, we need to be honest in facing what has happened in the past. The last 
issue is this: we need to imagine our changed situation in which we have been liberated 
and heralded and transformed. This is what now empowers our actions and decisions. 
Furthermore, Heyward asks that we pray harder and meditate well with these five 
characteristics because the prayer and meditation will guide the direction that we have to 
take and give us power to do the right things.   
Furthermore, learning forgiveness teaches us to learn nonviolence.
612
 Forgiveness 
gives up the desire for revenge. It accepts it as it is and decides not to use violence. 
Nonviolence has to be an important part of reunification in Korea. Because the ultimate 
goal of reunification is to make peace between Korean men and women, it has to be done 
in a nonviolent way.   
3) Restoration is a Reunification not simply of Individuals but also of two Major 
Communities 
Restoration of relationships is also a beginning to heal broken heartedness for the 
community. For this, we need to define the meaning of others in a correct way. In 
capitalistic society, the others are competitors and in patriarchal society, the others are 
those in the measure of who is in under me or above me.  
However, if we define others as sister, brother and friend,  then becoming brothers 
and sisters means that when my sisters and brothers are in need I will fulfill their need 
willingly; when they are in trouble, I will try to solve the problems with all my ability. 
Thus, there is the love that Jesus gave us until he died. However, one-sided charity may 
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be adequate in fulfilling other’s need, but we still have to be careful to practice love. 
When we live in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, we have to figure out the 
difference between charity and solidarity. Helping is not for the giver’s satisfaction and 
pleasure, and also helping is not only what I will give to others. Instead of that, the giver 
has to think what the others need. When they consider others as neighbors (Matthew 25) 
who are sisters and brothers, they can make solidarity.
613
 Furthermore, solidarity can be 
understood in the interconnection between oppressed and privileged, rich and poor and 
the oppressed and the oppressors. Thus, “Solidarity moves away from the false notion of 
disinterest, of doing for others in an altruistic fashion. Instead it is grounded in “common 
responsibilities and interests,” which necessarily arouse shared feelings and lead to joint 
action.”614 Solidarity leads to love relationships in human lives.  
Also, what we have to remember is that solidarity includes “preferential option” 
for the poor and oppressed. Because the oppressed are “pierced by suffering and attracted 
by hope, (we have to), allowed them, in their struggles, to conceive another reality. 
Because the poor suffer the weight of alienation, they can conceive a different project of 
hope and provide dynamism to a new way of organizing human life for all.”615 Also, the 
oppressed feel alienation which limits love and cannot exist in their lives.    
 Isasi-Diaz’ idea is similar to Min’s solidarity of others and “a preferential love” 
for the poor and oppressed people.  Min also stresses the importance of the way of 
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solidarity; supporting and helping others who were suppressed and alienated is not only 
helping them but it is recovering their rights. Also, it has to be a horizontal relationship 
not a hierarchical relationship. As I mentioned above, Min says that the solidarity of 
others considers others as another without a privileged perspective, and they are equally 
responsible, and all are subject.
616
 Solidarity is not interested in who is the giver and who 
is the taker. Both scholars point out that solidarity with the poor and oppressed people has 
to be done in an equal position as sisters and brothers. Also, Min stresses “a preferential 
love” which is God’s love for the poor and oppressed people who need more compassion 
and caring even though God’s love is universal and unrestricted to all, no matter what 
their gender, language, government, religion, culture and class.  
4) “Love” is a Fundamental Element in Building a Community 
Min explains “an excessive love,” “a practical love,” “a political love” and “a self-
transcending love” for a community. “An excessive love” goes beyond an ordinary love 
in your neighborhood and it is a more extended love to reach even to one’s own enemies. 
The love is “a practical love” which cannot remain just in word but is expressed in deed 
in a concrete way. The love is “a political love” which does not remain in the doctrinal 
teaching but struggles for liberation and changes unjust structures.
617
  The last is “a self-
transcending love” which is the love of God through the Son. The Son did not remain in 
his own position as God’s son but he threw away his own privileges and became a human 
being. He loved his people until he died and fulfilled God’s love for all humanity by his 
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suffering and dying on the cross. However, his life did not remain in death and failure but 
he was raised by the Holy Spirit and the way of salvation was open for who suffer the 
burden of sin and mortality.
618
 The love of the Son for the world teaches us that a more 
important fact for building community is serving others and also self-denial. The 
community is made possible by serving others and by self-denial in imitation of the Son. 
As Jesus proclaimed: he came here not to be served but to serve, and the community 
develops when each one serve the other.  We should not to expect to be a ruler over 
someone because of gender, class, age and richness. We should rather ask how I can 
serve someone with my wealth, talents, and ability. Serving other is not fulfilling my 
desire and greed but it is fulfilling other’s need and success. This becomes possible when 
I deny myself and when I love my neighbor as I love myself. However, the important 
thing is that in our service we do not serve only one side, such as the patriarchal order. 
Rather, it is serving each other in an equal way. Moreover, the healthier, the richer, and 
the more knowledgeable persons might be, there is a greater responsibility to serve. To 
having more means to share more.        
 
5. Women becoming Co-Builders of the New Community  
When Jesus started his work, the first work was calling his disciples. He did not 
do his mission alone but he collected the people who joined in God’s work. Moreover, 
one of his first ministries was to call others to participate in creating the community of 
God.
619
 Also, the members of the community were not limited to “the marginal” such as 
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the dispossessed, women and non-Jews. There were women disciples who joined his 
work and were part of the first community. Even though they were not represented as part 
of the 12 disciples of Jesus, they were the basic founders, first witnesses of the 
resurrection and co-founders of the early church community. According to Fiorenza, 
Jewish women were involved in Jesus’ vision and movement; the Jewish women fought 
for justice and created an egalitarian Christian community after Jesus’ death.620 It shows 
that Jesus gathered a discipleship of equals.  
Also, Rita Brock points out that Jesus did not work alone in making any miracles 
in Mark; “He could not do any miracles there, except lay his hands on a few sick people 
and heal them. And he was amazed at their lack of faith. Then Jesus went around 
teaching from village to village. Calling the Twelve to him, he sent them out two by two 
and gave them authority over evil spirits (Matk6:5-7). A more interesting part is that the 
unexpected and new power which was not worked by Jesus alone but by the participation 
of others, such as the Syro-phoenician and hemorrhaging women. They, according to 
Brock, were not allowed in Jesus’ unilateral power but they revealed a new power of 
Jesus by their joining in Jesus’ sole possession of power. It reveals the divine way of 
power by the weak and a “new understanding of power that connects members of the 
community.”621 It shows us how Jesus created his community and how women and 
alienated people were co-builders of his community.    
1) Women are co-leaders in churches 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
620
 Fiorenza, In Memory of Her, 99-104. 
 
621
 Brock, 87. 
 
 277 
 
 
In discussing women’s leadership role in churches, we need to consider these 
questions; what was role of women in the early church? Was the leadership of women 
denied at that time? Churches have to restore the original form of church from the early 
church of Christianity. Before the church became highly institutionalized, women had 
different forms and functions. A most particular form would be women’s leadership. For 
many years, the institutionalized churches did not accept women’s leadership roles in the 
church and this was reinforced by many theologians who built up male centered theology 
and churches. When the women’s ordination issue rose, the Vatican’s 1976 Declaration 
on the Question of Admitting Women to the Priesthood justified the position that the 
Catholic Church cannot accept women’s priesthood because the female body does not 
resemble the male body of Christ.
622
    
Karen Jo Torjesen provides women’s religious leadership in the Jewish and 
Christian community in her book, When Women were Priests.  According to Bermadette 
Brooten and Ross Kraemer’s investigation on funerary epitaphs and dedicatory 
inscriptions, women in Jewish communities had charge of religious offices positions such 
as rulers of the synagogues, elders and priests from the first century B.C.E. to the sixth 
century C.E.
623
 Also, women were deacons, priests, presbyters and even bishops in 
Christian churches from the first century to the thirteenth century. Moreover, women’s 
priesthood was shown through papal letters and inscriptions in the first thousand histories 
of the Catholic Church, 
 
The early churches’ women leadership is shown in many areas 
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such as prophets and teachers. Women’s leadership especially was prominent when they 
gathered in homes during the first and second centuries.
 624
  Also, many literary sources 
such as the writing of the New Testament, letters, sermons and the early church’s 
theological treatises show women’s leadership in the early churches. Among the Christian 
communities, the three cities of the ancient Mediterranean such as Philippi, Corinth, and 
Rome had strong women leadership.
625
   
Also, Torjesen provides evidence of women’s leadership as both bishops and 
priests. A Roman basilica was dedicated to two women saints, Prudentiana and Praxedis 
and also portrayed four female figures. Among the four, three female figures are 
recognizable but the fourth is not. According to lettered inscriptions in the basilica, the 
fourth female figure is named Theodora Episcopa. Her name is important because the 
name means Bishop Theodora; the Latin masculine form of bishop is episcopus and the 
feminine form is episcopa. It means that there were women Bishops. As evidence of a 
women priest, she provides (suggests) the archaeological findings of a burial site on the 
Greek island of Thera. There is a commemorative inscription on a tomb (epitaph) in 
which a woman is named as priest or presbyter (presbyteris). Her name is Epiktas. That is 
a women’s name and she was a priest in the third or fourth century.  
As another example of the early church’s women leadership, Torjesen points out 
Lydia (Acts 16:11-15). Lydia was a householder and merchant with financial 
independence and a wide network. When she decided to convert to Christianity, her 
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whole household which means not only her family but also domestic slaves were 
baptized together. Torjesen points out that it shows her authority in her house and her 
prosperity, such as providing space for Paul’s teaching and lodging (Acts 16:40)626     
Such women had important roles in Jesus’ mission and women were important 
leaders in the early church with a variety of roles.
627
 However, by the time the churches 
became institutionalized in the third century, house churches with diverse leaders started 
to be transformed into the institutional churches ruled by monarchical bishops. The 
institutional church started to define church leadership as male. Also, another reason that 
women lost their leadership role and achievements in early Christianity can be found in 
the process of canonization. The process started in the middle of the second century and 
finished in the early fourth century in which women’s leadership was controversial. 
Finally, it was concluded that they could not include those books which “celebrated 
women’s apostolic activity (Acts of Thecla), containing women’s words (collections of 
oracles of a women prophets), and transmitting women’s teachings (Gospel of Mary).”628 
Those books show women’s leadership and contributions in the early Christian church 
and were used in training religious life for many churches.
629
     
The Christian Church was a marginal sector in the first century to the imperial 
religion of the Roman Empire, Christianity which was reformed into the 
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patriarchalization of the Church. Especially, according to Ruether, as patriarchal 
Christianity became the imperial religion, the Messiah symbol was integrated into 
kingship ideology for installing political power. The kingship ideology applied to the 
political and social hierarchy as a “sacred canopy.”630  Thus, it made the hierarchical 
order, namely, Christ as Logos of God governs the cosmos, the Christian church of the 
Roman emperor governs the political universe, the master governs slave, and men govern 
women. Therefore, women, slaves and barbarians were considered “mindless” ones.631 
Also, the Aristotelian biology in medieval scholasticism provided the anti-women 
ideology in Christology and it further developed into defining that only males are the 
generic sex of the human species, representing the fullness of human nature. In contrast, 
women are defective persons mentally, physically and morally.
632
 Furthermore, in the 
thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas defined women as inferior by nature, with the result 
that women could not be capable leaders. The ideas of Aquinas were influenced by the 
Greek philosopher Aristotle. 
633
   
 Torjesen raises other questions: ―why are we so unaware of the prominence of 
women in the birth of Christianity? Why does this powerful misperception continue to 
marginalize women in even the more enlightened branches of contemporary 
Christianity?‖634 Her questions have to be implied in the South Korean Churches and in 
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women‘s leadership. Therefore, feminist reunification theology asserts that women‘s 
leadership role has to be recovered as found in Jesus‘ own movement and in the 
ministries of the early church.     
2) Women are co-leaders in nations   
                     Park asserts that women have to have important roles in building a new community 
of nations. Thus, she calls women “A Mother of a Nation.” 635 She connects feminist 
movements, women’s equal rights and the reunification movement, and considers all as 
the same system in Korea. According to Park, the male dominant system in Korea is 
connected to the Korean national historical, social problems; the problems of social 
inequality and division of the nation are mixed together as the same fundamental problem 
and are today the biggest problems in Korea. Therefore, Park asserts that disclosing of 
male dominance and male systems is the first step to bring about the new relationship for 
women and men and the new humanity of nations in the world. Also, the reason for 
women dealing with the nation’s problems is that without women dealing with the 
nation’s problems, the nation cannot be liberated from male dominated ideologies. Also, 
male domination can be applied to the issue of reunification; if the process of 
reunification is made by males, the new united Korea cannot avoid another male 
dominated country. 
636
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     Therefore, liberation of women cannot be separated from the nation’s problems. 
They have to be developed together. Class hierarchy and women’s equality have to be 
connected in a process of rebuilding a nation’s community.   
  In the divided situation of the nation, Korea is threatened by inequality in 
relations with the USA and Japan. It is hard for Korea to be free from being subordinate 
to strong countries. Thus, even if the feminist movement focuses on the problem of male 
domination, Korea is in a subordinate situation to strong countries politically, militarily 
and economically. In such a situation, women’s liberation could not be completed. 
Therefore, the women’s equal rights movement and the Korean national division 
problems are in the same system and line.
637
 Thus, liberation of women cannot be 
separated from the nation’s problems and has to be developed in the perspective of 
solving the problems of the nation. The feminist movement cannot be separated from the 
Korean nation’s biggest problems, reunification. This is the reason why we have to 
discuss gender politics and theology as part of Korean reunification.   
  Also, Min defines the Korean national division as an ultimate theological destiny. 
Individuals cannot be separated from the Korean nation and he calls it “the national 
community” in which we are interdependent with each other. The nation is categorized 
by a unity of ethnic origin with its own cultural, political, and linguistic history and it is 
called a nation or community.   As the destiny of an individual Israelite is thoroughly 
intertwined with the Israelite nation, the destiny of the Koreans is not separate from the 
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destiny of the Korean nation.
638
 Therefore, he develops the meaning of ethnic national 
identity; the value of ethnic national identity has to be recognized as the universal human 
community in the Christian perspective.
639
  Thus, Christianity recognizes the nation as 
important in the history of salvation and shows “a preferential, political love for a 
particular nation suffering oppression by another.” 640  Furthermore, Min warns and 
rejects “exclusivistic, imperialistic nationalism.”641  
 Min’s “the national community” and Park’s “a mother of nation” give the reasons 
and challenges why women have to be co-leaders in nations.  Also, Park’s assertion that 
the national identity as the universal human community, “a mother of nation” has 
universal, spiritual identity which presides over the limits of family members and has an 
identity that can lead the nation’s present and future life. Also, “a mother of nation” is a 
total symbol that presents the women who fight and labor in the field of history for a 
nation’s unity and to build the nation’s communities.642      
 Furthermore, The Korean churches have to learn lessons from the German 
reunification. The German reunification did not help the women issues in their 
reunification, basically because the men, including Church men, ran the show. The 
Christian Churches in Korea could pressure the governments to have women at every 
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level of discussion for reunification. Also, this feminist reunification theology has 
implications not only for the North and South Korea reunification but also for the whole 
Christian community.   
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION  
 
In my introduction, I stated that my thesis focused on the process for an eventual 
reunification of North and South Korea. In this process, the Korean leadership, both 
North and South, consider the political, economic, cultural and even religious issues 
which are part and parcel of reunification. My own central position focuses on the 
cultural and religious factors. In my thesis I claim that without involving both the 
perspectives and participation of women in rebuilding Korea, the eventual reunification 
process will be seriously inadequate. Thus, the cultural and religious factors must include 
an equal involvement of women and men.      
My argument for this thesis was mentioned in chapter one. I gave the reasons why 
the feminist perspectives are need in reunification discourse of both North and South 
Korea. We saw in the case of the German reunification, women in an overwhelming way 
experienced a loss of status and economic opportunity after the reunification. Their 
situation provides us with feminist perspective in reunification discourse is needed. The 
reunification of Korea struggles to bring about peace, national autonomy and national 
prosperity. Korean churches, which are in ideological struggle between progressive and 
conservative in the matter of Korea reunification, are also challenged to be part of 
building a feminist reunification theology.  
In chapter two, I examined three representative Protestant reunification 
theologians; Ham Sok-Hon, No Jong-Son and Kim Young-Bock. Their response to the 
situation of a divided Korea was theologically well done. They even defined the division 
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as sinful. They asserted anti-statism and they gave a special place for the minjung and 
their role in the reunification process. Even though the three theologians contributed 
much to the building of a peaceful reunification theology, they also can be called to task 
for some limitations and even omissions. In their reunification theology, there were no 
voices of women and they did not show any concern about women‘s issues. Moreover, 
they did not try to overcome a patriarchal ideology which is so prominent throughout 
Korea. Thus, women‘s pain and cry were not included and women were once again 
alienated from the construction of a reunification theology. 
In chapter three, I investigated in great how the German reunification influenced 
women‘s lives. I proved that both East and West German women suffered because of 
their exclusion from the reunification process. They suffered politically, socially, 
economically and in a family way. Simply put, the situation of German reunification did 
not include the participation of women. Also, with the statistics which I mentioned, I 
raised a major question; what were the gender attitudes behind the eventual 
unemployment rate of women? Culture, politics and religion impacted the number of 
unemployed women after the German reunification. Thus, I claimed that culture and 
religion play a strong role in the politics in human life and therefore religion must be part 
of the reunification of political entities. The dichotomous category of gender considers 
women‘s primary responsibility to be motherhood. Also, the determining political culture 
and family policy institutions which establish women‘s positions and employment rates 
in the society is affected by religion which influences people‘s minds, beliefs, ways of 
life and social systems. 
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The German case study can and should be a warning for the Korean situation. The 
German situation indicates what should not happen to women‘s lives when the process 
reaches its practical situation.  Korean women‘s current peace and reunification 
movements need to be re-investigated because of the information we have regarding 
German women after their reunification. The situation of the German women can assist 
the Korean women today, as they realign their peace and reunification movements. 
            Chapter four started with the statement that religion is a major factor in political 
cultures. Korean culture, both North and South, is strongly Confucian. In many ways, 
Confucianism is not a religion; on the other hand it has throughout Asia a religious 
quality. Confucianism maintain a dominantly male government and male family life, and 
these two issues affect the lives of Korean women in the education of women, in their 
married life, in their work force and in their position within the Korean political life. I 
searched how the Confucianism affected women‘s lives in both North Korea and South 
Korea. I made the observation that North Korea is still deeply influenced by 
Confucianism and this influence is felt strongly by North Korean women. We can find 
that the role and positions of North Korean women have not changed in actual life even 
though North Korea‘s new systems and laws have given major changes to women‘s 
positions and roles.  The ideology of subjection of women to men is still evident, and a 
woman‘s role is still defined as mother and supporter for her husband. Thus, I called the 
North Korean socialism ―Confucian socialism.‖ The ―Confucian socialism‖ is not just 
ideology and system but it is a form of practical religion in the North Korea society. 
In the case of South Korea, even though the status and roles of South Korean 
women have been improved with South Korea‘s economic development, the influence of 
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Confucianism and conservative Christian ideology are still strongly influencing the lives 
of South Korean women. The South Korean government remains dominantly male and 
family life is also male dominated. As I mentioned, South Korea was the economic 
miracle of Asia and hosted the G20 meeting in 2010, but in 2009 women‘s rights had 
ranked 61
st
 among 109 countries according to UNDP. Also, average annual wage of 
women in South Korea is about $16,931 compared to the average wage of men which is 
about $32,668. The average wage of a woman was just a little more than half the wage of 
a man in 2010. Also, the economic development did not bring about an improvement for 
the status of women. Rather, women in the work force gave women a double burden, 
namely as an employee and as a housewife. Without social support and lack of 
recognition by their family members, women are still struggling with their double burden.  
In chapter five, I examined how Korean Christianity influenced Korean women. 
The patriarchal Christianity was mixed with Confucianism in South Korean churches. 
Korean Christianity has indeed contributed to the better awareness of women and their 
participation in society but at the same time, it has reinforced the view that women are in 
a second-rate position status and they have a passive image in church, family and society.  
As we saw above, unequal situations and systems in German society were not 
only political but also, they had a strong religious base. German Christian religion gave 
no support for the establishment of an equalitarian community during and after the 
reunification. North and South Korea are in the initial stages of process for reunification. 
If the Korean reunification process does not include women‘s participation and if the 
religious community does not support women‘s equality, Korea will simply repeat the 
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failures of the German process of reunification, a process that did not improve the lives of 
German women.  
Therefore, I maintain that there is a serious need to reaffirm and develop in an 
even stronger way a feminist reunification theology in order to build an egalitarian 
community. A feminist reunification theology needs to be based on the right 
interpretation of the Bible; otherwise it will not overcome patriarchalism, androcentrism 
and sexism. We need to reject the literal and authoritarian interpretation and search out 
the true meaning of God‘s will for us today. A feminist reunification theology is looking 
to build up a community. The community centers its attention on alienated and oppressed 
persons. As Fiorenza claims, a feminist reunification theology includes the meaning of 
the Basileia of God and is looking for inclusiveness and wholeness in the society. Also, it 
leads to participation in the struggle for freedom against patriarchal religions and social 
systems. In Isasi-Diaz‘s the kin-dom of God‘s community includes a deeply Christian 
friendship as an important issue. Friendship does not consider women as commodities 
and each individual‘s worth is confirmed in and through a deep friendship. Everybody is 
considered important and everyone needs to express and develop his or her interests and 
talents and thus fulfill their sister‘s and brother‘s needs.   Rita Brock‘s erotic power is the 
basic power of the Christ/Community. It heals suffering and broken hearts and gives 
courage to the discouraged persons with its binding broken relationships. Jesus lost his 
life and but his losing gave life to all people who were suffering from broken 
relationships. Serving others and denying selfishness are the first steps to create 
community. Thus, as Min asserts, we need to make a community such as the triune of 
God makes a community. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of relations and solidarity, and 
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thus, the Spirit reunites all alienated and separated beings. Therefore, we have to be 
witness to the solidarity of others in the triune of God.                    
To accomplish this, broken hearts have to be healed and men and women need to 
learn how to express forgiveness of individuals and also at the community level. 
However, the most important thing is love through the power of Cross. Thus, to build up 
an egalitarian community, women have to be a co-builder. Torjesen has provided us with 
the examples of many women in religious leadership as seen in the early church. This 
early church history gives witness to a variety of roles such as deacons, priests, presbyters 
and even bishops within Christian churches from the first century to the thirteenth 
century. Women‘s leadership especially was prominent when they gathered in homes 
during the first and second centuries. Therefore, feminist reunification theology asserts 
that women‘s leadership role has to be recovered and also, women have to be ―a Mother 
of a Nation‖ for their nation‘s future. This is how I constructed my argument for my 
thesis.  
Have I proved my thesis? I believe I have. 
First of all, the three reunification theologians developed in a good way a 
reunification theology, but their theology would be enriched by an incorporation of 
women‘s issues and voices.  
Secondly, by investigating the process of German reunification, I have proved 
that women had lost their status and economic opportunity in the German situation. 
Furthermore, I proved that the unequal situation and systems in society are not only 
political but also there are strong and basic reasons why religion which influence deeply 
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on people‘s mind. Therefore, I challenged the Korean efforts not to repeat the German 
experience. Women‘s participation and women‘s voices need to be major element in and 
through the development of a feminist reunification theology.    
Thirdly, I proved that Confucianism has deeply influenced the lives of Korean 
women. Even though North Korea has guaranteed women‘s right in their constitutions, 
Confucian culture is still working negatively in their lives. North Korea socialism is 
―Confucian socialism.‖ South Korea developed an economic miracle, but women‘s lives 
were and remain under a negative Confucian influence.   
Fourthly, Korean theologians, two major reunifications and the mixture of 
Confucianism with Christianity have not brought about an equal role of women and men. 
With this background, I have showed in chapter five that there are three important ways 
to includes women‘s concern for true reunification. The first is the creation of an 
egalitarian community in work, family, and society. The second is the restoration of 
humanity by healing, love and forgiveness through the power of Cross. The third is the 
need for religion to be reformed in which a woman can be a co-leader in family, church 
and nation since the male and female the female belong to God in one and the same way. 
      
Implications 
 
My implications will follow the structure of my dissertation. 
In chapter II, I examined three great Protestant reunification theologians. As I 
mentioned before, even though they contributed much to the building up of a peaceful 
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reunification theology, there is a lack of concern about women‘s issues in their writings. 
Therefore, an implication of my dissertation is the following: Korean reunification 
theology has to include women‘s voices and deal with women‘s issues at every level of 
the discussion whether the discussion is political, economic, educational, etc. 
Furthermore, patriarchal ideology could easily remain underground in the reunification 
process, if male theologians dominate the reunification process. Moreover, South Korean 
churches and society are in an ideological struggle between procreative and conservative 
models in the reunification matter, so there is need to develop an inclusive reunification 
theology to harmonize churches and society into a unified goal.   
In chapter III, I argued that without the perspective and participation of women in 
the process of reunification, the eventual reunification process would be inadequate, since 
women and minority groups could easily be ignored (see p.119-121). Thus, ―Women 
have to remain aware of what happened to women many times in history and they have to 
be prepared that past mistakes are not repeated.‖ (p.122) Non-repetition of this mistake is 
a major implication of my thesis. 
Also, I pointed out that ―There is no women‘s improvement in the many aspects 
of the Ministry of Unification, the Foreign Affairs Department, and the Defense 
Department. Women senior officials in government are rare, and there are no women 
secretaries. Also, all the representatives of ‗the Six Party Talks‘ were men.‖ (p.126) 
Therefore, there is a strong need to make sure that in the reconstruction process women 
will participate in a decisive way. In order to accomplish this, the new government has to 
save seats for women by law (perhaps up to 50 %), and also the North and South Korean 
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people have to overcome their consideration that these governmental areas are reserved 
only for male participants.  
Furthermore, women need to increase their power in politics, in the military, and 
in the economic spheres as I mentioned: ―Another reason for the lack of women‘s 
participation is the powerlessness of women themselves in politics, the military and 
economic spheres. Even though there are a few professional women in the areas just 
mentioned, it is difficult for them to penetrate the male–dominated fields because there 
are no groups for women‘s empowerment. (p.126)  Another implication is the following: 
contemporary women‘s studies have to include more research on Korea‘s division and 
reunification because the division has to date had a strong influence on women‘s lives. In 
the new Korea, the role of women needs to be more pervasive. Shim asserts that ―One 
problem of women‘s studies is that there has been little to no preparation for the future 
reunified society. Without preparation and participation in the reunification discourse and 
politics, there will be no room for women in the future reunified Korean society.‖ (p.128)  
A further implication is this: feminist perspectives have to be developed to build a 
better society. Feminist perspectives are looking for peaceful coexistence such Park Ye 
Kung describes: ―The way of unification is changing today from an absorbing unification 
to an establishing of peaceful coexistence unification that is based on reconciliation and 
cooperation. Thus, it is time for women‘s roles and perspectives to appear strongly 
through new forms of men-women relationships through the use of dialogue, 
understanding and cooperation.‖ (p.129-130)  
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Through German reunification case studies, we have seen that German women, 
especially East German women, struggled in their employment, child care and positions 
in work places and family during and after the reunification. Therefore, the balancing of 
employment of women and men in a reunified state has to be studied, and the social 
support systems for women have to be more developed in the new Korean society. East 
German women became losers in their new state. To avoid this in the Korean new state, 
there will be an overwhelming need for social support systems to take care of North and 
South Korean women as they adopt a new society.  
An implication which comes from chapter IV of this dissertation is the following. 
There are two categories which have affected women. The first category considers 
women‘s primary responsibility as motherhood.  The second category determines the 
political, cultural and family policy institutions which establish women‘s positions and 
employment rates in the society. Both of these categories are affected by religion to some 
degree. Therefore, religion (by religion I mean Christianity, Confucianism, and 
Buddhism) needs a prophetic and self critical viewpoint. In the reconstruction of Korea, 
these religions will, in various degrees, influence people‘s minds, beliefs, way of life and 
social systems.  
In chapter V, as we saw in the reconstruction of the two Germanies, German 
Christian religion gave little to no support for the establishment of an equalitarian 
community during and after the reunification. Therefore, a feminist reunification 
theology, which focuses strongly on the building up of an egalitarian community, will 
challenge the Koreans who are presently constructing a new system. In the initial stage of 
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this reconstruction, a feminist reunification theology needs to be more publicly 
developed. This is a major implication of my dissertation.      
How can we build an egalitarian community and how can we be reconciled?  
Jeong Yong-Sub‘s interpretation of ‗the Parable of the Lost Son‘ (Luke 15) could be used 
in this matter. The oldest son is angry at his father who welcomes his son back and has a 
feast for him. The oldest son‘s response would be right because he worked harder to build 
up his family but his brother wasted all his property with a past life. It would be a similar 
situation for Koreans who have had painful experiences by the Korean War. They have 
felt han in their hearts and they say ―I cannot forget my han and also forgive it.‖ Many 
Koreans lost their families and properties but now South Korea has created an economic 
miracle in Asia. Nevertheless, how can the South Koreans forget the painful experience 
and can they share their properties with the North Koreans now?  
However, his father has a feast for the youngest one instead of punishing him. The 
father says to his oldest son that your brother lives again even though we thought he 
might be dead and we found him again from the lost. We can see the fundamental 
difference between the two situations and also the fundamental joy in the return of family 
life. Jeong points out that the older brother sees his brother‘s action but the father see his 
son‘s existence itself. This gives us a very important insight. Even though North Koreans 
have suffered major pains and even though the South Koreans lost their properties, the 
question remains: who they are the Koreans? North Koreans are sisters and brothers to 
South Koreans and South Koreans are brothers and sisters to North Koreans. Jeong states 
that while the oldest brother criticizes his younger brother‘s morality, the father is 
considering his son‘s living existence as more important. Jeong understands that this is 
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the key point of Jesus‘ parallel. The fact is that the youngest one‘s past life is not 
important here. Forgiveness starts from forgetting what they did to me. Keeping painful 
experiences in my mind is not useful and furthermore, it makes my life more painful.  
The father‘s love is the key point here. This is the kingdom of God‘s order that all 
Christians follow. If we try to judge somebody only in view of morality, we will fall into 
legalism. In the story, the existential love and action are more powerful for they lead to 
reconciliation. This same view would apply to the reconciliation of two countries. We 
have to focus on our brothers and sisters and their way of living first and we should also 
try to avoid an undue attachment to their morality. We need to learn from the father‘s 
love and practice what forgiveness truly means. As the father has a feast for the youngest 
one and puts a ring on his finger, we South Koreans need to prepare a feast for by our 
North Korean brother and sister who were lost but are – we hope -- now found.  
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